


The University of Chicago  
Libraries







PSYCHOLOGY FOR  
RELIGIOUS WORKERS



# PSYCHOLOGY FOR RELIGIOUS WORKERS

*By*  
LINDSAY DEWAR, B.D.  
CANON OF YORK

*and*

CYRIL E. HUDSON, M.A.  
HON. DIOCESAN CHAPLAIN TO THE BISHOP OF S. ALBANS



NEW YORK  
RAY LONG & RICHARD R. SMITH, INC.  
1932

BV4012  
D5



PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, BY THE  
NATIONAL PROCESS COMPANY, Inc., NEW YORK, N. Y.

## CONTENTS

	PAGE
PREFACE . . . . .	vii
CHAPTER	
I. PRIMARY CONSIDERATIONS	
I. THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD . . . . .	13
II. KNOWLEDGE OF SELF . . . . .	40
II. THE PASTOR	
III. CLERICAL APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY . . . . .	69
IV. SOME CLERICAL FAILINGS . . . . .	91
III. THE FLOCK	
V. INDIVIDUAL TYPES . . . . .	107
ADDITIONAL NOTE . . . . .	132
VI. SIN AND MORAL DISEASE . . . . .	136
IV. PASTORAL METHODS	
VII. INDIVIDUAL TREATMENT . . . . .	159
VIII. PREACHING . . . . .	195
IX. TEACHING . . . . .	218
INDEX . . . . .	235





## PREFACE

THE fundamental conviction underlying this book may be stated simply : it is that the cure of souls is an expert's task, demanding a knowledge, not only of psychology, but of the Church's tradition of moral and ascetical theology. If this *Manual* moves someone more competent than we are to attempt a really exhaustive discussion of the pastoral office from these combined points of view, no one will be better pleased than ourselves. In the meantime, it is hoped that the present work may do something to convince the clergy (especially the younger among them), ordination candidates, and perhaps some others, of the importance of basing their study of modern psychology upon a solid foundation of moral and ascetical theology, and at the same time of translating ancient formulations of these latter sciences into terms of a truly scientific knowledge of the human *psyche* and its processes.

It may possibly be thought that we have accepted too uncritically the doctrines and terminology of a particular school, or at least of one or two closely allied schools ; that, for example, too little account is taken of the classical psychology of Ward at one extreme, or of the Behaviourists' " psychology without a soul " at the other. Our reply to this is simply that a " dynamic " psychology works—in theory and in practice. It works in theory : that is to say, the use of such hypotheses as instinct, sentiment, the unconscious, intra-psychical conflict and repression, provides, in our judgment, a more intelligible account of human behaviour than any other. Such conceptions are admittedly hypotheses : no one has ever touched an instinct or seen the unconscious ; but they are in that respect no different

from the hypothetical conceptions of other sciences. And this type of psychology works in practice : translated into action and conduct, it achieves results. We can testify to the truth of this, not only from personal experience, but from our work in dealing with souls—work which, perhaps it should be said, has not ceased to come our way, though we are now neither of us parish priests.

If, again, any reader should suggest that this book's treatment of sin is vitiated by over-concentration on "abnormal" or "pathological" types of people, we should wish to insist that all sinners are, in a real sense, "abnormal." People are apt to speak of normality as if it were an empirical conception ; as if anyone had ever met a normal man. The fact (obvious to a Christian) is that true normality is found in our Lord alone, and that all others represent so many deflections from the standard. The only strictly "pathological" conditions to which reference is made in the following pages are those quoted by way of illustration from other writers.

It is not without much hesitation and diffidence that we have ventured to include a chapter on "Clerical Failings." It may appear to be Pharisaism in its worst form for those who are themselves clergy to write on such a subject : we hope, nevertheless, that such is not the case. We have dealt with this matter solely because of a desire to bear our personal witness to the great assistance rendered by the searching and impartial light of psychology to those who are striving against temptations to which all who are called to the Ministry of the Church are in a special degree liable. To have withheld this testimony would have been, on our part, not humility but cowardice.

Finally, we would take this opportunity of warning readers of this book that in our treatment of prayer and of the knowledge of God we are not dealing with the heights of mystical experience, which can be scaled only by the few. On the contrary, we confine our attention to the

ordinary routine paths of the spiritual life, wherein all may walk. It is often wrongly supposed, by those who have taken little pains to cultivate the interior life, that it is unreasonable to expect the average layman, or even the average clergyman, to give himself to meditation and mental prayer in any form. It is urged that the majority of persons have no aptitude for this kind of thing, and that it is both idle and unnecessary to encourage them in it. We believe this point of view to be profoundly erroneous, and that, in fact, it amounts to nothing less than a failure to apprehend man's true relation to God. If it be true that "the chief end of man is to glorify God and to enjoy Him for ever," then the whole of man's earthly life should plainly be an act of worship, a preparation for the eternal enjoyment of the Beatific Vision. That is why any view of prayer which would narrowly conceive it as being, in essence, no more than "petitionary," is entirely inadequate. It is due to the prevalence of this view in the Church of England to-day that so many of its members know next to nothing of the art of worship, and are unable to spend even a brief period in private prayer without suffering boredom.

It is doubtless true that the terms in general use, and employed in this book, to denote the various degrees and stages in the life of prayer, are mainly derived from the leaders of the Counter-Reformation. But this must not blind us to the all-important fact that their conception of prayer as contemplation is both primitive and universal in the Christian tradition. As Dr. K. E. Kirk has convincingly shown in his Bampton Lectures, those Reformers who equated prayer with petition "reversed the entire traditional doctrine of the character of Christian prayer."<sup>1</sup> The average man is probably not endowed with mystical gifts: but it is true, nevertheless, that his salvation depends upon his acquisition of the art of seeing Him who is invisible. Whatsoever is less than this cometh of evil, which is "the

<sup>1</sup> *The Vision of God*, p. 429.

brute motive force of fragmentary purpose, disregarding the eternal vision."<sup>2</sup>

We desire to express our thanks to the Editor of the *Pilgrim* for permission to reprint those portions of Chapter VIII which appeared in that journal.

L.D.      C.E.H.

<sup>2</sup> A. N. Whitehead : *Science and the Modern World*, p. 268.

PART I  
PRIMARY CONSIDERATIONS



# PSYCHOLOGY FOR RELIGIOUS WORKERS

## CHAPTER I

### THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD

*Quem nosse vivere*: so the ancient collect, in a well-nigh untranslatable phrase, expresses the final truth of the relation of man to God. Our subject is accordingly vast, and in its various ramifications covers the whole field of theology. For our particular purpose, however, we are concerned with only one aspect of it, namely the psychological. Moreover, there is a further restriction; we are dealing with *pastoral psychology* only, that is, with such psychological principles and methods as may directly assist the pastor in his supreme task of leading men to the knowledge of God. We are not entering upon a treatment of the psychology of religion as a whole.

In an ancient definition, which goes back to S. John of Damascus, and is adopted by S. Thomas Aquinas, prayer is said to be *ascensus mentis in Deum*. Psychologically speaking, it would be difficult to find a more satisfactory definition, avoiding, as it does, all terms which smack of the old "faculty" psychology. The fruit of prayer, on this definition, will evidently be the knowledge of God. Our present task, therefore, resolves itself into a consideration of the various aspects of prayer, thus understood, from the psychological point of view, and in addition, from the point of view of the pastor.



We must begin by pointing out that prayer is an essentially supernatural activity. It is supernatural in a two-fold sense ; it comes from God, and it goes to God. Now psychology can know nothing of this. Psychology is a science, and, as such, of necessity empirical and purely immanent. However high may be the matters of which it treats, it is still of the earth, earthy. The psychologist is often tempted to forget this. He may well be reminded of the recent exploit of the balloonists who succeeded in rising ten miles into the air. By so doing, no doubt, some of the substances which they sought to investigate came to them in a purer form : yet this was only a matter of degree. They were still unable to transcend their earth-bound limitations. Even so, the psychologist may, if he is wise and enlightened, somewhat reduce his limitations, but he can never altogether rise above them. His method is descriptive and not explanatory ; it is natural, and can never comprehend the supernatural.

Nevertheless, the processes to which we give the name of prayer, and by which we rise to the knowledge of God, being states of mind, come within the province of psychology. It is possible for the psychologist to examine them ; and the account which he gives of them may be definitely hostile to the religious point of view. In this event, his thinking will be of the kind described by Dr. Jung as *negative*.<sup>1</sup> Its characteristic mode is expressed in the words, "nothing but," a type of thinking which, as Jung reminds us, is personified by Goethe in the figure of Mephistopheles. This attitude of mind tends to depreciate everything, and to reduce it to its lowest terms.

It is necessary for us briefly to examine the modern psychological attack upon the reality of God at the outset of our enquiry ; and this for two reasons. The first is that the pastor will constantly have to meet it in one form or another in the minds of the more thoughtful members

<sup>1</sup> C. G. Jung : *Psychological Types*, p. 444.

of his flock. The second reason is that, if he does attempt to meet it fairly and squarely, he will find that it serves only to strengthen and to purify their faith; in a word, it will lead to an increase in their knowledge of God.

We may concisely state the hostile point of view with which we are now concerned by saying that it may be summed up in the theory that prayer is *nothing but* auto-suggestion, and that man's belief in God is derived solely from this source. It is a delightfully simple way of disposing of religion; but, if we are wise, we shall probably suspect that it is rather too simple. In fact, it raises many difficulties. In the first place, when we have described a process as being merely "auto-suggestion," we are not really very much wiser. We have certainly not gone far towards explaining it. We have not explained why it is that when a person has a thought in his mind this thought expresses itself in a physical symptom; why, for instance, the thought of sea sickness sometimes produces sea sickness. Conversely, it is also a mystery how it is that the actions of the body influence our thoughts, so that the act of smiling tends to make us pleased, and the act of scowling tends to make us angry in our thoughts. To call these experiences auto-suggestion does not tell us very much.<sup>2</sup>

It would seem that such phenomena as these are due to the fact that at the instinctive level of the mind thought and action are very closely connected; indeed, at this level, thinking and acting almost seem to be two sides of one process. For example, insects presumably think in a rudimentary kind of way when they perform their instinctive and sometimes quite complicated actions. Such thinking seems to be one with what it does. In the higher (i.e., later evolved) mental processes of self-conscious thought, however, no such close correspondence between thought and action exists, as our own experience plainly

<sup>2</sup> The James-Lange theory which identifies emotion with its organic correlate is almost universally rejected.

shows. For when we issue commands to our bodies, some members (e.g., the digestive organs) disobey us at all times, while all members disobey us at some times.<sup>3</sup>

In the experience known as auto-suggestion, however, we find that we can control all our members. The most satisfactory explanation of this is to suppose a return to the lower levels of thought which, though characteristic of the animals, still survive in man. At these levels, thought takes place simply in terms of stimulus and response; action follows almost automatically on the presentation of the stimulus. The formula employed by the practitioner in auto-suggestion provides just such a stimulus. The more mechanically it is applied the better. It may be gabbled, but it must not be the object of self-conscious thought; otherwise the body will not respond. It is as if a man who inhabited a house with a basement, in which were situated the servants' quarters, could get his servants to do what he told them only when he went down into the basement to give his orders; when he remained upstairs, they would take no notice of him. But *how* these things can be nobody has the slightest idea. All that modern psychology does is to exhibit the mystery in another form. It follows, therefore, that to say that prayer is auto-suggestion is at the best to explain the unknown by the equally unknown.

There are, moreover, further difficulties in this position. If it is urged that the believer's faith in God is due to his having auto-suggested himself into it as a result of his words and actions, it is only fair to point out that we must account for the atheist's unbelief in the same way, since *ex hypothesi* both are the result of their respective modes of life. This line of argument is obviously inconclusive. S. Teresa was wiser than this. She said that what concerned her

<sup>3</sup> Some Indian ascetics apparently are able to exercise conscious control over more members of their bodies than most persons are (e.g., they can consciously control the beating of their heart), but, even in their case, there are limits.

chiefly was not whether an experience was objective or subjective so much as whether it was from above or from below.<sup>4</sup> That is shrewd. Prayer is from above; auto-suggestion as such and in itself is from below.

In the parable of the Pharisee and the Publican we are given a picture which should enable us to distinguish between genuine prayer and mere auto-suggestion, which is not prayer. We read that the Pharisee stood and "prayed thus with himself." We then hear him suggesting to himself a list of his virtues. This is an exercise in auto-suggestion and nothing more. It is from below; it does not lift him up to God. It is obviously akin to Coué's famous formula: "Every day and in every way I get better and better." The Publican, however, with his "God be merciful to me, a sinner" was really praying. That was from above; it "justified" him. He was also making use of auto-suggestion, but as mere auto-suggestion it would have been harmful, since it would have served only to depress him, apart from the reality of his contact with God.

We cannot, then, single out the religious man for special censure in the matter of auto-suggestion. All alike are subject to it, and it operates from the first. By the time a child is (say) five years old, he has been influenced by both auto-suggestion and hetero-suggestion for five years. Indeed, he has been subject to it in a far more intense form than normally he ever will be in later life, for he is entirely without the assistance to be derived from the powers of his critical reason. To attempt to get away from auto-suggestion is like trying to run away from our shadow. We may freely admit that auto-suggestion plays its part in the ascent of the mind to God. How else should the mind, while it inhabits the body, rise to God? But when the argument concludes that prayer is *nothing but* auto-suggestion, then we

<sup>4</sup>In the end, the only test of this is: "By their fruits ye shall know them."

are bound to protest against this arrogant assertion. Psychology is certainly not at present in a position to say this, and there is no reason to suppose that it ever will be.

There are, however, some psychologists who seek to press this attack home by claiming to be able to give special reasons to show why belief in God, in particular, is simply the result of auto-suggestion. It is urged that this belief is a clear case of the psychological mechanism known as phantasy. This is the process whereby men spontaneously create fictions of their imagination in order to find a retreat from the harsh facts of existence. Just so, it is urged, did man invent the idea of God in order to find a refuge for his troubled spirit. "Lord, thou hast been our refuge from one generation to another." Such (it is claimed) is the attitude which has led to the rise of religion, and to this specific form of auto-suggestion. It is not necessary for our present purpose that we should enter into a full discussion of all the questions raised in connexion with this claim.<sup>5</sup> It will be sufficient if we point out here a consideration which is usually overlooked in discussions of this point. It is this; the Christian's communion with God is carried out in inseparable connexion with the historic person of Jesus of Nazareth. Christian prayer is different from all other prayer in that it is ultimately a continuation of the life of Christ in His Church. Christian prayer is rooted and grounded in that historic Figure.

<sup>5</sup> Broadly speaking, it takes two forms. (1) The belief in God arises as a "projection" of the child's belief in an earthly father. He postulates the existence of a Heavenly Father in order to satisfy his need for a greater security than he can find amid the changes and chances of the world. (2) Men come to believe in the existence of God as the result not of an individual, but a racial, phantasy. It is asserted that there lies behind the individual unconscious of each person a racial unconscious which recapitulates man's thinking throughout the ages, in much the same way as the growth of his body recapitulates the process of organic evolution. It is to satisfy the needs of this racial, or collective, unconscious that the phantasy of God's existence first arises. The second form of the theory is much more plausible than the first, if it can be shown that there is such a thing as a collective unconscious. But at present it is hardly more than an unfounded speculation. See, for a discussion of this, Balmforth's *Is Christian Experience an Illusion?*

But the essence of that life, from the point of view of psychology, was precisely that it was in no sense based upon phantasy. It was from first to last characterised, as no other life has been, by a steadfast adherence to what Freud has called the reality principle, as contrasted with the pleasure principle, which is the source of phantasy. Christ refused to run away; He refused to deviate by one hair's breadth from the path of truth and reality, although time after time temptations to do so swept upon Him. The result was the Cross of Calvary. He did not seek it as a martyr. It came as the inevitable result of His steadfast setting of His face towards reality. And He told His followers that they must in like manner be prepared for the same fate. In a word, He carried out Himself, and also put before His followers, the ideal of self-sacrificing love. And the result has been wonderful and remarkable beyond all human expectations. Where the Christian ideal has been faithfully followed, as, for instance, in S. Francis, it has produced a life of sublime happiness.

It is, therefore, quite true to say that the Christian ideal is perfectly suited to man's needs. But we must not fail to observe the dangerous ambiguity which lurks in the word "need." As this word is generally used, when it forms part of the charge that is brought against the reality of God, it means the kind of needs which are satisfied by phantasy. These are the needs of the moment, needs which are self-centred and the result of human weakness. Christianity, rightly apprehended, does *not* answer to men's needs in that sense of the term at all. The reverse is the case. Christianity does violence to the desires and dreams of the natural man. The Cross, as the culmination of self-denial, is abhorrent to him. It is as far removed from the realms of phantasy as anything can be. But history has shown, what nobody could ever have expected, that it has nevertheless satisfied the deepest necessities of man's nature. The fact that it has done this, despite its complete

antagonism to man's ready recourse to phantasy in the face of difficulties, is something which psychology is totally unable to explain.

It will, no doubt, be urged by some psychologists as a last line of attack that the Christian doctrine of the Cross has been successful only because it has appealed to that definitely perverted form of mentality known as masochism, in which a man derives pleasure from the endurance of pain. The explanation is not adequate. No fair student would deny that masochistic tendencies have existed in some devotees of the Cross, but it is quite impossible to account for the universal appeal of the ideal of self-sacrificing love in this manner. It must be carefully noticed that there is no trace of such tendencies in Jesus of Nazareth Himself. He did not set out to be a martyr. On the contrary, we know that He shrank from martyrdom. The same has been the case with His saints (apart from some exceptions), who have always recognized that heroics in every shape and form are to be discouraged, since they defeat the true ideal of love and self-denial, and in the end merely minister to human pride. It is impossible to hold that truly Christian love has anything masochistic about it.

We may conclude, then, that psychology cannot legitimately bar the way to God. We have now to see in what ways it can prove of active assistance, by observing what light it throws upon the mental processes by which we come to know God.

The broadest division of these processes is into two types; prayer with words, and prayer without words, or, to use the more usual expressions, vocal prayer and mental prayer.<sup>6</sup> The latter has been well defined as prayer "when the lips move not but the heart speaks to God." What has psychology to say in regard to this distinction? There

<sup>6</sup> This distinction, though not without its difficulties, is a very convenient one. For a brief discussion of these difficulties see W. L. Knox's *Meditation and Mental Prayer*, Ch. I.

is, of course, one large school of psychologists (to which reference has not so far been made), namely the Behaviourists, who would deny its validity altogether. According to these writers, it is impossible for their science to take cognisance of anything but behaviour which they can see. For them, what we call thinking *is* precisely the movement of the lips, even though, as a result of the restraining and repressing influence of civilization, this takes place frequently by means of what they call "concealed musculature." According to this view, therefore, mental prayer is a myth of which the science of psychology can take no account. All thinking, however, on this theory is in the same position. Psychology can know nothing of it. All it can legitimately do is to observe human and animal behaviour and to account for it, as far as it can, in terms of stimulus and response.

We cannot examine this strange view here owing to the exigencies of space. Nor is it necessary that we should, since this has already been done by various writers. We must be content to refer the reader to their works.<sup>7</sup> It was, however, necessary to make such a passing reference in order to complete our treatment of the subject. We can only express our view that we find the Behaviouristic treatment of psychology wholly unconvincing.

Non-Behaviouristic psychology, however, throws a good deal of light on the relation of vocal and mental prayer by revealing the nature of the sub-conscious levels of thought. Those who act on the supposition (as many do) that the only approach to God is by means of vocal prayer, modern psychology shows, from a new angle, to be entirely mistaken. To ignore the sub-conscious approach to God is to ignore the widest path to Him; the path of words,

<sup>7</sup> See especially: W. McDougall, *Outline of Psychology*; J. B. Watson and W. McDougall, *The Battle of Behaviourism: An Exposition and an Exposure* (the report of a debate); *Behaviourism: a Symposium*. See also C. E. Hudson's essay in *The Christian Life*, vol. i, for a summary of the arguments against Behaviourism.



though adequate, is dangerously narrow. It has, indeed, always been recognized by those gifted with insight that words fail to express the highest and the deepest thoughts of the human mind; hence man's recourse to painting, to sculpture, and to music, when words fail him. Moreover, even in cases where words have their rightful place, they are never entirely adequate, and sometimes gravely inadequate. Hobbes spoke no more than the truth when he remarked that words are the counters of wise men, but the money of fools.

Psychology, therefore, in revealing in these last days the truth about all this more fully, has strongly endorsed the Church's faith in what she has been accustomed to call mental prayer. It has also endorsed the teaching of Holy Scripture, which makes it plain that the sphere of the operation of the Holy Spirit quite definitely embraces what we now are accustomed to know as the sub-conscious levels of the mind. The outburst of sub-conscious phenomena on the Day of Pentecost, whatever their precise nature, is sufficient to demonstrate this. But we have in addition the evidence of S. Paul; it seems to be clear from this that the Apostle had discovered the reality of the divine operations in the hidden depths of the personality. "The Spirit also helpeth our infirmity: for we know not how to pray as we ought; but the Spirit himself also maketh intercession for us with groanings which cannot be uttered; and he that searcheth the hearts knoweth what is the mind of the Spirit, because he maketh intercession for the saints, according to the will of God."<sup>8</sup> Such a passage as this (which may perhaps be called the New Testament charter for the practice of mental prayer) has much light thrown upon it by modern psychology.<sup>9</sup>

Mental prayer has gradually, in the course of the Church's

<sup>8</sup> Romans viii, 26, 27.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. also S. Paul's distinction between prayer with the spirit and prayer with the understanding in 1 Cor. xiv.

history, come to be divided into three kinds, commonly known as meditation, the prayer of affection, and the prayer of simplicity. It will be convenient to follow this classification in our present undertaking, especially as it is evident that these three types of prayer have somewhat close affinities with the three main aspects of the mind as studied by psychology to-day. These aspects are cognition, affect, and conation, which have taken the place of the old "faculties," reason, feeling, and will. The significance and importance of the modern classification is that it emphasizes the fact that the mind is one, and that in every mental operation we may detect these three aspects, although sometimes one aspect, and sometimes another, predominates. Our task, accordingly, is to examine man's knowledge of God from the cognitive, the affective, and the conative, points of view respectively.

First, then, we have to consider the cognitive aspect of man's approach to God. That is to say, we have to examine, from the psychological point of view, man's thinking about God, or, as it is commonly called, meditation. As we have said, this does not necessarily involve the use of words. It might perhaps be supposed that, psychologically speaking, thinking about God is not essentially different from thinking about any other subject. This, however, is not quite true. Although psychology cannot tell us anything about the Object of religious meditation, it can throw some light on the well-known fact that many people find it extremely difficult to meditate. In doing this, it performs no mean service.

Everybody who has attempted to meditate knows the particular difficulty which is technically known as "distractions" viz., the constant wandering of the attention from the thought of God, or from the subject in hand. In the case of some individuals, it is so acute that they are tempted to suppose that they are constitutionally incapable

of meditation. Psychology has done a great service to religion in exposing the falsity of such a supposition. It has shown that inattention (where it does not arise from sickness or genuine fatigue) is simply due to lack of interest. As Adler has said, inattention, or wandering of mind, arises because the object of our thought does not fit into what he has called "our behaviour pattern."<sup>10</sup> Consequently, we find it hard to attend to the concerns of God, if *He* does not fit into our behaviour pattern; or, in other words, because we do not order our lives according to the pattern shown us in the human and yet divine life of Jesus Christ. In the technical language of ascetical writers, we are not "recollected." A person who is recollected is one who never allows God to depart altogether out of his thoughts, in the sense that God lies behind all his purposes as the guiding and directing force. There is any number of analogies of this. For example, the man who sets out to make a fortune is not all the time consciously thinking of money; if he were, he would obviously fail to achieve his object. Nevertheless, the aim of money-making is never absent from his mind. In Adler's phrase, money-making is his behaviour pattern. So, for a Christian, the life and mind of Christ should provide a behaviour pattern. Where this is the case, meditation is not really difficult.

Psychology, however, can render us still further assistance in this matter of meditation; it can show us why it is so difficult for us to take God for our behaviour pattern. This difficulty is due to the egocentric origin of all our thinking. Every child is at first the centre of its own universe. It is of quite first rate importance to grasp this truth. A striking illustration of it is given in M. Allier's book, *The Mind of the Savage*. He cites the instance of a certain Mme. Rusillon, who asked one of her pupils<sup>11</sup> the

<sup>10</sup> A. Adler: *Understanding Human Nature*, p. 94.

<sup>11</sup> The age of the child is not given.

following simple question in arithmetic: "I write down seven and take away four, what remains?" The child did not answer. The mistress continued: "I gave you seven francs; you gave me back four, how much do you still owe me?" The child was still unable to answer. The mistress asked: "You gave me seven francs, I gave you back four, how much do I still owe you?" The child replied immediately, "Three."<sup>12</sup> This instance shows the force of the self-centred interest.

When any of us began to think it was always strictly from our own self-centred point of view. M. Piaget has shown<sup>13</sup> that the very small child makes no attempt to understand anybody's point of view but his own. He is the centre of his own universe, and thinks the thoughts that please him regardless of logic and truth. For example, if the child of four or five years is shown two boxes of the same size and appearance and is asked which is the heavier, he will touch one of them and say, "This one," without making any attempt to weigh them or otherwise to verify his opinion. Later on, the necessity for considering the logic of facts arises (notice the significance of the adjectives which we apply to facts—hard facts, stern facts, cold facts, stubborn facts, brute facts, and so forth) by reason of the need of co-ordinating his experience with that of other people. But it is not easy for him thus to readjust himself. In many cases, he never does make any adjustment that can be called satisfactory. He continues to be dominated by his own ideas. Thus is born crankiness, and prejudice in all its forms.

If it is thus difficult to give due recognition to "the other fellow's point of view," it is evident that it is still harder to realize God's point of view, or even to desire to do so. For God's point of view is all embracing, and makes far

<sup>12</sup> R. Allier: *The Mind of the Savage*, p. 240.

<sup>13</sup> See J. Piaget: *The Language and Thought of the Child*, and *Judgment and Reasoning in the Child*.

greater demands upon us than that of any fellow human being. In fact, it involves the complete abandonment of infantile self-centredness in all its aspects. The replacement of the self-centred by the divine standpoint has been well described as the Copernican revolution in the soul. Just as astronomical science could make no further progress until the old geocentric view had given place to the heliocentric, so we may say that spiritual progress cannot come until we have ceased to be egocentric, and become theocentric. It is owing to the fact that in so many of us this revolution has not yet occurred that we find it desperately hard to meditate. "Where your treasure is, there will your heart (*sc.* mind) be also." Our Lord was expressing the truth we have been considering when He uttered this saying.

We may well be grateful to psychology for thus revealing to us this truth from a fresh angle. It should encourage the priest who finds meditation difficult to persevere more than ever; for it is surely somewhat of a scandal if this revolution has not taken place in one who is the Lord's minister. It is only by steadfastly persevering that he can hope to save either himself or his flock. He must constantly remind both himself and them that all attempts to meditate, however interrupted they may be by wandering thoughts, are by no means wasted. Not only do they in fact bring us into touch with God, but they also serve to make us realize our weakness and self-centredness, and so to keep us alive to our need for constant re-conversion. If we accept these distractions humbly, and offer them to God, they will bring us great blessings. We need to emphasize most strongly in all our teaching about prayer the great spiritual value of what may seem to be the most hopelessly bad prayers.

The various systems of meditation—Ignatian, Franciscan, Carmelite, Salesian, Liguorian, Oratorian and the rest—are simply carefully thought out schemes to assist the mind

to attend to the things of God.<sup>14</sup> In themselves they have no virtue ; they are solely means to this end. But whether we adopt one of these, or some other, there are certain considerations which psychology brings before us in connexion with the method of meditation which are worth bearing in mind.

First, we should remember that individuals differ very much in the matter of imagery. Psychologists are in disagreement concerning some of the problems of imagery, but they are at one in recognizing the following types : visual, auditory, verbal, kinaesthetic, olfactory. Some persons are very strong indeed in respect of one of these varieties of imagery, and very weak in others. For example, some are capable of forming but feeble mental pictures, while others have such a power of vivid picturing that they may even be tempted to mistake their imaginations for reality. Others, again, are possessed of striking powers of "hearing" imagery, insomuch that, having heard a piece of music once, they can sit down and play it through without a mistake. Others, yet again, think primarily by means of words. Others reproduce in their minds the movements associated with the objects of their thought ; psychologists say that such persons make use of "kinaesthetic" imagery. Very few persons are predominantly olfactory. The power of discriminating between smells is one which for the most part has atrophied in man, though here and there individuals occur who are possessed of it in a striking degree. Thus the French novelist, Zola, is said to have known every town he had ever visited by its smell.

All this has an important bearing upon the technique of meditation. For example, in the Ignatian method (which, perhaps unfortunately, is the one most commonly recommended to beginners) an important place is given

<sup>14</sup> For a valuable account of the various systems of meditation see Bede Frost : *The Art of Mental Prayer*.

to forming a mental picture of the scene. For a person of the "visile" type, this method is helpful. For one who is not, it is a grievous trial. How many people, devoid of the power of visual imagery, must have suffered torments in attempting to carry out the Ignatian method! Each person, therefore, should, by means of introspection, and by comparing notes with others, discover which kind of imagery comes most easily to him, and make use primarily of that variety in his meditation.

Secondly, psychology has revealed anew the significance of the ancient warning, given to those who are trying to meditate, that, when their thoughts wander, they should be careful to bring them back *gently*. We now know that this is due to the psychological principle known as the Law of Reversed Effort. According to this Law, as formulated by its discoverer, Emile Coué, when the imagination and the will are in conflict, the imagination always wins. This form of the Law has not escaped criticism, since it is plainly a very incomplete act of will which is thus defeated.<sup>15</sup> But, whatever be the precise form in which it is stated, this Law exemplifies the highly important truth (to which reference has already been made) that the sub-conscious levels of the mind cannot be directly controlled by conscious effort.

We have seen that the reason for this appears to be that thoughts at this level arise from those springs of action which we are accustomed to call instincts. These can be controlled only by the presentation of the appropriate stimulus. Consequently we are able to order the unruly thoughts of our hearts best in such circumstances, not by peremptorily commanding our instincts to obey us,<sup>16</sup> but by tactfully leading them in the desired direction by means of suitable forms of words. The technical name for

<sup>15</sup> Baudouin's formulation of the Law is more satisfactory. See his *Suggestion and Auto-Suggestion*, p. 116.

<sup>16</sup> Which they will never do; hence, ultimately, our need of a Saviour.

these is "acts"—of faith, hope, love, and the like—whereby we can see that the wisdom of the Church has led her by a sure intuition to divine the secrets of modern psychology.

A difficulty is sometimes expressed, and perhaps still more often felt, in connexion with such "acts," that they are intellectually dishonest. Thus one modern theologian has recently said that he does not propose to play ducks and drakes with his intellect in this manner. For instance, let us suppose the case of a man who is beset by doubts as to the existence of God. It will be urged by some that it is intellectually dishonest for such a person to make acts of faith, in order to meet the situation, for he is thereby pretending to have faith, which *ex hypothesi* is what he has not got. This objection, however, is really based on a misunderstanding. It fails to take account of the facts of the case. First, it overlooks the affective element in all thought. It assumes that a state of intellectual assent (or dissent) can exist in isolation from any affect or desire. Such is not the case. If, therefore, a person desires to make an act of faith, he already is in possession of some measure of faith, and is not to be regarded as dishonest. It is a case of: "You would not have sought me had you not already found me."

Secondly, the objection we are considering overlooks the fact that in regard to the fundamental issues of life neutrality is impossible. On occasion, at least, everybody is compelled to act as if he did (or did not) believe in God. If, therefore, a person is in a state of genuine doubt, it is no more dishonest for him to act as if he believed (in the case we are considering, to make acts of faith) than it is for him to act as if he disbelieved.

There is a third point to be noticed. The evidence of our experience is that belief is reached only through action. To refrain from action, therefore, is to preclude the possibility of belief. It is to adopt the absurd standpoint of



the man who asserts that he will never enter the water until he knows how to swim. Everything, therefore, ultimately depends upon what James called "the will to believe." Faith, from this point of view, is essentially the resolution "to stand or fall by the noblest hypothesis."

"What think ye of Christ, friend, when all's done and said,  
Like you this Christianity or not?  
It may be false, but will you wish it true?  
Has it your vote to be so, if it can?"

This brings us to the final observation which we wish to make in connexion with the psychology of meditation. Everybody who has even casually read a book of instruction on meditation is aware that great stress is laid upon the fact that every meditation should issue in some practical result, usually to be formulated in some definite "resolution." Apart from this, as one writer has put it, the continual marshalling of our "considerations" in meditation is as futile as would be the everlasting drilling of soldiers on the parade ground without the possibility of their being able to use their skill in war. Psychology can give us some guidance in connexion with this practical outcome of meditation. The majority of psychologists agree with Aristotle that thinking, as such, achieves nothing.<sup>17</sup> If thoughts are to influence action they must arise in connexion with the springs of action, namely the instincts, and the sentiments which are built upon them. It follows, therefore, that if, as a result of continual meditation, the instinctive forces of the soul are more and more directed to Christ, the kind of conduct desired will *inevitably* follow. Let this be a consolation to those who find a difficulty in framing appropriate resolutions with which to conclude their meditations. Moreover, it should also console them to remember that since the appeal is ultimately to the instinctive forces of the soul, *any* good action per-

<sup>17</sup> διάνοια δ' αὐτῇ οὐθὲν κινεῖ.—*Ethics* 1139a.

formed with the right intention will lead to the desired end. Here it is important to bear in mind that the saying of words is a physical action—and the remaining on one's knees.

It is, indeed, from this point of view that the best understanding of the nature of vocal prayer can be obtained. Thus S. Thomas Aquinas teaches that the purpose of vocal prayer is not only to lift up the mind and the affections to God, but also to fulfil the duty which is incumbent upon every man to serve God with his *body*.<sup>18</sup> He quotes in support of this view the passage in Hosea where the prophet says that we offer to God "the calves of our lips." Consequently, although the mind may wander from the words that are spoken, we may not say that the prayer is vain. In some cases it will wander just because (as we have already said) words are never entirely adequate vehicles of thought. It will then ascend to God without the ladder of words.

The essential point about vocal prayer from the point of view of psychology, however, is that it is the instrument by which our desires are lifted up to God. This is specifically stated by S. Thomas (following S. Augustine) to be the primary purpose of vocal prayer.<sup>19</sup> This is not only good theology, but also sound psychology. That it is good theology a little reflection will soon show. Clearly, we do not put our prayers into words in order to inform God, since He already knows the secrets of our hearts. Nor, on the other hand, do we make use of words in our prayers merely in order to express our desires, for we know only too well how sadly they fail to do this. In the end, we attempt to put our desires into words in order to inflame those desires. Although it is true that

"We cannot kindle when we will  
The fire which in the heart resides"

<sup>18</sup> *Summa Theologica* IIa IIae, Q.83, Art. 12.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*

experience abundantly shows that by putting into words such desires for God as we have, or rather, by attempting to do so, we often fan them into flame. Vocal prayer is indispensable just because it does this, and for no other reason. Hence it is that the recognized remedy for dryness in mental prayer is to have recourse to vocal prayer, said aloud, if possible. Hence also the importance of the injunctions to the clergy that, in the private recitation of the Divine Office, they should at least form the words with their lips, if they do not say it aloud. If it were never necessary for us "to teach our faint desires to rise," we should be able, if we chose, to dispense with vocal prayer altogether.<sup>20</sup>

This is, of course, an instance of a psychological common-place, namely, that by expressing a desire we tend to increase it. If we say that it is a case of auto-suggestion, we do not err, but we shall not on that account be foolish enough to suppose that we have explained prayer away.

We turn next to the consideration of the affective aspect of our knowledge of God. In the older writers, such as S. John of the Cross and S. Francis of Sales, the prayer of affection is included in meditation. The actual name "affective prayer" does not seem to have been used until 1616.<sup>21</sup> The distinction, however, is a useful one, and is likely to be retained by ascetical writers, since it is a very common experience to find that after some perseverance in meditation the "considerations" tend to diminish,

<sup>20</sup> It may be objected that our Lord said nothing in His recorded teaching about "mental prayer." We must, however, remind ourselves not only of the fragmentary nature of the Gospel record, but also that, in any case, it is professedly only an account of "the *beginning* of the Gospel of Jesus Christ." Moreover, it seems certain that our Lord was in the habit of spending long hours in private prayer. "The idea of the Vision dominates both our Lord's teaching, and the synoptic presentation of His life," writes Dr. K. E. Kirk in this connexion. "Ideas are not conveyed by words alone; emphasis often seems to express them even better than direct enunciation." K. E. Kirk: *op. cit.*, p. 94.

<sup>21</sup> See R. P. Poulain: *The Graces of Interior Prayer*, p. 10.

their place being taken by spontaneous "acts" of affection and praise, sometimes of a strongly emotional nature.

Psychology affords us much assistance in rightly appreciating the significance and value of this kind of prayer. If we bear in mind the threefold division of mental processes into cognition, feeling-tone (or affect) and conation, we can see the situation in its right perspective at a single glance. Affective prayer forms only a third part of the soul's approach to God. It is a matter of real importance for the pastor to realize this, and to help his people to do so; for, as every priest knows, in the minds of many, "feeling"<sup>22</sup> is the supreme value in religion. They suppose that if they do not "feel" close to God when they pray, there is something amiss, and that they are not getting to God. If they do not "enjoy" their private prayers or their churchgoing, they give them up. When they are asked the reason why, they usually say that it is because they did not get any good from them. If they are pressed as to what they mean by "good" in this connexion, it always turns out that they mean "pleasure." Affect is their supreme value in spiritual as in other matters, and it appears to constitute the whole substance of their religion. If, however, we regard this question in its psychological setting, we can see at once how misguided is such a view.

But psychology not only reveals to us the place and proportion of affect in the soul's approach to God: it also explains to us the reason why it looms so much larger than it ought to do in the average person's mind. The cause of this is to be found in the fact that it is the most prominent element in the life of the newly born child. The infant has no power of critical reason, and its conation is vague, but from the first its experience of pleasure and its opposite is

<sup>22</sup> This highly ambiguous word is avoided by psychologists as far as possible. The term "affect" is employed to denote the second, and emotional, aspect of the mind. Pleasure and its opposite, unpleasure (*cp.* the German *Unlust*), are its most fundamental forms. See J. Ward: *Psychological Principles*, p. 41.

vivid. In a sense, it has as intimate a knowledge of them as the wisest philosopher. If anybody doubts this, let him perform the simple experiment of sticking a pin into each of them. They will both react in precisely the same manner, the only apparent difference being that the philosopher in his response to the stimulus will display a greater command of language than the baby. The real difference between the two cases is that the life of the baby at first consists entirely, or almost entirely, of affective experience, whereas in the instance of the philosopher the other two elements are ranged on more or less equal terms alongside of it.

Let us examine this point a little more closely, for it has an important bearing upon the spiritual life. The business of the infant, at first, is to feed itself, and in so doing it evidently experiences very pleasurable affect. If, however, it is well brought up, in course of time it will be weaned, not only from its mother's breast, but also from all for which that stands psychologically. In other words, it will gradually learn that there are other activities in life besides self-gratification and selfish enjoyment. It will learn not to regard its mother, or other persons in general, as existing simply to gratify its desires. This affective training of the child should take place side by side with that opening up of its mind to see the "other fellow's point of view" to which reference has already been made. Unless this is the case, the child, from the psychological point of view, will never grow up, although it may have the body of a giant, and the brain capacity of a Plato. It will still be essentially in the baby stage, imagining unconsciously, if not consciously, that everything exists in order to gratify its desires. Under such circumstances one might almost say that it looks upon the world as one enormous sweet to be sucked. There are many adults who adopt this attitude to life. Needless to say, they find it full of bitter disappointment, for, whatever it may be, it certainly is not this. It is this state of mind which gives rise to the widespread delusion that

the essence of true religion is pleasurable enjoyment, and which leads to religious "phantasy."

Psychology thus puts before us in a new light the age-long teaching of the saints that we should not pay too much attention to the presence or absence of pleasurable affect in prayer. We can see their wisdom in pointing out the spiritual danger attached to "enjoyment" in religion.<sup>23</sup> Obviously, until a person ceases to be dependent upon such enjoyment, he remains in the baby stage, and further progress for him will be impossible. Consequently, the saints are plainly right in insisting that when prayer is "dry" and devoid of all pleasurable affect, it is, from the spiritual point of view, most profitable; for it delivers us from self and leads us to God. As S. Francis of Sales most aptly said, prayers when they are dry smell sweetest to God, just as rose leaves do to us. Clearly, therefore, perseverance in prayer, in spite of the absence of pleasurable emotion, reveals and fosters an unselfish motive in the worshipper; he perseveres solely for the glory of God. For, obviously, he does not pray simply for the pleasure to be got out of it. Therefore it is that, when some little spiritual progress has been made, God withdraws the sense of uplift, in order to test the soul. When more progress has been made, He may give it back again in "the prayer of affection."

It is most important for the pastor to have a firm grasp of these principles, for it can hardly be doubted that multitudes fall away from regular prayer, and from the sacraments, because they are ignorant of them. It ought to be possible to teach this amount of psychology, at least, to confirmation candidates, warning them against attaching too much importance to spiritual "uplift." It should be impressed upon them that religion is a matter of good wills rather than of good thrills.

<sup>23</sup> For the literature on this subject reference may be made to K. E. Kirk's note entitled *Panbedonism*. *Op. cit.* pp. 489-491.

These principles are well illustrated by the famous passage in which the prophet sets down what we may perhaps be allowed to call the first law of spiritual motion. "They that wait upon the Lord shall renew their strength; they shall mount up with wings as eagles; they shall run and not be weary; they shall walk and not faint."<sup>24</sup> First comes the sense of "uplift"; it is given to encourage the new disciple. "Nuts and apples for children," even so emotional a person as Luther called it. Next comes the stage when we are still filled with enough zest to *run* the race that is set before us. But sooner or later we are compelled to drop down to walking pace; yet, if it is a walk with God, it shall suffice.

The third and final aspect from which the psychologist views man's knowledge of God is the conative. Conation takes various forms. It may exist as a mere craving for some undefined goal, or as a fully conscious desire, or as a conflict of desires. When we are actively engaged in working towards a goal, this conative experience is complicated by the kinaesthetic sensory qualities set up by muscular strains, insomuch that some writers have gone so far as to assert that conation consists solely of them.<sup>25</sup> All the sub-conscious and unconscious processes of physical growth belong to this category. These do not concern us now. We are deeply concerned, however, with the sub-conscious striving which forms the background of our mental life. This is of vital significance in man's approach to, and knowledge of, God. As we have already noticed, there is reason to believe that the Holy Spirit works in the depths of our being.

The conative aspect of the mind is clearly in one sense the most fundamental of all. For the mind cannot cease to strive until it has achieved the goal of knowledge. In

<sup>24</sup> Isa. xl, 31.

<sup>25</sup> For a criticism of this view see W. McDougall: *Outline of Psychology*, pp. 318 ff.

relation to God this fulfilment is the Beatific Vision, which is admittedly denied to man here below. Nevertheless, even on earth he may temporarily attain to a state of mind wherein striving to a large extent ceases ; this is frequently known as contemplation. This term, however, is so ambiguous that it has become general to adopt the phrase, first coined by Bossuet, "the Prayer of Simplicity," to denote that state of mind wherein an immediate and comparatively effortless apprehension of the things of God is reached.

In the prayer of simplicity, therefore, we have the culmination of the process by which man rises to the knowledge of God. It is not to be confused with mystical states, which are reserved only for the few, but it is an act of sustained intuition by which the ordinary man can, if he perseveres, at length gain an immediate apprehension of spiritual truth. His whole personality, in its three aspects of cognition, affection, and conation, is thereby turned to God. Fr. Poulain illustrates this by drawing an analogy with the man of science. As the result of prolonged study, the scientist becomes intimately conversant with the subject matter of his science. Consequently, he is able to take in at a glance a multitude of facts, and by an act of intuition to observe their inter-relation. In some such way as this does a man behold spiritual truth in the prayer of simplicity. Moreover, just as the scientist can at times meditate upon his beloved science without a conscious sense of effort at all, even so does the devout worshipper fix his mind upon God in the prayer of simplicity.<sup>26</sup>

<sup>26</sup> It is important to grasp firmly the cognitive significance of the prayer of simplicity, for the question has been rather seriously confused by a recent writer. Dr. Grensted in his Bampton Lectures has said that "vocal prayer . . . is the highest prayer of all" (*Psychology and God*, p. 89), apparently on the ground that mental prayer reduces the worshipper more or less to the level of a hypnotic patient, or at least to that of childishness. His account suggests, however, that he is not quite clear in his own mind on the question. He not only uses somewhat loosely the terms "contemplation," "prayer of union," and "mysticism," but he fails to distinguish between the prayer of



Dr. Thouless has suggested<sup>27</sup> that the prayer of simplicity is, from the psychological point of view, identical with what M. Baudouin has called the *state of contention*, which he defines as "a psychological equivalent of attention, minus effort."<sup>28</sup> In this mental state, the conscious attention is held by some object, or by some act (such as the repetition of a formula), in such a way that there arises what he calls an "out-cropping of the sub-conscious"; that is to say, ideas flow freely from the lower levels of the mind. It is, in fact, a case of auto-hypnosis.

The identification of this state with the prayer of simplicity should not be accepted without qualification. In reality, a more exact parallel to the state of contention is provided by the mental condition accompanying the use of the rosary. The prayer of simplicity, on the other hand, should be clearly distinguished from it for two important reasons. In the first place, the essence of the state of contention is the complete absence of effort. As we have seen, it is a condition of auto-hypnosis. The intellectual content of the mind in this state is irrelevant. It may be merely a state of reverie or "wool-gathering." The prayer of simplicity, on the other hand, is primarily an act of intuition. *The really significant thing about it is the intellectual insight which it brings*, rather than the absence of any effort to attend. Indeed, probably in the majority of cases a greater or lesser degree of effort *is* here required to hold the attention.

Secondly, the identification referred to is apt to lead to the overlooking of a factor of supreme importance, namely the operation of the Holy Spirit. Doubtless, descriptive

---

simplicity and quietism. This is somewhat unfortunate, and it is not surprising that he is in consequence not attracted by mental prayer. The only way to gain a right understanding of the prayer of simplicity is to see it as the culmination of cognition.

<sup>27</sup> R. H. Thouless: *An Introduction to the Psychology of Religion*, p. 180.

<sup>28</sup> C. Baudouin: *op. cit.* p. 142.

psychology, as such, can take no account of this, but care must be taken by psychologists not to beg the question here. For the religious man, the prayer of simplicity (or acquired contemplation, as it is sometimes called) is *toto coelo* different from auto-hypnosis, and from an infantile condition of mind. For him, it is never a state of auto-hypnosis. It might more truthfully be called theo-hypnosis, but even this expression would be misleading. For, in fact, the surrender of the *psyche* to the divine influence and illumination does not reduce it to the level of a hypnotic patient. If this were so, then religion would predispose men to dissociation and nervous instability. The reverse is the case. The attitude of mind which earnestly seeks to know God, and which culminates in the prayer of simplicity, so far from leading to dissociation, tends to a deeper unification of personality. By obeying God we become more truly free. By surrendering ourselves to His gracious influence we achieve our highest individuality. To continue the quotation with which this chapter began, *cui servire est regnare*.

## CHAPTER II

### KNOWLEDGE OF SELF

To the minds of many introspection is morbid. "I never try," said Forbes Robinson, for example, "to classify and enter into details about my sins. I bring the whole contradictory, weary, and unintelligible mass of them to God, and leave them with Him."<sup>1</sup> But there is overwhelming authority to support the belief in the value and necessity of true self-knowledge. We may take a few instances from widely different varieties of persons. Coleridge says: "There is one knowledge which it is every man's interest and duty to acquire, namely self-knowledge, or to what end was man, of all animals, endowed by the Creator with the faculty of self-consciousness?"<sup>2</sup> So S. Teresa says: "The knowledge of our sins, and of our own selves, is the bread which we have to eat with all the meats, however delicate they may be, in the way of prayer; without this bread, life cannot be sustained, though it must be taken by measure."<sup>3</sup> Again, Jeremy Taylor concisely says: "He that does not frequently search his conscience is a house without a window."<sup>4</sup> It is this truth of the need of self-knowledge which was the chief burden of the teaching of Socrates. Before a man can rightly carry out the chief business of life, which is the "tendance of the soul," he held that it is necessary for him to know himself.

<sup>1</sup> Forbes Robinson: *Letters to His Friends*, p. 133.

<sup>2</sup> *Aids to Reflection*, Author's Preface.

<sup>3</sup> *Autobiography*, xiii, 23.

<sup>4</sup> *Holy Dying*, Chap. ii, Section 2.

The prejudice against self-knowledge is, in fact, based on a confusion of thought. To be "introspective" is not necessarily to know oneself. The introspective person (in the popular sense of the phrase) is interested in himself, even passionately interested, but he does not on that account know himself. Indeed, the more interested he is in himself the less likely is he to know himself. In order to know ourselves we must look outwards as well as inwards; we must, in fact, learn to view ourselves objectively, and to see ourselves as others see us. The introspective, introverted type of person, on the contrary, stands in his own light. Dr. William Brown points out how introverts frequently use that very expression and say that they seem to be "standing in their own light."<sup>5</sup>

Further, the issue is often still further confused because we fail to recognize that the art of self-knowledge is, as such, not an endeavour either to accuse or to excuse ourselves, so much as an attempt to get at the truth about ourselves, regardless of praise or blame. The ordinary idea of "self-examination" is, in fact, inclined to be somewhat misleading. The aim of the art of self-knowledge is to know ourselves *as we are* rather than to remember precisely past misdeeds. No doubt, it is all to the good to call these to mind, but the truth is that we necessarily tend to forget them. Nietzsche expressed this very forcibly when he said: "'I have done that,' says my memory; 'I cannot have done that,' says my pride, and remains inexorable. Finally my memory yields."

The art of self-knowledge confers four great benefits upon us. In the first place, if we acquire it, we learn to recognize bad tendencies in ourselves early, and so are enabled to nip them in the bud. Even powerful tendencies can be thus controlled, as McDougall points out when he reminds us of the capacity we have of stifling laughter when we are tempted to indulge in it on some solemn occasion.

<sup>5</sup> *Science and Personality*, p. 85.

Secondly, self-knowledge is the road to the sympathetic understanding of other people, and to their understanding of us. It enables us to put ourselves, to some extent at least, "in their place." On the other hand, if our characters are distorted and tangled, so that we do not know ourselves, we can hardly be surprised if we are misunderstood by others. We must surely know and understand ourselves, if we wish others to understand us.

Thirdly, ignorance of self is the cause of nervous breakdown, which is, so far as we know at present, invariably the result of repression, the name psychologists give to the "resistance" against recalling to mind what is painful.<sup>6</sup> This is what makes it so hard for us to admit the truth even to ourselves, when it is of an unpleasant nature. Hence the extraordinary capacity of human nature for self-deception. One is reminded of the story of the American in the Zoological Gardens in London, where for the first time in his life he saw a giraffe. "Help!", he exclaimed, "there ain't such an animal." It is fatally easy for us all, in Nelsonian fashion, to put the telescope to the blind eye of the soul and then to affirm that we can see nothing. This failing is so common that it is perhaps unnecessary to cite instances. We may content ourselves with one quoted by Galton in connexion with colour blindness. "I have seen curious instances of this," he writes ;

"one was that of a person by no means unpractised in physical research, who had himself been tested in matching colours. He gave me his own version of the result to the effect that though he might perhaps have fallen a little short of perfection as judged by over-refined tests, his colour sense was for all practical purposes quite good. On the other hand, the operator assured me that when he had toned the intensities of a pure red and a pure green in a certain proportion, the person ceased to be able to distinguish between them!"<sup>7</sup>

<sup>6</sup> For an account of the actual case which first led Freud to formulate the concept of "resistance" see S. Freud: *The Problem of Lay Analyses*, pp. 229, 232.

<sup>7</sup> *Inquiries into the Human Faculty*, p. 31 (Everyman Edition).

This reminds one of the man who says that while, of course, we all have our faults, yet he has never done anybody any harm. The proverb speaks truly when it says that there are none so blind as those who will not see. It is this amazing capacity of human nature of being blind to itself which is so fruitful a cause of neuroticism. We shall return to this point later. Meanwhile it is sufficient to note that, conversely, self-knowledge (or autognosis, as the psychologists call it) is the road to mental health. In dealing with a neurotic, says Dr. William Brown,

"You may think that you know what the cause of the symptoms is and you may tell him why he has become like that and he may understand what you say. But that will not benefit him. Instead of getting better he may sometimes get worse under such treatment, so that external knowledge of the cause of his illness is not sufficient for him. Self-knowledge is what he needs—direct awareness."<sup>8</sup>

In the fourth place, self-knowledge is the essence of humility, and is accordingly the foundation of the virtues. It means that we recognise ourselves as we really are. Self-depreciation, which is frequently mistaken for humility, is in reality its extreme antithesis, and as a rule betrays a complete lack of self-knowledge.

We must, then, in the words of S. Catherine of Genoa, "enter into the cell of self-knowledge." And here psychology comes mightily to our aid. It affords us assistance in two respects: (*a*) it has unmasked the dodges of self-deception; (*b*) it has revealed to us, as they have never been revealed before, the constituents of our common humanity; it has provided us with a mirror in which we can, one and all, see ourselves reflected.

We consider first the dodges of self-deception. We have said that this arises from repression. Let us consider this point more closely. Anything which conflicts with our self-love tends to be repressed, because it is painful to us.

<sup>8</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 139.

Hence we naturally repress our sense of sin, and are blind to our faults. We also tend to be blind to anything in ourselves which conflicts at all strongly with public opinion. That is why we are specially prone to be blind unconsciously to matters concerning the instincts of fear and sex ; for in the best society it is " not done " to manifest openly emotions associated too directly with these particular instincts. Another proverb comes to our aid here : Love is blind. When the staid married man smiles complacently at the blindness of fond lovers in the ardour of their first love, he will do well to remember that, of all forms of blindness produced by love, self-love is the blindest.

Having repressed our faults, we salve our consciences by means of the very familiar processes of rationalization and projection. Since every book on elementary psychology in these days contains an account of these operations, we need not stay to describe them closely here. Suffice it to say that rationalization is the well-known process whereby we find good excuses for our misdeeds, without even admitting them to ourselves. Projection is the procedure whereby we condemn our own faults in other people, as David did in the incident of Uriah the Hittite. It thus ministers to unconscious self-deception. Our self-love, then, makes us blind to our faults. In confirmation of this fact we may notice in passing the unpleasant tone of the expression " home truths." These are precisely the truths about ourselves which are of a disagreeable nature, and to which, consequently, we tend to be blind.

The situation, however, is made still worse by a further capacity of our human nature, whereby we not only are blind to defects which are there in our characters, but actually see virtues which are not there. There is another proverb which explains the meaning of this to us : the wish is father to the thought. Owing to this, we harbour what psychologists call phantasies. That is to say, we take refuge in the realm of imagination and in day dreams, thus

escaping from hard and painful facts of experience. A familiar form of this is the well known habit of "building castles in the air." It is easy to see that our idea of ourselves in this way becomes grossly distorted. In fact, our picture of ourselves tends to be the very reverse of the truth, for, of course, our phantasies are naturally contrary to the facts. We wish to be what we are *not*. Accordingly, the foolish man may easily persuade himself that he is wise, or the plain woman that she is beautiful. This picture of ourselves is indeed somewhat akin to a photographic negative in which we see the light and the shade reversed. What appears on the negative as black is really white, and what appears white is really black. We are thus sublimely unconscious of our most glaring faults, unless we have learnt to acquire the art of self-knowledge. This part of psychology is an eloquent commentary on the well known words of Jeremiah: "The heart is deceitful above all things, and it is desperately sick: who can know it?"<sup>9</sup> So S. Teresa says: "Great are the wiles of the devil, for he will turn Hell upside down a thousand times in order to make us imagine we possess a virtue which in reality we do not."<sup>10</sup>

Having unmasked the process of self-deception, let us pass on to consider the other way in which psychology assists us in acquiring the art of self-knowledge, namely, by the scientific account which it gives us of human nature. The foundation of our nature is constituted by those inherited tendencies which we call *instincts*. In the words of McDougall, "These are the dynamic foundations of the whole structure of personality. They rough hew our ends, shape them how we may."<sup>11</sup> We may pardon the mixed metaphors which the Professor employs, for, indeed, it is hard to find any consistent metaphor which is capable of

<sup>9</sup> Jer., xvii, 9. (R.V.)

<sup>10</sup> *Interior Castle*, 5th Mansion, c. 3.

<sup>11</sup> *Character and the Conduct of Life*, p. 12. For a very thorough discussion of the nature of instinct in man see the *British Journal of Psychology*, Oct. 1910.



justly representing the facts. The figure of a building is gravely inadequate, as S. Paul discovered. The number of the primary instincts is a matter of some difficulty and is much disputed. We may, however, posit at least eleven, as follows: Hunger (food seeking), flight (fear), repulsion, curiosity, pugnacity, mating, parental, gregarious, acquisition, self-assertion, submission. They fall naturally into three groups: Self-preserving, race-preserving and herd-preserving. What we call sins are perversions of these fundamental forces of personality.

The next element in our nature to be noticed is what we call *disposition*. This is the resultant of the instinctive forces of the *psyche*. Although, in theory, all men have the same set of inherited instincts, yet in practice no two men are altogether alike even in this respect. In every individual some instincts are more prominent than others. In some cases there is a very considerable difference in what we may call the degree of sensitiveness of the several instincts. One man, for example, seems to be endowed with a highly sensitive instinct of pugnacity, while he seems to be almost incapable of feeling curiosity. Another man may have the instinct of acquisition unduly prominent. In this way we have the genesis of an ill-balanced disposition, for, as McDougall points out, we tend to enter here upon a vicious circle, since the more any particular instinct is stimulated the stronger it steadily becomes. So we have the various dispositions, according to the several instincts: courageous or timid; enquiring or dull; pugnacious or submissive; industrious or slothful; anxious or placid; avaricious or generous; unselfish or selfish. There are also many permutations and combinations of these various tendencies.

Moreover, a person's disposition may be much influenced by his temperament, which is the sum total of the *physical* influences of the body upon character. We shall consider the question of temperament at length in the chapter on *Types*, so that it is not necessary to deal with it here. The

important point for us to notice at the moment is that a person's disposition is acquired, not inherited, and that he is capable (at any rate by the grace of God) of triumphing over even temperamental weaknesses and deficiencies. Disposition is indeed a most vital element in character. While not, of course, unchangeable, it is nevertheless formed by the age of four or five years, and many people undoubtedly never alter their fundamental attitude to life after that age. Hence the enormous importance of the early years of training, and the folly of entrusting the child too much to nursery governesses. For even the best governess is no adequate substitute for a good mother.

We pass on to consider what psychologists call *sentiments*. This very useful word was claimed by Mr. A. F. Shand some twenty years ago to denote the *acquired* conative trends of human nature in contradistinction from those which are inherited, which, as we have seen, are called instincts. It is a well known fact of experience that emotion tends to organise itself into systems. We may almost speak to-day of a quantum theory of emotion. Thus if we are attached to a particular person we tend to be attached to everything associated with that person. Contrariwise, if we dislike a person, everything associated with him tends to arouse our dislike. These organizations of instinctive forces may, of course, be centred upon either abstract or concrete objects. Thus patriotism is an abstract sentiment, whereas affection for the Union Jack is concrete. In every person there is a large number of these sentiments. They constitute, in fact, the very core of personality. It is difficult rightly to understand ourselves or anybody else without a thorough grasp of the nature of a sentiment, and without a knowledge of the more important sentiments which go to form a particular character. We may without exaggeration say that the conception of sentiments is the most illuminating contribution to the science of personality which has been

made in recent years. We must, therefore, examine it at some length.

We may conveniently divide sentiments into two broad classes:<sup>12</sup> (a) Single-instinct sentiments; (b) General instinct sentiments. The former are, as the name suggests, those which are based mainly, if not entirely, on a single primary instinct. We may take the following list of examples of such sentiments, in which we follow the list of primary instincts given on page 46. Love of food or drink, fear of death, dislike of castor oil, love of science, love of boxing, love of flirting, devotion to an only child, love of a crowd, stamp collecting, love of self, deference to the aristocracy. It normally happens, however, that a sentiment is supported by more than one instinct, and so we come to the second, and far more important class, general-instinct sentiments. Here it is to be noted that the greater the number of instincts which go to the formation of a sentiment the more powerful is that sentiment. It will have been observed that the instincts which we have mentioned fall into two broad classes, those of attraction and those of repulsion. Hunger, curiosity, submission, the parental instinct, mating, the gregarious instinct, and acquisition, are instincts of attraction; repulsion, fear, and pugnacity are instincts of repulsion.

Accordingly, we may class sentiments in the same manner. These instincts may combine in almost numberless ways to form sentiments of liking and of disliking, with varying degrees of intensity, ranging from the mildest possible attraction or dislike to the most passionate love and the most venomous hate. Weak sentiments are made quickly, but they are not durable. For example, in reading a novel by an unknown author, if the first part is rather heavy we may conceive a sentiment of decided dislike for the writer. But if we persevere, and the book becomes more interesting

<sup>12</sup> We may remind the reader of what was said in the *Preface*. These constituent "parts" of personality are no more than convenient hypotheses.

as we continue, this sentiment of dislike may gradually become weaker, until in the end it has been transformed into a sentiment of decided attraction. The result may be that we read a large number of books by the same author until quite a strong sentiment of attraction for him is formed. Really strong sentiments of love, however, take a considerable time to grow, as Aristotle realized when he said that it is impossible to make a real friend in a short time.<sup>13</sup> But once they are formed they are immensely durable. "Love is strong as death."<sup>14</sup> Sentiments of hate may be made more quickly. Whether hate is as durable as love experience cannot decide. If the question is to be solved at all, it can be only on philosophical principles.

The next factor in personality to be considered is *habit*. We must carefully distinguish between habits and sentiments. A habit is physiologically determined; a sentiment is psychologically determined. In other words, a habit can be accounted for by a knowledge of the nervous system. So far as we know, there is no means by which such knowledge can throw any real light upon the nature of sentiments. No doubt, if we are determinists, we shall boldly claim that it does, but it will be a claim unsupported by evidence. It will be a claim made in support of a theory, not one demanded by the facts.

A habit, then, is external; a sentiment is internal. The value of good habits has been greatly exaggerated. This exaggeration is perhaps a legacy from pre-Christian systems of ethics. Thus even Aristotle thought that virtue was a habit. His *Ethics* shows no sign of his having grasped the nature of a sentiment. By contrast with sentiments, habits are superficial. They do not touch "the heart." Hence there is a real danger in religious habits unless they proceed from sentiments. Religious practices which are *merely* habits have not much influence upon character. We must all have wondered at times how it is possible for a person to

<sup>13</sup> *Ethics* 1156b.

<sup>14</sup> *Canticles* viii, 6.

be a regular churchgoer for many years and yet, on moving to a new neighbourhood, to get entirely "broken off" from church attendance. This is due to the fact that his religion was merely a habit, without any sentiment of love for God or for the Church. In like manner, the evening prayers of many persons are, apparently, scarcely more than a habit, which, as the phrase suggestively says, "they learned at their mother's knees." One father known to us gave the following advice to his son on leaving home: "Clean your teeth and say your prayers." It is clear that for this father religion was no more than a habit like the cleansing of the teeth. It did not touch the heart of his life. To quote McDougall, "A mere habit of action is specific, peculiar to the particular circumstances under which it has been induced. A sentiment for a particular quality of conduct or character is perfectly general in its application and influence."<sup>15</sup>

It is clear that habits may constitute a real danger to the personality. "Some people have the repentance habit," writes Professor E. J. Swift. "They gain a certain solace and even joy from the excitement. It is a kind of emotional debauchery in which they indulge periodically, just as others drown their sorrows in drink."<sup>16</sup> Moreover, habits may be a danger not only to the emotional life, but also to the intellectual. Here we cannot do better than quote a well known passage from William James.

"Most of us grow more and more enslaved to the stock conceptions with which we have once become familiar, and less and less capable of assimilating impressions in any but the old ways. Old-Fogyism, in short, is the inevitable terminus to which life sweeps us on. Objects which violate our established habits of 'apperception' are simply not taken account of at all; or, if on some occasion we are forced by dint of argument to admit their existence, twenty-four hours

<sup>15</sup> *Outline of Psychology*, p. 438.

<sup>16</sup> *Psychology and the Day's Work*, p. 346.

later the admission is as if it were not, and every trace of the unassimilable truth has vanished from our thought."<sup>17</sup>

To come to matters specifically religious, herein lies the essential difference between the religion of the Pharisees and the religion of Christ. For the former, religion meant a routine of duties faithfully and meticulously performed by the worshippers; but their heart might be far from God. Our Lord, on the contrary, saw that the problem of religion must be solved from within and not from without; in a word, He made it a matter of sentiments and not of habits only.

We must not, however, fall into the opposite error of supposing that habits are in themselves bad.<sup>18</sup> They are both good and necessary. They are an essential part of character, for they are the great time savers. If, for example, it took us as long to dress, and to walk five yards, as it did the first time we performed these actions, life would consist simply in getting up, going to bed, and going to and from our place of business. There would scarcely be time for anything else. We may perhaps explain the true place of habit in character by a parable. Habits may be likened to clerks in a business. The head of the business is (or should be) the Ego. It is for him to tell the clerks what to do, and to delegate his work wisely to them. They are indeed invaluable clerks, for they do their work most accurately, and once they have been trained they require no more attention, nor do they ask for any reward. Plainly, the more clerks there are, the better for the head of the firm, who will have more time to devote to the task of developing and directing the business. But it is a bad business in every sense of the phrase when the clerks "run" it, and the head of the firm is a cipher in his own office. And it must be admitted that this is far from an uncommon condition in the

<sup>17</sup> *Principles of Psychology*, vol. ii, p. 110.

<sup>18</sup> As, for instance, Rousseau did when he said that the best habit to form is to contract no habits whatever.

affairs of the soul. Excellent as these clerks are, they have one weakness, and that is that they like to get too much power into their own hands. Moreover, like all clerks who have been employed for many years, they are somewhat hard to dismiss. That is why long established habits are so difficult to break. Consequently, it is highly expedient that the head of the firm should keep a tight hand on the business, otherwise there may arise the humiliating position of the office boy being in command of the firm. Hence the great value of such a time as the season of Lent, when the director can review the situation, and take the necessary steps to prevent the power of the clerks from encroaching upon his jurisdiction. At such a time as this the Church enjoins him to see that he is not being "run" by his own body. This is the position in which the majority of the human race find themselves. They cannot say "No" to their desires. They are slaves to their habits, instead of their habits being slaves to them.

So far nothing has been said concerning the place of intellect in our human nature. The relation of intellect to instinct and sentiment is, indeed, one of the most difficult in the whole of psychology. It is, of course, possible to solve it, as Dr. William Brown does, by saying roundly that there is a "cognitive instinct."<sup>19</sup> But such a rapid solution is too easy, and really raises more problems than it solves. As we have already said, most people will probably agree with Aristotle, and with the majority of modern psychologists, that pure intellect moves nothing, or, in more modern phrase, is not *hormic*. Fortunately it is not necessary for us to attempt to enter upon a discussion of this thorny problem, which would take us too far afield. All that we have to notice in this connexion for our present purpose is that a highly trained intellect is no guarantee of excellence or even of strength of character. As Von Hügel once said, nothing is more certain than that great intellectual gifts

<sup>19</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 73.

may co-exist with great emptiness of heart. This is due partly to the fact already noticed, that we so easily deceive ourselves. A cultivated intellect does not necessarily involve knowledge of self. Indeed, most systems of education seem to be designed to teach every subject under the sun except the knowledge of self. It is also due to the fact that it is, unfortunately, possible to know the better and to choose the worse.

In addition to the knowledge of self, the only kind of knowledge which is absolutely necessary for the building of character is knowledge of the good. This is what lies behind the old Socratic paradox that virtue is knowledge ; and this knowledge, as Aristotle clearly saw, is not a matter of intellectual gifts, but of moral training. When it comes, it comes as an intuition, the immediate perception of the morally good man. But since "we needs must love the highest when we see it," this knowledge passes into a sentiment, the love of goodness.

This brings us to the consideration of the crowning element in character, the master sentiment. Apart from some dominant sentiment, strong character is an impossibility. It may, of course, be strong and bad, just as it may be good (on the whole) and weak ; this happens when a number of sentiments, each good in itself, are loosely conjoined. Again, it may be weak and bad, or, on the other hand, it may be strong and good. These possibilities explain one of the most curious and striking features of human nature, namely its amazing inconsistencies. This phenomenon was well expressed by R. L. Stevenson when he made Dr. Jekyll say : "It was on the moral side, and in my own person, that I learned to recognize the thorough and primitive duality (he might have said multiplicity) of man ; I saw that of the two natures that contended in the field of my consciousness, even if I could rightly be said to be either, it was only because I was radically both." Herein is the key to the right understanding of man's



inconsistency. With its aid it is not difficult to reconcile (for example) the ex-Kaiser's protestation of religious devotion with his unashamed militaristic nationalism, or to explain the familiar case of the man who prays on his knees on Sundays, and on his neighbours all the rest of the week. It would not be true to call such persons dissociated personalities, for they have never been associated. They are rather sub-associated personalities. If the personality is to be truly united it should be governed by a master sentiment, which must be enormously strong in order to knit up the forces of the *psyche* into a single coherent character. For a Christian, this sentiment is, it is hardly necessary to say, the love of Christ.

The foregoing analysis of the constituents of human nature—an analysis which has necessarily been somewhat lengthy—now makes it possible for us to approach the practical problem of self-knowledge in a scientific manner. It is really hopeless to attempt it unless we have got a fairly good idea of the make-up of personality. To expect to succeed in the very difficult task of self-knowledge by simply using a set of "self-examination" questions of the conventional type (although these are far better than nothing) is really to expect the impossible. It is like trying to hit a bull's-eye with a shot-gun. One may succeed, but, if so, it will be by good luck and not by good management.

The first step to take in the matter of self-knowledge is to obtain a kind of bird's-eye view of the soul. Since, as we have seen, our idea of ourselves tends to be the reverse of the truth, it is not a bad beginning to sit down and write our own characters, just as we might write the character of somebody else for whom we were writing a "reference." A man of our acquaintance sometimes did this when he was serving in the Indian Civil Service. When a native, of whom he knew little or nothing, came and asked for a reference, he told him to go away and write his own charac-

ter, and then to show it to him. The Englishman then put his pen through it, and wrote the opposite ! In this way he felt that he was nearer the truth than if he had trusted to his own powers of observation. Perhaps we might take a hint from this, if we are not practised in the art of self-knowledge. If we wish for further guidance, we can find it kindly provided for us week by week in *The Church Times* and other newspapers where the clergy are wont to advertise themselves for posts as follows : Energetic priest, preacher, visitor, good with men and boys, musical. It would sometimes be instructive to know what others who know the advertiser well would say to this. Perhaps this character might not unjustly be interpreted thus : Thinks he is hard-working, but does not really know the meaning of work ; tries to preach extempore and cannot ; visits the people he likes, but not many others ; is popular with men and lads, but somehow does not get " any forrader " ; not as musical as he thinks he is.

Having written out our character and reinterpreted it in this fashion, we may then begin a more detailed examination. We should begin with the instincts. We have seen that in this matter there are great differences of natural endowment, and we should make it our first business to discover how it is with ourselves in this respect. In this way we shall be led on to the knowledge of our disposition, which is, as we have seen, the resultant of the various instinctive forces of the *psyche*.

The crux of self-examination is, however, knowledge of our sentiments. We should examine ourselves with the utmost care in order to find out as clearly as possible the number and the nature of the most important sentiments in our character. This is by no means an easy task, as we cannot simply by taking thought light upon our sentiments. We must tackle the question indirectly, and by a roundabout route. We may notice, at the outset, three means which may prove to be of assistance. First, we may recall the

several duties and the various persons which together make up "the daily round, the common task." In this way, we shall certainly discover some at least of our sentiments of attraction and of repulsion. Secondly, we may take note of our habitual forgetfulnesses; these reveal unmistakably our sentiments of dislike. This process of examining our forgetfulnesses takes time, of course, and also a certain amount of practice, but it amply repays the trouble it gives. If we find, for instance, that we simply cannot remember the monthly meeting of the Mothers' Union, we can take it as certain that we have a sentiment of coolness (which we have probably not admitted to ourselves) towards that body. In like manner, if an otherwise good memory breaks down habitually in any particular (e.g., the taking of weddings or the dates of the ruri-decanal chapter meetings), that is an unmistakable sign of sentiments of repulsion in respect of those things. That is why it is commonly and rightly recognized that to say "I forgot" is but a lame excuse. As someone has pointed out, if the lover explains to his beloved that he did not meet her by moonlight on the previous evening because he forgot, she will not unnaturally fail to be impressed. Thirdly, we may take note of any persons or circumstances habitually irritating to us, and liable to make us ill-tempered. These will reveal to us sentiments of attraction as well as those of repulsion, for anger is normally aroused only when a sentiment of attraction fails to find a satisfactory outlet.

By some such indirect means as these we must seek to gain a knowledge of our sentiments. But in carrying out the procedure there are certain considerations which we should bear carefully in mind. (1) We are looking for *tendencies* rather than for isolated thoughts, words, or deeds—in a word for *sin* rather than for *sins*. Our conventional self-examination questions frequently fail because they tend to give the impression that sin consists of a series of isolated acts, whereas it is really centred in evil sentiments.

We have seen that the essence of our Lord's ethical teaching is that religion is essentially a matter of sentiments. So He taught that it is what cometh out of the heart that defileth, and He proceeded to give a list of evil qualities, most of which are undoubtedly what the modern psychologist would call sentiments.<sup>20</sup> In thus looking for tendencies we are quite in keeping with the best traditions of thought at the present day. Just as we no longer think of the material world as made up of tiny atoms or pellets of "matter," so we should cease to think of sins as pieces of dirt adhering to the soul, or as being like rust on a mirror. At any rate, if we thus speak of them we should remind ourselves and our hearers that we are using loose, pictorial language. Sin is rather to be likened to stresses and strains threatening the stability of a building.

So indeed our Lord implied in the forcible parable of the two builders, who erected their houses on the sand and on the rock respectively. These tendencies reveal the true nature of our character, and show us, "which way the wind is blowing." Surely it is for this reason that our Lord issued His at first sight strangely severe warning about the guiltiness of "every idle word"<sup>21</sup> and the judgment which will be meted out to it. For it is the "idle" words—i.e., the words we utter when we are off our guard—which provide the truest index to the state of our souls.

It is ourselves *as we are* that we seek to know, rather than ourselves in the days that are past. As we have seen, we cannot safely rely upon our memories to give an accurate account of our past failures. Even if we have not forgotten them altogether, they will certainly be distorted more or less seriously in the process of recollection.

(2) We should aim at viewing ourselves objectively. In other words, we should attempt to see ourselves as others see us, and as we see others. This is a matter of great

<sup>20</sup> *S. Mark* vii, 21 and 22; *S. Matthew* xv, 19.

<sup>21</sup> *S. Matthew* xii, 36.

importance. In the ordinary way, we fail utterly to do this. We tend to estimate and to judge ourselves by our motives, intentions, and desires, and, as we have already seen, in this we are extremely likely to be self-deceived. But we judge other people by their *deeds*. We do not judge them by their fair speeches ; still less do we judge them by their motives. Indeed we cannot do so, since these motives are hidden from us. But should we do so even if we could ? Is it not commonly regarded as a most damaging criticism to say that a person " means well " ? We may notice in passing that herein lies the secret of the fact that when we compare ourselves with our neighbours we so frequently appear to the best advantage, for whereas we judge ourselves from the inside by our motives, we judge them from the outside by their deeds. Since the criterion is so much more strict for them than it is for ourselves, it is hardly surprising that we usually come off best. If we are going to judge others by their deeds, therefore, it is only fair and just that we should deal with ourselves in the same manner. In other words, we should seek to view ourselves objectively.<sup>22</sup>

However, even in judging our deeds we are grievously likely to be biassed in our own favour. We should accordingly seek to estimate our deeds from other people's point of view. Especially may we learn much useful information about ourselves by taking heed to criticism—even to unkind criticism ; for it is the element of truth in the latter which gives it its sting. We should endeavour to discover that element of truth. All the great spiritual writers are insistent upon this point. If we have written out our character in the manner indicated above, then we may well test it (in the phrase associated with a well-known parlour game) by " what the world said." There are some persons who are

<sup>22</sup> The acquirement of this capacity is, it may be noted in passing, of the first importance for anybody who wishes to become a student of psychology. It is the means to " introspection."

so blind and incapable of viewing themselves objectively that they continue to believe in themselves despite all criticism. In one instance known to us a clergyman was accused of being a "party" man. He indignantly repudiated the charge. When he was told that at any rate everybody said that he was, he boldly replied: "Well, then, everybody is wrong." In the end there are only two classes of persons who believe in their own judgment despite all criticism; geniuses and lunatics. A genius can afford to do this because he is a genius. Thus Napoleon defied all the accepted rules of strategy, and he proved to be right, because he was a genius. But a lesser man who had attempted to do so would have been hardly better than a lunatic. If, therefore, we find ourselves holding fast to the integrity of our opinion *contra mundum*, we shall probably be wiser not to think that we are budding geniuses, but rather to incline to the other alternative. As Mr. G. K. Chesterton has put it, it is impossible to give worse advice to a person than to say, "Believe in yourself." That is the case with the inmates of Hanwell and Colney Hatch, but as they have been unable to persuade others to believe in them also, they find themselves where they are.

An objective view regarding ourselves is, indeed, the essence of sanity. And it is worth while to notice that a rough and ready test as to whether we have acquired in any measure this power is to observe how far we have the capacity of laughing at ourselves. We may perhaps classify people in four groups in this matter: (*a*) those with no capacity for laughter at all; (*b*) those who are able to laugh only at their own jokes; (*c*) those who can enjoy all jokes by whomsoever made; (*d*) those who are capable of laughing at themselves. These last are they who have succeeded in gaining a truly objective standpoint. That the power of laughing at ourselves is an infallible sign that we have gained an objective point of view is confirmed by the well-known fact that we seem to lose all sense of humour in

our dreams. We may do the most ridiculous things in them, but they never seem to strike us as being funny. This is because the dreamer is in every case the chief actor in the dream (although of course he may be disguised as another person) and in the dream state we are completely introverted ; that is to say, there is not a trace of objectivity in our point of view. The student of the art of self-knowledge may well ask himself, therefore, how far he is able to enjoy a joke of which he is the butt.

(3) It is important in attempting to gain a knowledge of our sentiments to notice carefully how far our characteristics are based on sentiments and how far they are based on habits merely. For example, the incumbent who as a regular custom does not go to church except when he is taking the service may rest assured (however unwelcome the conclusion) that his religion is more a matter of habit than of sentiment. So is the religion of the person who, on a month's holiday, takes a holiday from church.

(4) In undertaking the search for our sentiments, it is a matter of great importance to be on the look-out to see how far there is any incompatibility between them. We have already seen that it is the possibility of mutually incompatible sentiments co-existing in the same personality which is responsible for the queer inconsistencies of human nature. In examining ourselves we should search diligently for such inconsistencies until we find them, for the lives are few indeed which are entirely free from them. In the majority of persons we find the personality divided up into two or more water-tight compartments. It is of the essence of conversion to break down these divisions in the soul and to unite it under one master sentiment, namely Christ.

Having gained a knowledge of our disposition, our habits, and our sentiments, we are now in a position to pass something like a just judgment upon ourselves. But before we can do this there is one other requirement. Plainly, we need a standard of measurement. Everything

depends upon this standard. We have seen that many adopt the standard of their neighbours, though even that standard they do not apply fairly. The majority have no true estimate of themselves because they have no standard at all, or, if they have one, it is too low to be of any value. The proverb truly says that in the kingdom of the blind the one-eyed are kings. So Plato reminds us<sup>23</sup> that we must not think too hardly of a young man who falsely supposes himself to be a "six-footer," if he has no foot rule, especially if everybody tells him that he is. In other words, we require an ideal. Many characters which have excellent qualities in them fail because they have no ideal, no head.

The Christian has in this matter a great advantage in that he is in possession of a sure and certain standard to which he can constantly appeal. That standard is Christ. It is worth while to try and estimate His sentiments. In His perfectly balanced character, there were perhaps, in strictness, no single-instinct sentiments. If, however, there were any such, they may be said to have been two in number: desire for knowledge (*cp.* His evident anxiety to learn manifested by the incident when He was twelve years old) and desire for food. His general-instinct sentiments seem to have been these: love of the Father, love of His Mother and S. Joseph, love of His friends, love of humanity, love of children, love of nature, love of innocent amusement, hatred of evil (and, in particular, of hypocrisy), shrinking from suffering. It is plainly a matter of great difficulty even roughly to attempt to form an estimate of our Lord's sentiments during His Incarnate life, but if there is any validity at all in the foregoing summary, then surely it provides us with a most valuable criterion. By that and by no other must we seek to judge and to estimate ourselves. Moreover, we must be careful to observe one caution. However much care we may take, we must never make the fatal error of supposing that we actually do know ourselves. Samuel

<sup>23</sup> *Republic*, 426d.



Butler very wisely said that no man is a great hypocrite until he has left off knowing that he is a hypocrite. If we are constantly alive to the danger of self-deception (and who can carry out a self-examination on the lines which we have suggested and fail to be thus sensitive?) then we shall be secure from its greatest snares.

There is, however, perhaps only one adequate safeguard here, and that is to have a spiritual director, or guide. The prejudice which exists against this method of procedure is due to the ill-balance of reaction. No doubt, it is desirable for a person not to be too dependent upon another's help, and every good director is aware of this, and will strive to assist the penitent to help himself. But we must learn to walk before we can run, and it is to court failure to attempt to dispense with a guide, at any rate at first. "It is deeply significant," writes Dr. Allers,

"that all great ethical or religious systems have emphasized the necessity of personal guidance, declaring it to be indispensable for a man's progress and the attainment of knowledge of what he is, actually and potentially. The sacred books of the Indians of all creeds, the wisdom of China and Islam, and the mystery-religions of classical times, have all stressed the need of a guide . . . . The idea of personal guidance recurs even in Christianity, in a deeper and more enlightened sense."<sup>24</sup>

A good director will perform a two-fold service to the Christian disciple who aims at self-knowledge. He will, in the first place, hold up as it were a mirror in which he can see himself; in other words, he will greatly assist him in gaining that objective point of view of which we have spoken. Secondly, he will encourage him, and save him from despair. There is a real danger that any person, who attempts conscientiously to know himself in some such way as has been outlined above, may be so greatly disheartened by the sight of himself that he is tempted to throw

<sup>24</sup> R. Allers: *The Psychology of Character*, p. 363.

up the struggle altogether, and to adopt the easier course of letting things slide. A wise director will prevent him from succumbing to this temptation by revealing things to him in their right proportion. Furthermore, when the sinner is enmeshed not only in the snares of sin, but also of moral disease, the help and sympathy of another person are absolutely indispensable for the resolving of the conflict, as we shall see more fully later on. Even the most stalwart supporter of what he conceives to be Reformation principles has never denied this in practice, though as a rule he has been unwilling to allow it a due place in his theory. This task, when it is skilfully carried out, is the highest glory of the work of the true pastor.

It will possibly help to make the foregoing exposition clearer as well as of greater practical value, if we conclude this chapter by two concrete examples. We may first take a fairly simple case, that of a working lad of sixteen. First of all, he runs through his instincts. He discovers that two in particular seem in his case to be specially prominent—namely, those of pugnacity and self-assertion. This will give him the key to his disposition. He then turns his attention to the question of his sentiments. Of single-instinct sentiments we may suppose that he finds in himself the following: fear of being laughed at, self-conceit, and quarrelsomeness. He discovers these general-instinct sentiments: (*a*) of attraction: his mother, football, cinemas, self-abuse, cigarette-smoking, girls, hymn-singing, and betting; (*b*) of repulsion: his father, the foreman at the works, churchgoing (apart from hymn-singing). Some of these will most likely be hardly more than habits, but it will probably be quite beyond his capacity for him to discover which are sentiments and which are merely habits. His priest, however, should endeavour to find this out, for, as we shall see in a later chapter, the distinction is one of some importance in dealing with the conquest of sin.

As we survey such a character as this, it is at once apparent

that of the general-instinct sentiments of attraction only two are definitely bad—namely, self-abuse and betting ; the rest are good, or at least harmless in moderation. The general-instinct sentiments of repulsion and the single-instinct sentiments are not quite so good. But in the main this self-examination reveals at a glance what other methods very often fail to reveal at all, except to those possessed of a rare gift of divining character. First, it reveals that the chief weakness of this character is the absence of good, rather than the presence of bad, sentiments. It reveals, in fact, the absence of precisely those sentiments which we have supposed to have been mainly characteristic of the Incarnate Christ. In guiding a lad of this description, it is half the battle to realise this. Secondly, this method reveals the all important truth that the boy is not one self but several selves. He is one lad at home, another lad in the works, and yet another with his boon companions. He is what we have called a sub-associated personality. If these points can be brought home to him in any kind of way, he will gradually begin to see what the Gospel message of the need of a Saviour means.

For our second example let us take the case of a clergyman. He begins by examining his instincts. He also finds those which are most prominent to be those of self-assertion and pugnacity. He is thus able to see that he is of the dominating variety of disposition. He next looks for his single-instinct sentiments, remembering to judge himself, as far as possible, objectively by his deeds. He finds the following : love of his own ideas (based on self-assertion), love of money (based on acquisition), love of the suffering and unfortunate (based on the parental instinct), fear of death, fear of the organist, fear of the parochial church council. His general-instinct sentiments he seeks under two headings : first, those of attraction. These are, love of praise, love of preaching, love of committees, love of games, love of holidays, love of God, love of nature, love

of relatives, love of certain individuals, love of tobacco. His general-instinct sentiments of repulsion are : dislike of laziness, dislike of funerals, dislike of visiting (except sick visiting), dislike of teaching in the schools, dislike of Mr. Jones and Mr. Smith, dislike of the Bishop, dislike of High Church (or Low, as the case may be).

It will perhaps be thought that we have not chosen a very inspiring example. Possibly not ; and yet we must remember that not many characters will look inspiring when set out thus in cold blood and cold print. It is for this reason that this method is a powerful one for teaching us to know ourselves as we are and for inculcating humility. The imaginary character which we have just written out by no means describes one whom the world would regard as a bad parson. On the contrary, such a man might well be regarded as a very good parson, and certainly he might be outwardly most successful. He would probably have a very well attended church ; he would more likely than not be highly respected in the town in which he lived, and have a place on most of the important committees, both civil and ecclesiastical. It would not be surprising to find him a rural dean and an honorary canon. Yet there is plainly something seriously lacking. What is it ? The examination which has been conducted reveals what it is. The love of God is, indeed, present among the sentiments. But it is only one among many, and by no means the strongest of them. It is not, in fact, the master sentiment. That is the sentiment of self-assertion in this case. Until this is changed by the grace of God, this ministry will to a greater or a less extent miss fire.

Let each one of us attempt to make an honest self-examination on these lines, and we shall find the product, if somewhat disappointing (to put it mildly), the means to greater consecration in the future. When all is said and done, there is still hope for us, so long as we realize how far we have fallen short. Moreover, we may well push

the advantage of the self-examination home by enquiring how far such good qualities as we possess are based on sentiments, and how far they are merely a matter of habit. Good habits alone will not make a good priest (though they are indispensable); good sentiments, with love of Christ as the master sentiment, will alone suffice.<sup>25</sup>

<sup>25</sup>This ideal is, of course, supremely depicted in the Beatitudes (in their Matthean form) and in S. Paul's eulogy of love in 1 Cor. xiii.

PART II  
THE PASTOR



## CHAPTER III

### CLERICAL APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY

ONE of the most valuable scientific developments of the past ten or fifteen years has been the rise and growth of what is known as *Industrial Psychology*. Here psychology is applied to the various occupations of life with a view to producing greater efficiency therein. In the words of one of its leading exponents,

“Its aim is to discover the best possible human conditions in occupational work, whether they relate to the best choice of a vocation, the selection of the most suitable workers, the most effective means of avoiding fatigue and boredom, the study and provision of the most valuable incentives to work, the causes of and remedies for irritation, discontent and unrest, the best methods of work and training, the reduction of needless effort and strain due to bad movements and postures, inadequate illumination, ventilation, and temperature, ill-considered arrangements of material, or defective routing, layout, or organization.”<sup>1</sup>

Industrial psychology, therefore, covers far more than is usually understood by the word “industry”; it includes *all* occupations and professions. There are, however, some of these which have not so far been brought within its purview, and one of them is the work of the Ministry. An attempt is here made to make good this deficiency.

It is, on the face of it, obvious that, in the case of the work of the clergy, it is not possible to obtain such clear cut psychological data as one finds in the average manual

<sup>1</sup> C. S. Myers in *Industrial Psychology* (Home University Library), p. 9.



worker's trade, where the output can be weighed and measured, and where curves can be drawn to show the effect upon output of this or that factor. The product of clerical labour cannot be thus estimated; it belongs to the realm of the imponderables. We should, however, be guilty of a serious error if, in consequence, we supposed that it was useless to attempt to bring the work of the clergy into relation with industrial psychology. Although the output of the clergy cannot be measured, the human factor enters in here as much as in any other profession or occupation; the clergy are but human beings, and they carry their treasure in "earthen vessels." Moreover, we shall misconceive the nature of industrial psychology, if we suppose that its primary purpose is to increase output; rather is its aim to enable the worker to perform his task with greater ease and efficiency. We are, therefore, fully justified in studying as carefully as possible the conditions under which the clergy do their work, with a view to discovering how it can be rendered most effective, and in order to reduce wasted effort to a minimum. There is, after all, a maximum spiritual output, even though it cannot be weighed and measured, and it is not unreasonable to suppose that, other things being equal, this output will be greatest if the human factor concerned is working under the best possible conditions, and if, further, the workers are fully equipped with the knowledge of what those conditions are, and of the various obstacles and hindrances which prevent their realization.

It is, for example, not a small matter to be fully alive to the existence of what psychologists call "the tendency to minimum effort" in human nature. This tendency seems to be a survival, in man, of the trial and error method by which the lower animals attempt to solve practical problems. If they are successful, they succeed (like the English) by "muddling through." Owing to this tendency, men's achievements are usually well below their maximum

efficiency. "They grow to the smallest dimensions of their job and then stop," writes Professor Swift.

"They do not make a little job into a big one. . . . No more effort is expended in a piece of work than is required to produce a satisfactory result ; and 'satisfactory' is a variable quality. There is usually no standard. Consequently, the result attained is far below the grade of which the individual is capable. It requires a severe effort to maintain one's highest level of efficiency, and effort is a strain which one is loath to make. Consequently lawyers, doctors, teachers and business men are contented with efforts that bring fair results."<sup>2</sup>

To no class of men, surely, do these words come with greater force than to us clergy. We are only too prone to remain contented with results which are hardly even "fair." How easy it is to be satisfied with a handful of weekly communicants in a large parish, or with an utterly inefficient Sunday School, or with a congregation in which the men are conspicuous by their absence, or with the delivery of half-prepared sermons. Unfortunately, many clergy, although doubtless they would like to be more successful than they are, are not willing to make the necessary effort. In this they are no better and no worse than many Works Directors. "Managers," says a recent writer, "want to get better results *in their own way* but they do not want to learn new ways."

It will be convenient to consider the problem set before us under three aspects : (1) physical efficiency ; (2) mental efficiency ; (3) spiritual efficiency. We begin with the first of these, physical efficiency. In the case of the priest, no less than in the case of the bricklayer, there is need for physical efficiency, inasmuch as his task is fulfilled in and through a human body. Speaking generally, his work is gravely marred without such efficiency. "Conscientiousness," writes Mr. Hudson Davies, "gets no chance

<sup>2</sup> E. J. Swift : *op. cit.* p. 22.

against permanently bad conditions.”<sup>3</sup> We must, therefore say something about the conditions of physical efficiency. Before we do so, however, we must pause to consider an objection to our whole enquiry.

It may be suggested that we are working on entirely wrong lines, since it is an undeniable fact that some of the greatest saints have been physically weak and even diseased. Moreover, it would seem that it was necessary that they should thus suffer as a very condition of their spiritual power. Von Hügel pointed out that it seems to be essential for great mystical gifts that their possessor should have a peculiar psycho-physical constitution. So we find it in S. Paul, S. Teresa, S. Catherine of Siena, S. Catherine of Genoa, S. Francis of Assisi. Nevertheless, “all the great mystics, and this in precise proportion to their greatness, have ever taught that the mystical capacities and habits being but means and not ends, only such ecstasies are valuable as leave the soul, and the very body as its instrument, strengthened and improved.”<sup>4</sup> Nor must we forget that these pathological conditions were completely absent, so far as we can judge, in the Supreme Life of all. Had He not been “physically efficient” He could never have sustained the colossal burden of those anxious and laborious years; still less could He have been the great Healer. In any case, we are concerned here not with exceptional cases and conditions, but with the ordinary routine paths of the spiritual life, and there seems to be no good reason for denying that here, at least, physical efficiency is a prerequisite for the fullest pastoral power.

Under the heading of physical efficiency, we propose to consider four factors: fatigue, method, environment, and food. We begin with the first of these, fatigue. Here it is important to distinguish between genuine fatigue—“objective fatigue” as it has been called—and boredom,

<sup>3</sup> *Industrial Psychology*, p. 43.

<sup>4</sup> *The Mystical Element of Religion*, vol. ii, p. 46.

or "subjective fatigue." In practice it is often hard to differentiate between them, but they are really distinct. Boredom appears earlier than fatigue, increases at a more rapid rate, and may be banished by emotion, and overcome by will. The same does not hold good of objective fatigue. This is inability to do work, owing to organic influences.<sup>5</sup> It takes its rise owing either to the exhaustion of certain energy-producing compounds in the body, or to the presence of certain toxins in it. Lack of oxygen is an important factor in both these cases, as this substance makes possible the liberation of the former bodies, while it causes the elimination of the poisonous products. The effect of these physical influences may be felt in the muscles, in the nerve trunk, or in the synapses (the junctions of the nerve cells), or in all three. The remedy for fatigue is rest, especially that form of it which we call sleep.

Much experimentation has been made in recent years to test the relation between fatigue and rest. Thus, for example, Maggiora showed that when the middle finger was made to lift a weight until further contractions were impossible, a rest of two hours was necessary for complete recovery. If, however, only half the number of contractions was made, the period of time required for recovery was reduced not by one half, but by one quarter.<sup>6</sup> It follows from this that a suitable alternation of work and rest will enable activity to be sustained over a very long period. Contrariwise, long periods of unbroken work are not economical of energy. Because a man can do a certain amount of work in two hours, it does not follow that he can do twice the amount in four hours; still less does it follow that he can do four times the amount in eight hours, or eight times the amount in sixteen hours. Nevertheless, it has taken us over a hundred and fifty years of

<sup>5</sup> The extent to which real fatigue can be caused by mental work is still unknown.

<sup>6</sup> See A. Mosso: *Fatigue* (Eng. Tr.), p. 151.

industrialism fully to realize that this is not the case. "The outbreak of the World War . . . brought home to society the futility of considering the worker simply as a machine."<sup>7</sup>

Accordingly, there has increasingly arisen the custom of introducing breaks, or "rest-pauses" as they are called, into industry. Their value has been verified in the boot industry, in metal polishing, in celluloid polishing, in shirt ironing, in sweet packing, in handkerchief folding, and in stamping lids, as well as in other industries. Laboratory experiments have also been carried out with a view to testing the value of these rest-pauses in purely mental work, such as mental arithmetic. The question is still full of difficulties, and in general "the published work relating to rest-pauses in industry tends to raise more problems than it solves,"<sup>8</sup> but it has certainly made it clear beyond any question that a judicious mingling of work and rest makes for the happiness of the worker and for the better quality and larger quantity of the work. Thus, to take a specific instance, in an investigation connected with the assembling of bicycle chains, the workers were allowed a rest of five minutes every hour. It was found that, although the rests absorbed seven per cent. of the working day, the output began to increase immediately after the introduction of the rests, and finally attained a level which was thirteen per cent. greater than in the pre-rest period. This favourable evidence (which might be multiplied on a large scale) is due not only to the physiological factor which has been already mentioned, but also to psychological factors, such as "incitement," or "warming up," whereby we tend to work better when we have got up steam. Again, the expectation of getting a "breather" in a short time is a factor of some importance. The number and the length of the pauses should naturally be varied according to the nature of the work.

<sup>7</sup> Art. *Industrial Psychology*, Enc. Britannica (13th edn.).

<sup>8</sup> S. Wyatt : *Rest Pauses in Industry*, p. 21.

In connexion with the work of the clergy the following points should be borne in mind : (1) The subjective feeling of tiredness is no valid criterion of fatigue.

“In the performance of mental work especially, decided sensations of fatigue may be experienced when the objective record shows that increasing and not decreasing amounts of work are being done ; and there may be complete absence of any sensations of fatigue when the objective record shows that the work is falling off in quantity, or in quality, or in both.”<sup>9</sup>

So wrote the late Dr. Rivers. Similar evidence is forthcoming from Professor Thorndike. “I was constantly surprised,” he says,

“to find myself when feeling, as I would certainly have said, ‘mentally tired,’ unable to demonstrate, in the feeling anything more than emotional repugnance to the idea of doing work. On at least half the occasions this seemed to be all there was.”<sup>10</sup>

(2) It follows as a corollary of this that the clergy should make some attempt to decide the relation of work to rest by devising an objective criterion, making their observations extend over a considerable period of time before coming to any definite conclusion. (3) Experience shows that it is best, whenever possible, to take a break *before* the onset of fatigue ; if the rest-pause is delayed until afterwards, a longer period of recuperation is required in proportion. (4) While there is some evidence to show that complete relaxation of the muscles is the most recuperative form of rest, it is also true that a change of occupation, and, in the case of mental work, change of posture and bodily movement are advantageous.

The practical conclusions to be drawn from the foregoing

<sup>9</sup> W. H. R. Rivers : *The Influence of Alcohol and other Drugs on Fatigue*, p. 2. Cp. also the record of two sets of experiments made with medical students and typists respectively, *Brit. Journal of Psychology*, vol. x.

<sup>10</sup> *Psychological Review*, vol. 7, p. 547, quoted Swift, *op. cit.* p. 21.

considerations are not insignificant. In the first place, they contain much encouragement for the busy parish priest, who is tempted to think that he has no opportunities for study. For it is clear that in such a case any time that is given to serious reading will provide conditions of considerable and sometimes even of maximum efficiency, since the mind will be fresh, unless the body is actually exhausted. The parson who can give only an hour and a half or two hours a day to study may at least console himself with the thought that they are the most productive two hours in the day for that purpose. Secondly, it seems to be clear that every parish priest should learn to acquire the simple art of "relaxing." It frequently happens that when persons are resting in a chair, or even when they are in bed, their muscles are as tight as a drum. There is no true rest in this. It is a valuable accomplishment to learn to "flop." Thirdly, it is not really open to doubt that it is the height of folly and "asking for trouble" for the parish priest not to take a break of at least half an hour, apart from meals, in the middle of the day. If he is up early in the morning (as so many are, and as all should be) and working until quite late in the evening, it is an utter impossibility to continue to work efficiently without some kind of break. Inspired by a great ideal,<sup>11</sup> it is possible for men to defy nature for a *limited period*, but in the long run such defiance spells disaster. *Naturam expellas furca tamen usque recurret.*

Closely associated with the question of fatigue is that of method. This is essential for efficiency. There is undoubtedly a close relation between fatigue and bad methods. Moreover, they cause an increase in what is known in industrial psychology as "unproductive working time." As examples of this, we may cite the time taken in fetching tools, or the time spent in waiting for raw materials. Regard to such factors as these has no small effect upon

<sup>11</sup> See Essay by J. A. Hadfield on *The Psychology of Power in The Spirit* (ed. B. H. Streeter).

productivity. To take a concrete instance, the foot lever of a clamping machine was elevated to prevent uncomfortable leg-stretching, and a heavy spring was moved to a new position. In addition, a support was shortened so as to save space, and to permit of more storage room for raw materials. The working position of tools was also rearranged so that the necessity of lifting a heavy tool some hundreds of times a day was obviated. The result of these changes was a net increase in output of eleven per cent.<sup>12</sup>

The clergy may well lay such evidence as this to heart. We probably lose more by "unproductive working time" than any other class of workers. Our unbusinesslikeness is a by-word. To go into many clergy studies is to receive a severe shock. Books and papers lie about in a state of utter confusion. It may not be possible for us to avoid being thought a little mad by the average layman, but at least he ought not to be able to add the reproach that there is not even any method in our madness. The parish priest should be methodical in recording the results of his visiting, and the results of his reading. He should be methodical in his correspondence, in keeping an engagement book, and, above all, in money matters. Much otherwise good work is marred by failure in such things as these. The priest should regard shortcomings in these directions as sinful; for so they are. Nor are they by any means negligible factors in retarding the advance of the Kingdom of God. It is, indeed, on the side of method that the clergy can do most to attack the question of output. As we have already seen, we cannot weigh the imponderables which the parish priest is there by God's help to produce. But we can at any rate consider the various tasks he has to perform, and attempt to place them in the order of their spiritual importance. Having done this, it is then possible to frame a method calculated to produce the maximum output.

<sup>12</sup> A. Angles in *Industrial Psychology*, p. 117.



We may perhaps set down the activities of the average parish clergyman as follows : Conduct of public worship, surplice duty (weddings, funerals, etc.), correspondence, preparation of sermons and addresses, sick visiting, clubs and societies, committees and meetings, private prayer, study, visiting of the whole. An attempt is here made to arrange these various duties in the order of their *physical urgency*. To make our meaning clear, if the parish priest does not conduct at least one service on a Sunday, he is liable to lose his job. Therefore we may say that this is, on the material side, the most "urgent" of his duties. Without in any way attempting to press the correctness of this arrangement as accurately representing the descending order of physical urgency in the priest's duties, it is at least clear that it does not even approximately correspond to the order of their *spiritual urgency*. On the contrary, what are indisputably the most spiritually urgent of all the pastor's duties, namely private prayer and private study, occur eighth and ninth respectively on the list. It is plain, therefore, that the busy and overworked parson is in grave danger of allowing them to be crowded out by sheer pressure of physical necessity, unless he quite deliberately adopts some method of working which will make this impossible. In fact, it not infrequently happens that physical necessity is thus allowed to dominate the priest's life, with disastrous results. In order to do his job efficiently, in the best sense of that term, *he must order and limit his work so that, come what may, the order of spiritual urgency rules in his life, and not the order of physical necessity*. The parson is the spiritual *persona* of the parish, or he is failing utterly in his task, no matter how many hours a day he may work.

In this connexion we must not overlook the important part in producing inefficiency which is played by bad management in any business or organisation. It seems to be established that

"in by far the majority of cases slackness is due to bad management, and therefore is to be radically cured not by introducing even an appropriate incentive, but by removing the features of that bad management by dismissing inefficient uncongenial overseers, by abolishing waiting for material and other causes of unproductive time, and by instructing workers in the best methods of work."<sup>13</sup>

Few would deny that these physical causes of inefficiency have their analogue in Church organization. If the work of the Church is to make headway against the active forces of wickedness, organized and unorganized, to say nothing of the enormous dead weight of indifference to spiritual things, the rank and file of clergy who, after all, bear the burden and heat of the day, cannot afford to be without the inestimable assistance of sympathetic and helpful bishops, and understanding archdeacons, who will do their utmost to remove the elements of bad management which are still all too numerous. It is to be hoped that the day will soon be past when the clergy are expected to carry on with enormous vicarages, in many cases far removed from their churches, and in not a few cases even outside their parishes. Conditions such as these make unproductive working time very considerable. It is to be hoped, further, that the day may not be far distant when it is realized by those in authority that not every incumbent is a suitable person to train a deacon, and when some appropriate system may be designed and universally applied to prevent unsuitable vicars from giving titles. It is a fatally short sighted policy to sacrifice the first two years of a man's ministry—years of critical importance for the learning of the right methods of work—to any considerations whatsoever.

We may pass more quickly over the remaining two factors which we have set ourselves to consider under physical efficiency, namely, environment and food. With regard to the former, it is a commonplace to say that the workshop and

<sup>13</sup> C. S. Myers in *Industrial Psychology*, p. 11.

the office, or the study, should be well ventilated. Recently a number of experiments have been performed in connexion with ventilation which give a more accurate meaning to the term, and which reveal very clearly the importance of this factor. It is now known that the essence of bad ventilation is mainly air stagnation. Fresh air is, therefore, not the only remedy. The essential requirement is that the air should be *in movement*. In the words of the Industrial Research Fatigue Board, "the air in a well ventilated room should be (a) cool rather than hot, (b) dry rather than damp, (c) diverse in its temperature in different parts, rather than uniform and monotonous, and (d) moving rather than still."<sup>14</sup> And there is abundant evidence concerning the connexion between bad ventilation and inefficiency. Thus, for example, in a five years' survey in five tinsplate works, the output was ten per cent. less in August than in January.<sup>15</sup> It is, indeed, true that an investigation carried out in order to discover the relation between bad ventilation and purely mental work revealed the surprising fact that just as good results were obtained under bad conditions as under good.<sup>16</sup> But the value of this experiment is not great since the subjects worked for only five consecutive days under such conditions, and only for four hours a day at that. There is no reason to doubt that in the long run the effect of bad ventilation on mental work will be not less harmful than it is on physical. As we have already observed, our nature is capable of making exceptional and, in a sense, super-human efforts, for a limited period, but only for a limited period.

The problem of food—the last of our physical efficiency problems—provides a happy hunting ground for faddists and cranks. We are here concerned, of course, only with the psychological side of the question of diet. This, how-

<sup>14</sup> *Preliminary Notes on Atmospheric conditions in Boot and Shoe Factories*. Industrial Fatigue Research Board, Report No. 11.

<sup>15</sup> A. Hudson Davies in *Industrial Psychology*, p. 49.

<sup>16</sup> P. Sandiford: *Educational Psychology*, p. 271.

ever, is a most important aspect of it. Eating is not simply a matter of putting food into the stomach, even when it is the right food. The state of mind in which we feed either makes or mars the process, because of its all powerful influence upon the process of digestion. Probably everybody knows in a vague kind of way that the mind influences the process of digestion, but not everybody realizes how immensely important that influence is. It is important in two respects, and the degree of its importance has been experimentally demonstrated. In the first place, it can be shown that the pleasurable anticipation of food causes the secretion of gastric juice, which is indispensable for digestion; the same holds good *a fortiori* of the pleasurable consumption of food. Secondly, it is known that unpleasant states of mind—notably, anger, fear, anxiety and worry—inhibit the flow of the gastric juice, and hinder digestion even to the point of bringing it to a standstill. A number of experiments have been performed by Professor Pavlov<sup>17</sup> and other physiologists upon dogs with a divided oesophagus, exposed at the two ends, together with an opening made in the stomach. In this way the dogs could be given “sham meals” since the food would never reach the stomach, while at the same time the amount of gastric juice in the latter could be measured. One dog continued to eat for five or six hours, enjoying every minute of the period, and in that time 700 c.c. of the purest gastric juice were secreted, although no food had actually entered the stomach. On another occasion, a cat was brought in where the dog was enjoying a good meal and rapidly secreting gastric juice. The dog became very excited and angry, and the secretion ceased immediately.

These conclusions are of the utmost importance for physical efficiency. The busy parish priest should seek to eat his meals in a state of calm, and, during them, to avoid talk of a kind which is liable to arouse strong emotions.

<sup>17</sup> See *The Work of the Digestive Glands*, tr. W. H. Thompson.

For this reason there is some wisdom in the practice observed in some vicarages and clergy houses (but how often is it carried out?) that "shop" shall be forbidden at meals. This is a rule which should be stringently enforced for the very work's sake. It must never be forgotten that the evidence conclusively shows that the influence of unpleasant<sup>18</sup> emotions, even of those mildly unpleasant, inhibits the beneficial effect of a good appetite. Unless he has a constitution of iron, the parish priest should also do something to protect himself against the endless interruptions to which he is liable to be subject during meal times. It will probably be kindest to his flock in the end.

We may now turn our attention to the question of mental efficiency. A disciplined mind: this is the essence of real intellectual power. It finds expression in the capacity to suspend judgment, and to make experiments. "The undisciplined mind," says Professor Dewey,<sup>19</sup> "is averse to suspense and intellectual hesitation; it is prone to assertion." The absence of this power means that prejudice rather than reason rules the mind. Prejudice is reason's most deadly enemy. It arises when the mind is dragged wheresoever desire wills. It is unfortunately a very common condition. "Thinking is often a re-arrangement of our prejudices."<sup>20</sup> Hobbes spoke no more than the truth when he remarked that even the axioms of Euclid would be disputed, if men's passions were involved in them. It has been well, if somewhat crudely, remarked; "'Taint what men don't know that makes trouble in the world; it's what they know for sartan that ain't so." Surely prejudice should have no place in the mind of any disciple of Christ, still less in that of any of His ministers. Alas, the clergy are no more immune from this evil than the laity.

<sup>18</sup> No doubt "shop" is not, as such, unpleasant! But worrying topics are likely to creep in when "shop" is regularly talked at meals.

<sup>19</sup> *Democracy and Education*, p. 222.

<sup>20</sup> E. J. Swift: *op. cit.*, p. 67.

A disciplined mind is one which is open, at the top and not at the bottom! It is adaptable: it is prepared to make experiments, to accept fresh evidence, and to weigh it carefully; to follow the argument whither it leads, to admit unwelcome conclusions. It seeks to guard against the influence of passion. Its spirit is admirably revealed in the well-known practice of Darwin, who was accustomed to take careful note of all facts which seemed to conflict with his own theories, knowing full well that, if he failed to do this, he was specially liable to forget them. Unfortunately, not all men of science have followed this good example. It is a mistake to suppose that theologians have been sinners in this respect above all thinkers. Probably they have not been much worse than the rank and file of scientists. But it is surely a shame to them, as the professed followers of Him who is the Truth, if they have been no better than other men in this.

The method of thinking, in the case of a disciplined mind, is as follows. First of all, there is the recognition of a problem to be solved. Then comes the disentangling of it from irrelevant issues, and a clear presentation of it. It is a great matter to be able to frame the right questions. Once this has been done, the process of collecting further evidence can proceed, together with the making of hypotheses and (so far as may be possible) experiments. All this while the mind is in a condition of suspended judgment, until such time as the final process of verification can be attempted. It must be observed that such a condition of mind is by no means incompatible with due regard for authority, and with the state of mind which is commonly called faith. For instance, a person might accept on authority both the doctrine of the Incarnation and that of the Virgin Birth, and yet might find himself adopting (without any disloyalty) somewhat different mental attitudes respectively towards them. In the case of the former, he might hold that he had been able to verify the hypothesis in such

a way as to achieve a high degree of intellectual conviction ; whereas, in the case of the latter, he might feel that he required more evidence than he had yet found in order to produce an equal degree of intellectual certainty. The harm begins only when what is accepted on faith is confused with what is scientifically established. It is further increased when it is wrongly supposed that a rightful claim to authority is a claim to inerrancy.<sup>21</sup>

A good memory : we may consider this as the next element in mental efficiency. In what does it consist ? The problems of memory are highly intricate, and we are only just beginning to envisage some of them, so that it would be worse than rash to dogmatize on the subject ; but probably the majority of psychologists would endorse the following considerations. (1) There is a sense in which a person's memory cannot be improved, but there is also a sense in which it can. It cannot be raised in quality from C<sub>3</sub> to A<sub>1</sub>, but it can be improved so as to attain the maximum efficiency for its class, and this affords a very large margin for improvement. (2) To have a good memory is to have a well organized mind. This is one which has a large number of "apperceptive systems"—a phrase which we shall explain in a moment. We must not be deceived (as we are likely to be) by spatial metaphors when we are dealing with the question of memory. We are tempted to suppose that it is like some sort of box, in which the amount of available space diminishes as more is put into it. The reverse is the case. The more a memory holds, the more it is able to hold. "To him that hath shall be given" is true conspicuously here. Every new subject learnt is, as it were, another set of pegs fixed to the walls of the mind (which for practical purposes are almost unlimited in extent) so that it is possible for more and more knowledge to find a place there. Such a set of pegs is what psychologists call an "apperceptive system." That is why it is true, as we all know, that we can remember

<sup>21</sup> See A. E. Taylor : *The Faith of a Moralist*, vol. ii, p. 228.

fairly easily facts and ideas relating to subjects of which we already possess some knowledge ; whereas, if we know little or nothing of a subject, we can retain but little of what we read or hear about it. The reason is that in such cases there are no pegs (or, as it is commonly said, pigeon holes) in the mind ready to receive the information. In strictness, therefore, we should say that we have not "a" memory, but rather many memories. This is commonly recognized, as, for instance, when a person says he has a good memory for dates, but a bad one for faces. The essence of the cultivation of a good memory, therefore, is the acquisition of as many apperceptive systems as possible. In performing this all important task, it is necessary to remember that the best results are obtained *by consolidating one such system before embarking upon another* ; otherwise, they are apt to suffer what is known as "interference" from one another.

(3) It has become increasingly recognized that the main problem is to discover not why we remember, but why we forget. It used to be taken for granted, to take an example, that the first few years of a child's life should be forgotten. It is now seen that this raises a problem which calls for explanation. In like manner, other instances of forgetting need to be explained. The distinction, now universally accepted by psychologists, between retention and recall assists us here. A memory may be retained in the mind without being capable of recall at any particular moment. Since a memory is of no practical use unless it can be recalled, however, the most vital problem is to discover the conditions which respectively assist and impede recall. Freud, as is well known, has asserted that the inability to recall is in all cases due to a (usually unrecognized) wish not to recall. In this opinion he has not been followed by many other psychologists, although few would deny that this is one factor in the problem. Most psychologists will agree with Loveday when he says, "Lack of interest is a



much more important condition of forgetting than is negative interest.”<sup>22</sup> There is, in fact, convincing experimental evidence to show that we are able to recall ideas which attract us far more accurately than those in which we are not interested.<sup>23</sup> The probable reason for this is that our liking for a subject both diverts and reinforces our attention. The conclusion seems to follow, therefore, that forgetting, in the sense of failure to recall, is due to lack of attention and concentration rather than to anything else.

(4) Finally, it must be briefly noticed that a good memory possesses not only the power of recall but also the power of forgetting. It must, however, be a power of selective, as contrasted with haphazard, forgetting. In other words, the efficient mind will be able (within limits) to choose what it will recall, and also be able to unburden itself of what it regards as useless information.<sup>24</sup>

The power of concentration: this is the last factor in mental efficiency which we must consider. Evidently, it is one of great importance, for, as we have seen, upon it depends the power of a good memory. In order to realize its significance, we must notice that attention is of two kinds, voluntary, and non-voluntary (or spontaneous). Concentration is the name which we give to the former. “All mental training and discipline,” says Professor Stout, “depend upon the victory of voluntary attention.”<sup>25</sup> This is undeniably true. At the same time, if voluntary attention is to achieve anything, it must enlist in its service spontaneous attention. In other words, unless we can succeed in making ourselves really interested in a subject, we shall not

<sup>22</sup> T. Loveday: *The Role of Repression in Forgetting*, British Journal of Psychology, September 1914.

<sup>23</sup> See C. Fox: *The Influence of Subjective Preference on Memory*, British Journal of Psychology, April 1923.

<sup>24</sup> On this question, and others kindred to it, the reader is recommended to study R. H. Thouless's book, *The Control of the Mind*.

<sup>25</sup> G. F. Stout: *Manual of Psychology* (4th edn.), p. 651.

achieve much in it. Fortunately, this is quite possible, as the existence of what are commonly known as "acquired tastes" is sufficient to prove. Moreover, it is encouraging to realise that the reward of efforts to concentrate is the increase of the power of concentration as such. Anybody, therefore, who has to make the effort to concentrate upon some distasteful topic may console himself with the reflection that he is at least *learning* to concentrate even if his best efforts fail to arouse in him a spontaneous interest for the matter in hand. This is a big consolation, for the power to concentrate, as such, is more important by far than the knowledge of any specific subject. It is apparently in order to impress this fact upon their pupils that some systems of mind training go out of their way to teach them to concentrate upon trivial and even useless subjects.

It is worth while pointing out in the present connexion that the Law of Reversed Effort finds no exemplification here. The art of concentration can usually be acquired only at the cost of sheer "grind" and will-power. It is thus more than a merely intellectual accomplishment; it involves moral and spiritual factors also. If any clergyman, therefore, is tempted to think that he cannot concentrate because of unfavourable conditions, let him see to it that he becomes independent of them as quickly as possible. Once he allows himself thus to become the victim of circumstances, he is not only losing a spiritual opportunity, but he is also on a slippery slope which may well lead him to the loss of all real mental power.

We come, finally, to the question of spiritual efficiency. This is the supreme requirement of the pastor. Apart from this, the other kinds of efficiency, of which we have spoken, are barren and useless. It is, however, not enough to say (as we may perhaps be tempted to do) that this is the work of the Holy Spirit, and to leave the question at that. Undeniably true as this is, it is not the whole truth. It cannot

be denied that some clergy are hopelessly inefficient for the simple reason that they do not say their prayers. Nevertheless, it may be that most of us have known clergy who have been earnest and devout, and yet who, so far as one could judge, have to some extent missed fire. Earnestness, although a *sine qua non* of efficiency, does not of itself guarantee it. It is, therefore, worth while to attempt to estimate as accurately as may be the factors which make for spiritual power. First and foremost there is the knowledge of God ; of this we have already treated at length. Then there comes knowledge of self, and its ensuing penitence. There is no necessity to add to what has been already said on this question except to say that of all people the clergy need most to know themselves. " Shall the blind lead the blind ? " In the next chapter we shall see some of the unhappy consequences of clerical blindness. Thirdly, beyond all question, there is need of what we can only call inspiration. With a brief consideration of this factor we shall conclude this chapter.

It may possibly be thought that it is idle to discuss such a question as this, since inspiration is something altogether beyond our power. " The wind bloweth where it listeth. " This seems to be only half the truth. There is a good deal of evidence which seems to suggest that, although we cannot, of course, control the operations of the Divine Spirit, it is nevertheless true that inspiration and illumination occur only after a longer or a shorter period of struggle and effort, and that then it comes suddenly, in the twinkling of an eye. Many illustrations might be given of this ; we may content ourselves with one or two. A. R. Wallace, in speaking of the discovery of the idea of natural selection, wrote : " The idea came to me, as it had come to Darwin, in a sudden flash of insight ; it was thought out in a few hours. " <sup>26</sup> There is similar testimony of a striking character in connexion with the inspirations of the mathematical

<sup>26</sup> *Letters and Reminiscences of A. R. Wallace*, by J. Marchant, vol. i, p. 113.

genius, Raymond Poincaré.<sup>27</sup> This is a phenomenon which did not escape the keen observation of Plato, who says that to the earnest seeker the vision of the eternal beauty will suddenly be revealed.<sup>28</sup> It was under such circumstances, S. Anselm tells us, that there first came to him the famous ontological argument for the existence of God, since he had for years been strenuously seeking a single convincing proof of the Divine existence. It may have been to this that our Lord was drawing attention when, according to the Fourth Gospel, He said: "He that willeth to do the will shall know of the teaching."<sup>29</sup> S. Paul seems to have the same point in mind when he writes to the Philippians: "I press on toward the goal unto the prize of the high calling of God in Christ Jesus. Let us, therefore, as many as be perfect, be thus minded: and if in anything ye are otherwise minded, even this shall God reveal unto you."<sup>30</sup>

It has been the fashion to "explain" such phenomena as being due to unconscious gestation, ever since William James first made the suggestion. Perhaps this does not really make us much the wiser. In any case, we are concerned here with practice rather than with theory, and from the practical point of view, this evidence is of immense significance. It follows that if the parish priest has "no ideas" it is partly his own fault. We have no right to expect them unless we are continually striving to know and to learn. A certain tenseness and alertness of mind is the indispensable prerequisite. "They that wait upon the Lord shall renew their strength."<sup>31</sup> It is suggestive that the Hebrew word for "wait upon," *qowe*, probably is derived from a root meaning "twisted," and so "tense," as of a rope or a cable. It is doubtless true that "tasks in hours of insight willed may be through hours of gloom fulfill'd." It is no less true that the hours of insight are

<sup>27</sup> See B. H. Streeter: *Reality*, p. 332.

<sup>28</sup> ἐξαίφνης κατόψεταί, *Symposium* 210 c.

<sup>29</sup> S. *John* vii, 17.

<sup>30</sup> *Phil.* iii, 14 and 15.

<sup>31</sup> *Isa.* xl, 31.

the result of the hours of gloom and toil, and this is the more important truth of the two. There is, in fact, much consolation here. Let not the hard worked parish priest suppose that his apparently fruitless hours of study, snatched from a rushing busy life, are in vain. Beyond question, they will issue in fresh ideas, and he will reap his reward in due season, if he faint not. It is the keen and earnest mind that, with however little opportunity, is always seeking for a fuller knowledge of the truth, which the priest should offer to God. It is surely a sacrifice—how costly a sacrifice in some cases!—in which He is well pleased. It is also the condition of the highest inspiration.

## CHAPTER IV

### SOME CLERICAL FAILINGS

THE progress of industrial psychology has familiarised us with the phrase "occupational disease," by which is meant a disease peculiar to, or at least very closely associated with, a particular kind of work. Thus, nystagmus is an affection of the eye prevalent among coal-miners, the result of long periods of work in badly lighted galleries of mines. Mirror-makers suffer from fine tremors, due to the slow absorption of mercury into the system. Silicosis, a form of tuberculosis, is also common among miners. Workers in chocolate and sweet factories form a large group among the victims of certain skin diseases. The risks—of severe dermatitis and even of cancer of the skin—to which workers with X-rays and radium voluntarily subject themselves are well known. As a final example, we may refer to the fact that certain *mental* instabilities not infrequently occur among workmen in indiarubber factories—the result of inhaling carbon bisulphide fumes.

We propose in this chapter to discuss some of the "occupational failings" of the clerical profession. It is not, of course, suggested that the moral and spiritual weaknesses here enumerated are peculiar to the clergy—any more than cancer is peculiar to workers in radium, or dermatitis to chocolate-dippers. But clergy, from the nature of their calling, are perhaps *liable* to them more than other men: the conditions of their work constitute temptations to these sins from which men in other callings are often comparatively free. And where even to say so

much may seem an exaggeration, we shall at any rate try to describe these things in the forms in which they manifest themselves in a clergyman's life.

We notice, to begin with, that some of these failings are ambiguous, regarded from the point of view of their essential significance. Thus, for example, vanity may be sheer, conscious pride and self-conceit: a man may have so good an opinion of himself that his cocksure manner may express nothing more obscure than a frank conviction. When a priest says (as we have heard one say) "After all, I am the person to whom the Bishop naturally looks for a lead," we may size him up pretty safely: we may infer that we need search for no trumpeter for *him*. Vanity of this odious kind is manifest and unmistakable, the direct result of pride, the deadliest of sins. But not every kind of vanity springs from such shady antecedents. Now that psychology has become fashionable—at least so far as its jargon is concerned—we often hear the phrases "superiority-complex" and "inferiority-complex" bandied about with little regard for their real meaning. People describe such a man as the clergyman just quoted as suffering from a "superiority-complex." But that is by no means certain. The word "complex," as used in psychological literature, signifies a repressed, and therefore unconscious, mental state. And a man's unconscious, repressed "superiority" is more likely, on the whole, to express itself in outward conduct and demeanour as an exaggerated *inferiority* than the reverse. We may reasonably doubt, for example, the genuine humility of a man, obviously *not* without considerable gifts in many directions, who doth protest too much and too often that he has only a C 3 brain, that he can neither preach nor teach, and that his ministry, in all its aspects, is and has been no more than a series of blunders. Above all, we should recognize self-pity, in ourselves and in others, as a sure sign of a conviction—repressed and hidden because of its obvious incompatibility

with our profession and reputation—that we are really very exceptional people, and that if we had our deserts, and others (bishops, and patrons of good livings, for example) had eyes to recognize the real thing when they saw it, we should not be jogging along our present obscure and humdrum path.

To return to vanity : when it is due to a “complex” at all, this is, as we have suggested, more likely than not to be an *inferiority* complex. That is to say, an unconscious sense of inferiority may disguise itself, for purposes of outward life and conduct, as superiority : the subject’s vanity and over-self-assurance are in this case a cloak, or, to put it another way, compensation. This is likely to be so in the case of the prig, whose meticulousness in regard to other people’s conduct and character is really a criticism of his own. In this connexion we may recall the observation, which has been frequently made, that we all tend to condemn most vehemently in others just those vices which, unknown to any but ourselves, constitute our own special temptations : though the converse of this is also true, that we may

“Compound for sins we are inclined to  
By damning those we have no mind to.”<sup>1</sup>

Even though, as we have suggested, there are no strictly occupational clerical failings, there is one which is nearly so : namely, indifference to holy things. This may manifest itself in a variety of ways : in carelessness in the conduct of public worship or the private recital of the Divine Office, or in an irreverent demeanour in church, or in a flippant and semi-contemptuous way of speaking of religion, and even of God. All these are clearly the result of familiarity—but of familiarity on the level of habit rather than of sentiment. It is not too much to say that

<sup>1</sup> It seems not impossible, for example, that the heavy legal penalties attached to homosexual vice represent an unconscious over-compensation for the lax standard of the community as a whole in regard to heterosexual sin—at least on the part of men.



they are conspicuous by their absence when a priest's life is the expression of a really living sentiment of love for God ; and whenever we observe traces of such familiarity in ourselves—or infer from the irreverent behaviour or flippant conversation of others that they expect us to find it congenial—we may know that the very foundations of our interior life need strengthening.

Professor McDougall has in a series of books<sup>2</sup> pointed out the immense importance, in the formation of character, of the “sentiment of self-regard.” We cannot agree with him that it should be the governing, co-ordinating sentiment in a man's life : such a view leads at best to a Stoical conception of human nature and its destiny. A Christian's master-sentiment, as we have seen, will be the “Christ-sentiment” ; and growth of Christian character consists in a growing, deepening fellowship with God in Christ, known and served as Lord, Saviour and Friend. But as to the importance, as a constituent part of his Christ-sentiment, of the Christian's sentiment of self-regard—the whole group of ideas as to his own place and purpose in the scheme of things—there can of course be no question. Perhaps the simplest way of expressing the truth is to say that the Christian's “self-regarding” sentiment should be, to borrow a phrase of Mother Julian's, a “self-naughting” sentiment. In other words, his thought of himself will be theocentric, not autocentric. We approach here a question which is ultimately theological rather than psychological : but its bearings upon life and conduct are so great that we make no apology for devoting some attention to it.

The popularly accepted notion of the relationship between the service of man and the worship of God is that the former is the end of life and the latter a means towards its accomplishment : we are to love the brethren—that is the real business of Christian living ; and prayer and worship are the most certain aids towards its accom-

<sup>2</sup> *Social Psychology, Outline of Psychology, Character and the Conduct of Life, etc.*

plishment. Now there is, as we shall point out in a moment, an element of truth in this view. Nevertheless, it inverts the order. *Worship* is the end of human life : contemplation, adoration of God—of what He is, has done, is doing and will do. Worship is the characteristic activity of heaven—that is, of the “atmosphere” pervaded by God’s presence ; and worship is the life for which we are born, and heaven the atmosphere we are meant to breathe. Adoration is the true background of the Christian life. Our prayers, our meditations, our Communions, our attendance at church services, should be so many “moments” of *concentrated* worship in a life which is, in its essential quality, *all* worship. The element of truth in the view we have just rejected is this : that the test of the reality and value of our worship of God is to be found in the character of our service of man—in the *agape* manifested in our contacts with our fellows. But worship, not service, is the end. All other activities of the Christian life—work, duty, the love of our neighbour—are either the expression, the consequences, of our worship, or means towards making it more worshipful. “Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God” : that is, they shall enjoy the heavenly life. We are not told : Blessed are they who see God, for they shall be pure in heart. The vision of God—heaven—is the end : purity of heart, discipline of the will and affections, control of the instincts and emotions—all these are means towards that end, of dwelling continually with Him and with Christ our Lord.

Considerations such as these must clearly have the greatest influence on our self-regarding sentiment. And there can be little doubt that we clergy often fail precisely because our religion—and, in particular, our sense of our fundamental vocation as Christian ministers—is less than thoroughly theocentric. What is at fault, only too often, is our sentiment of self-regard. Either it has become (temporarily at least) the dominant sentiment of our life ;

or it is giving a false colouring to the Christ-sentiment in which it is incorporated. The result in both cases is the same: it produces either pride or spiritual deadness and depression.<sup>3</sup> The truth of this may be illustrated by reference to our prayers. Prayer (even for spiritual blessings) which is self-centred, concentrated upon the person praying rather than on Him to whom the prayer is addressed, is something less than Christian prayer. It may even be, as Archbishop Temple said in one of his addresses during the Oxford University Mission in 1931, no more than a pious aspiration addressed to no one in particular: "I cannot imagine," he added, "anything more tedious or more futile." And when we find prayer tedious we are apt to give it up, or to fall into spiritual despair, with disastrous results to ourselves and to others.

We may take another illustration, this time from our life in the world, in order to see how empty and spiritually deadening our service of others may be unless it is rooted in worship, springing from the desire to serve *God*, and issuing in thanksgiving to Him for having used us for His purposes; unless, in a word, it is theocentric and not autocentric. I set out, it may be, to do this or that for another, with little or no thought of God. Then, if I succeed, I am apt to fall into pride and self-congratulation: how good I am, how generous, how unlike some others I know, with greater gifts and opportunities than mine! But I may fail: then, this was because the other man was not the sort of person one *can* help; or, this evidently is not my job, and I had better leave it to someone else next time—anyway, I cannot be expected to try again!

The ills arising from a disproportionate self-regarding sentiment are indeed endless. We may refer to two others, tending in the same direction, though differing in some respects from those already described.

<sup>3</sup> *Cp.* the saying (the source of which is unknown to us) that "Depression is self-confidence which has failed."

The word "Vicaritis" is probably not to be found in the New English Dictionary ; but it would have to be included in any glossary of modern ecclesiastical terms. It denotes the aggressive, overbearing, tyrannical attitude adopted by some clergy, not only towards their assistant curates, but in their relations with every worker in the parish, voluntary or otherwise. Such men give the impression of believing in a threefold ministry of bishops, incumbents and curates, in which the last named are a necessary evil, and the first an archaic and redundant survival. We do not suggest that a perverted self-regarding sentiment is the sole ingredient in "Vicaritis" ; but it will always be found to be a contributory factor, and any priest who sees signs of it in himself should examine his conscience as to the place which *he himself* occupies in his thought about God and His purposes.

To the factor we have been discussing is also to be attributed, at least in part, one of the commonest traits of the "professionally" religious—Pharisaism ; the tendency to regard ourselves as enjoying a confidence with God which is denied to others ; the sense of being "in the know" in regard to spiritual things.

We need add nothing here to what was said in Chapter II about rationalization. But in any consideration of clerical (as of all other) shortcomings this extraordinary capacity of the mind for self-deception must be remembered, and we would reiterate what was said in that chapter as to the importance of true self-knowledge and the ways of attaining it. If one may assume that what the clergy recommend to the laity is what they practise themselves, and that the writers of books of devotion are typical of the clergy, it would seem that few of our brethren have got much beyond that conception of self-examination which refers to isolated sinful acts. What is much more important, as we saw, is that we should discover our *tendencies*—that is, our sentiments. And the life of a clergyman affords endless

opportunities for that deadliest form of hypocrisy, self-deception. Vanity posing as dignity ; priggishness, as self-respect ; self-pity, as the result of overwork ; meanness or slovenliness, as asceticism ; moral cowardice, or worldliness, as being all things to all men ; insincerity, as humility ; who among us can say that these and similar rationalizations find no place in his own life ?

It is a commonplace of modern psychology to emphasize the importance, in the growth of character, of environment, upbringing, experience. Successful psychotherapy—of whatever school or by whatever means—consists in the first place of discovering (or rather of helping the patient to discover) the situations in his past history which gave rise to the maldevelopments which have led to his present condition ; and secondly of redirecting the mental forces thus liberated along other and healthier channels. The processes of conversion, or spiritual education, are obviously, *mutatis mutandis*, very much the same. “Conversion” means the repeated and continuous direction towards God of all the elements of our psychical life, and for this to take place effectively it is of the greatest value to understand the reasons which have prevented it hitherto. These reasons will always be found to involve some element of “intra-psychical conflict” ; conflict, that is to say, between different desires, emotions and tendencies of the personality, or between the whole personality and the facts of life. Let us consider one or two of them.

It is well known that the Adlerian school of “individual psychology” lays the greatest emphasis on the ego-tendencies—the “masculine protest” or “will to power”—as the fundamental characteristic of human nature, in contrast to Freud’s emphasis on sexuality. This will to power only redoubles its energies in the face of obstacles, so that the whole individual life-process may be regarded as an attempt to overcome the feeling of inferiority which would otherwise be produced by the inevitable thwarting of the will to

power.<sup>4</sup> The conquest of obstacles is accomplished by means of *compensation*.<sup>5</sup> This may take a physical form—as when the undersecretion of one of the endocrine glands is “compensated” for by the oversecretion of another.<sup>6</sup> More commonly, the compensation is effected by an increase of the will to power. In extreme cases, this reveals itself as a neurosis: with these we are not here concerned. Usually, the compensation is achieved by the over-development of some egoistic tendency. Frustrated in one direction, the ego goes “all out” in another.

Now, it is clear that compensation of this kind may often be a contributing factor in many clerical “failings”; and, where this is so, it will increase our self-knowledge to discover it. “Vicaritis,” for example, may sometimes owe something to the fact that a henpecked husband or children-driven father is not master in his own household; very well, then, he will show his curate and his lady worker who is master where *they* are concerned. Doctrinal rigidity, to the point of blind obscurantism, may conceal neglect—or incapacity—to think out the intellectual implications of one’s creed or to relate it to the facts of life. When we find ourselves being over-critical of the mistakes of others, we are generally “compensating” for futility in ourselves which we will not acknowledge. Pomposity, aggressive mannerisms—such as the common and singularly irritating one of making responses too loudly, or saying the second half of the

<sup>4</sup> It is, of course, obvious that every human being begins life in an “inferior” position.

<sup>5</sup> Adler’s use of this term is slightly different from, and on the whole simpler than, Jung’s. “Whereas Adler restricts his concept of compensation to a mere balancing of the feeling of inferiority, I conceive it as a general functional adjustment, an inherent self-regulation of the psychic apparatus.” (Jung: *Psychological Types*, p. 532.) In Jung’s usage, “compensation” means a usual and universal balance and proportion between conscious and unconscious elements: according to him, it is only what might be called “over-compensation” which is unusual: “the aim of analytical therapy” is said to be “to make the unconscious contents conscious in order that compensation may be re-established.”

<sup>6</sup> On the nature and function of these glands see further Chapter V.

verses of a psalm, either a little before or a little after the rest of the congregation—may any of them be disguised expressions of the will to power, ways of self-assertion.<sup>7</sup>

Reference was made on the last page to the phenomenon of *physical* compensation, where the organism as a whole

“develops a tendency to stimulate an ineffective, ‘inferior’ organ to greater efforts, or to strengthen some other part of the organic system connected with the inferior organ, and to increase its development and effectiveness, so that the total operative capacity of the organ in question attains a normal level (compensation), or even exceeds it (over-compensation).”<sup>8</sup>

This is the process known to biologists as “regeneration.” Examples of it are not uncommon in every grade of organic being: thus, in many cases,

“if a part of an organism is taken away by mechanical violence, the remaining part regenerates the lost part, and so restores the complete organism. The case of the newt’s limbs is perhaps the most widely-known. . . .”<sup>9</sup>

These facts help us to understand how, when a physical defect cannot for some reason be thus physically regenerated by the body-mind unity, which is, so to speak, the teleological agent at work, another course is open—namely *psychical* compensation for purely *physical* inferiority. Thus,

“We may notice that many remarkably small men—of course by no means all; overstatement is especially deplorable in such instances—speak unusually loudly, as though to say ‘Stop! Don’t overlook me; although people fail to see me, they shall at least hear me.’ Perhaps one might discern a similar motive behind the child’s habit of talking and crying more loudly than necessary, although this is certainly to a large extent to be interpreted in terms of ‘the pleasure of right function.’ Further, the trivial fact that almost everyone imagines that by loud speaking he emphasizes

<sup>7</sup> Cp. the fact that weak characters are notoriously liable to be obstinate.

<sup>8</sup> R. Allers: *op. cit.*, p. 93.

<sup>9</sup> W. McDougall: *Body and Mind*, p. 239.

his words or commands, points to a similar connection. This mechanism of compensation, occurring in a different field from that of the inferiority, accounts, at any rate partly, for the frequently noted intellectuality of hunchbacks, as in the case of Moses Mendelssohn, or for their malice and love of intrigue, as with Thersites. A very remarkable instance is that of Shakespeare's *Richard III.*"<sup>10</sup>

The tendency to regard persons as things may be mentioned here : it is sometimes the consequence of a perverted sentiment of self-regard, sometimes an expression of the will to power, sometimes of both. Nothing in our experience is more beautiful than the true pastor's relation to his flock, loving them as brothers and sisters for whom Christ died : and nothing, surely, less Christlike than the attitude of a clergyman who regards his people as a mere means of livelihood, or (still worse) of self-advancement. That is this sin at its worst. A slightly less odious form of the same thing is the habit of *dragooning* people, trying to manage their lives for them ; in intimate dealings with individuals, forgetting that the true relationship of a soul to God—the ideal, therefore, which a director of souls should set before himself and before those who seek his help—is not that of a slave but of a son.<sup>11</sup>

There are of course connexions of other kinds between traits of personality and physical disabilities. We will mention only one. Probably every parson is subject at some time or other to that horrid concatenation of depression, unaccountable laziness, and irritability over trifles which the ancients called *acedia*. Bishop Francis Paget's paraphrase of S. Thomas's description of it is worth quoting :

" the dreary, joyless, thankless, fruitless gloom of sullenness, the sour sorrow of the world ; the wanton, wilful, self-distressing that numbs all love and zeal for good ; that sickly, morbid weariness in which the soul abhors all manner of meat and is even hard at death's door ; that woeful

<sup>10</sup> R. Allers : *op. cit.*, p. 96. Allers represents a modified Adlerism.

<sup>11</sup> Cp. L. Hodgson : *Essays in Christian Philosophy*.



lovelessness in which all upward longing fails out of the heart and will—the sin that is opposed to the joy of love.”<sup>12</sup>

It should be recognised that the *causes* of this condition may be at least as much physical as spiritual ; that other factors go to the making of it as well as—generally, perhaps, even more than—the mortal sin of sheer sloth. Such are, commonly, lack of exercise, overstrain, unsuitable diet and, in many cases, perhaps, malfunctioning of certain of the glands of internal secretion. It will be noted that none of these factors is beyond the competence of the subject—with the help of his doctor and wife or housekeeper—to handle.

A frequent accompaniment of accidie—though it may exist alone—is hypersensitiveness or “touchiness,” for which the clergy are not altogether unjustly noted. This may be due to various causes ; most commonly, perhaps, to an exaggerated sentiment of self-regard, which shrinks from the cold light of reality and truth, and adopts this attitude to protect itself. On the other hand, hypersensitiveness may represent an over-development of the “instinct of submission” ; or it may be a disguised fear—of giving oneself away, of an unrepented sin, of some particular temptation, of the opinion of others. In any case, an essential stage in the process of letting the Holy Spirit work in us the conquest of this sin is, as always, self-knowledge.

Another weakness greatly illuminated by Adler’s theory is self-pity. It is part of the mechanism of compensation to project a double picture of oneself. First, there is the picture of the man we should be if it were not for circumstances over which we have no control—our weak constitution, ill-health or poverty ; other people’s stupidity and lack of responsiveness ; the enervating climate in which we are forced to live ; and so forth. This we are apt to regard as the picture of our *real, essential* self—the self that, surely, God must recognize as the true one. And then, secondly, there is the picture we perforce present to the world—

<sup>12</sup> *The Spirit of Discipline*, p. 48.

broken and spoiled : but it is life, not we, which has spoiled it. Self-pity thus enables us to explain our failures at no cost to our self-esteem ; it protects us against disappointment, and it throws a high light upon those exiguous fields in which (as we flatter ourselves) the ideal and the actual coincide.

This is the age of the expert, when a man must be master of his job if he is to succeed. And it can hardly be denied that the impression given by a good many clergy is that they are not experts : there is evidence, too often, of uncertainty, indecision—in short, as a friendly critic put it to us recently, of “ dithering.” Now, in so far as this charge is true, it is fair to remember the nature of the Christian minister’s task, the most difficult, the most delicate, the most responsible work that any man can undertake, and which none dare undertake save in reliance upon the special grace of God. On the other hand, it is true that, in the Church of England at any rate, the parson’s is on the whole a *safe* job. Only as the result of the gravest moral dereliction is he likely to be unemployed so long as his physical health lasts. He is perhaps the only salaried worker who is practically free from the terror that besets the vast majority in these days—that of being out of work. It is clear that this subconscious sense of security must minister to any tendency towards sloth, half-heartedness, procrastination, unpunctuality or forgetfulness, that a clergyman may have : it must strengthen any disinclination to become a more and more perfect master of his craft. And we mention this trouble of half-heartedness at this point because it derives great, if unconscious encouragement from any tendency towards self-pity. “ I would of course do this or that if I could. But—owing to circumstances entirely outside my control—I cannot. It is no use my even making a start : I should be harassed and hindered, as I have always been in the past.”

It is probable that a vocation to the ministry (as, indeed,

to some other professions) is sometimes a more or less sublimated expression of the will to power. It may also be, in the language of Freudian psychology, a disguised exhibitionism, or a flight into security by a man who knows (unconsciously, or only half-consciously) that, though he would fare ill in one of the more rough-and-tumble professions, as a clergyman he will always be in the centre of the stage, though it may be a small stage. One of the present writers has recently had to deal with a case in which both these motives were realized by a candidate on the eve of ordination. Among other reminiscences of the past it appeared that his favourite game as a child was to dress himself in a white nightdress and "preach" to his baby brother : there were other indications of the same tendency. Also (he was a man of thirty) he had never been able to keep any job for long, and had never been promoted in any position which he had held. It had to be pointed out to him, of course, that neither of these characteristics need be regarded as an absolute bar to ordination ; they were in any case not the sole motives—indeed they were not conscious motives at all—in his seeking to serve God in the ministry ; and to be forewarned was to be forearmed. But we mention the case here in order to suggest that these closely-related factors—the will to power and the impulse of self-display—are surely involved, in a barely sublimated, unconsecrated form, in many cases of clerical censoriousness, ambition for preferment, laying down the law, playing to the gallery in "popular" preaching, petty jealousy and aloofness—to say nothing of "spikery" ; and that we should be on the look-out for these vices at the least signs of them in ourselves.

PART III  
THE FLOCK



## CHAPTER V

### INDIVIDUAL TYPES

THE obvious fact that every man's individuality is unique has never deterred the observer of human nature from dividing his fellows into classes and groups. We may perhaps distinguish three kinds of classification.

(1) The popular. There is here no attempt to be scientific or meticulously accurate; on this reckoning, there are almost as many types as individuals: *quot homines tot varietates*. It is this popular, loose discrimination that we use when we describe a person as belonging to the gentlemanly type, or to the uncouth, the optimistic, the pessimistic, the peppery, the vain, the aesthetic, the "muscular Christian," the bellicose, the jovial, the moody, or the aggressive types—and so on *ad infinitum*.

What may be called the "literary" classification is no more than a refinement of the "popular": it is familiar to Englishmen from the pages of *The Pilgrim's Progress* and William Law's *Serious Call*.

(2) The earliest attempt at a scientific classification of psychological types is that associated with the name of Galen, a Greek physician who lived in Asia Minor in the second century A.D. He distinguished four varieties of temperament—the melancholic or gloomy, the choleric or excitable, the sanguine or unreliable, and the phlegmatic or self-contained. After eighteen hundred years there is still value in this classification—though not, it should be added, in its hypothetical basis, Galen supposing that the differences were due to a predominance of gall, bile, blood

and phlegm respectively in the system. Nevertheless, it is a striking instance of science, like history, repeating itself, that in our own day the most probable explanation of the ultimate basis of temperament should be a physical one. "The temperament of a man," says McDougall,

"may be provisionally defined as the sum of the effects upon his mental life of the metabolic or chemical changes that are constantly going on in all the tissues of his body."<sup>1</sup>

Recent research has shown that the most influential of these chemical changes are those that take place in the endocrine glands—or glands of internal secretion, as they are also called: we shall have something more to say about them later.

(3) The classification of temperamental types most generally accepted to-day is that suggested by Dr. C. J. Jung, or some modification of it.<sup>2</sup> Jung's principal distinction, and the one most familiar to the layman, is that between *introvert* and *extravert*. The following description of these two types is by a writer thoroughly familiar with Jung's thought:—

"Jung has worked out . . . two fundamentally opposite types . . . to which he has severally given the names of 'extravert' and 'introvert.' They are distinguished by the attitude adopted in each case towards the object. The *libido*, or psychic energy, or interest, of the extravert flows outwards to the object: objective facts or external happenings are the all-important factors of life for him. People and things and events are endlessly interesting to him, and he adapts himself easily and well to his environment. He is the man with 'many irons in the fire,' and is never so happy as when his days are full to overflowing with business or other activities. . . . He is eminently social and detests solitude. . . . The attitude of the introvert is diametrically opposite. His interest is fundamentally subjective and not objective. . . . For the introvert the significance of the

<sup>1</sup> *Outline of Psychology*, p. 354.

<sup>2</sup> *Psychological Types*. See also Jung's essay ("Psychological Types") in *Problems of Personality: Studies Presented to Dr. Morton Prince*.

object lies not in itself but in how it appears to him. It is not the situation objectively considered, but the situation *as he sees it*, that is the decisive factor. The first reaction of the introvert to the object is apt to be a negative one. Whereas the extravert, so to speak, enfolds the world in his arms, and cheerfully seeks adventure therein, full of faith in its benevolence towards himself, the introvert is never quite at home in the external world of men and things. He views it with more or less suspicion and fear, and unable to adapt easily to it, withdraws into himself, into his own inner kingdom, where he is quite at home. He can not only endure solitude, which would break the extravert: a certain amount of it is necessary to his mental health and happiness. As a rule, self-expression is difficult to him, and he is apt to appear dull and uninteresting."<sup>3</sup>

It will be noticed that introversion and extraversion are here regarded as two distinguishable *attitudes* of the *personality as a whole* to the external world. In Jung's own words,

"this then is the basic characteristic of the extraverted attitude: the psychic life is displayed, so to speak, outside the individual in objects and relationships to objects. In especially marked cases there occurs a sort of blindness for one's own individuality. In contrast with this, the introvert always conducts himself towards the object as if the latter possessed a superior power over him against which he had to steady himself."<sup>4</sup>

The problem of psychological types would be simple indeed if this were all; if the distinction between introvert and extravert were always plain and unmistakable, and we could label any individual "E" or "I" without more ado and be done with it. But of course no one is completely introverted, and no one completely extraverted. It is always a case of "on the whole." Further, there is abundant evidence (in dream-experience, for example) that the introversion of individuals belonging to this type

<sup>3</sup> Joan Corrie: *The A.B.C. of Jung's Psychology*, pp. 32-34.

<sup>4</sup> *Problems of Personality*, p. 296.



is balanced or compensated,<sup>5</sup> in the hidden and normally inaccessible depths of personality known as the Unconscious, by extravert elements ; and *vice versa* : and that some neurotic conditions are best understood as the rebellion or self-assertion of such unconscious elements, hitherto denied sufficient expression owing to their incompatibility with the dominant attitude (whether introverted or extraverted) of the person concerned.

The matter is still further complicated, if we follow Jung, by the fact that, in addition to these two distinguishable object-relationships, colouring the whole mental and physical life of the individual, he divides the activities of human beings into four separable *functions*—sensation, thinking, feeling, intuition.

“ Under the heading *sensation*, I wish to include all apperception by means of sense organs ; by *thinking* I understand the function of intellectual cognition and the forming of logical conclusions ; *feeling* is a function of subjective evaluation, and *intuition* I hold to be apperception by an unconscious method, or the perception of an unconscious content.”<sup>6</sup>

Now, one or other of these functions is, broadly speaking, characteristic of every human being. There are people (the “ sensation-types ”) whose lives seem to be wholly at the mercy of their environment. At its most self-conscious and most sophisticated, the sensation-type is seen in the pseudo-hedonism which affects to regard it as man’s highest duty to himself to refuse no experience ; at its worst, in the man or woman “ tossed about by every wind ” and influence. The thinking-type is the logician pure and simple, or the philosopher, or the man who knows what he wants from life, and plans and follows every step of the way to his goal. The behaviour and interests of the feeling-type are dominated by his likes and dislikes ; while

“ ‘ intuitives ’ concern themselves neither with ideas nor with feeling reactions, nor yet with the reality of things, but

<sup>5</sup> See p. 99.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 297.

give themselves up wholly to the lure of possibilities and abandon every situation where no further possibilities are scented.”<sup>7</sup>

Now, “*every one of these types* (sensation, thinking, feeling, intuition) *can be introverted or extraverted* according to his relation to the object in the way described above.”<sup>8</sup>

Humanity is thus, on this elaborate theory, divided into eight main types. We must not allow ourselves to be blinded to the fundamental truth and practical usefulness of the theory by its appearance of artificiality and ingenuity. “Too neat and tidy to be true,” the student is inclined to say. But an example or two may convince us that Jung is on the right track, although some of the terms he uses to distinguish the subdivisions of his two main types are somewhat vague and ambiguous. (It will be remembered that we are here discussing *pure* types—which of course do not exist. Any of the following descriptions would require to be modified in the case of any real individual, however nearly he seemed to correspond to it.)

Consider two clergymen of the thinking-type; one of them extraverted, the other introverted. The extravert’s knowledge tends to be of the inductive kind, based upon the contemplation and study of external facts and objects. Since he is anxious to share his knowledge with others, he has the makings of a good teacher in him. It is easy to persuade him to join a study circle. At the same time, he tends to be dogmatic, even dictatorial, and his pupils or fellow-students may find him unsympathetic with their point of view: they may suspect that he thinks of them largely as wax tablets to be impressed with his own personality. And it is true that his capacity for sympathy, as for feeling of any kind, is exceedingly small. This defect he shares with his introverted brother of the thinking-type. (This, perhaps, is why both of them tend almost to over-emphasize the truth that religion is a matter of the “will”

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 298.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 14.

and not of the emotions.) But in other respects they are very different. The introvert's mental processes are deductive. He is interested in ideas for their own sake, less than for what they will accomplish when translated into conduct. He is never a pragmatist. He shuns controversy and debate : he is unconcerned to share his knowledge with others or to bring them to think as he does, with the result that in conversation he is apt either to be inarticulate or to mislead people as to his own real opinions. He is a bad committeeman, and the idea of "groups" or "circles" as conducive to sound thinking seems to him preposterous. He probably keeps a diary ; but he will never publish his autobiography.

As examples of the feeling-type we will consider two young women of the educated class who have just left school. The extravert is at the university, having persuaded her parents to send her there, not so much for its educational advantages as because many of her schoolfellows are there, and she is likely still further to widen the circle of her friendships. She makes friends very readily : it is the easiest thing in the world for her to be all things to all men—and most women. She takes to others so easily, and they to her, that she hardly has time to reflect that some of her friendships have little real depth, or that one or two of them are, on her side, almost insincere. Her few enemies accuse her of being shallow. She is highly impressionable. Her religious sentiment is finding expression in Buchmanism : the emotional side of religion is very real to her, and she has no difficulty or shyness in discussing religion in general, or her own religion in particular, with other people ; she is a good "sharer."

The introverted girl of the feeling-type presents, to the intelligent observer, a striking contrast. She is sensitive, retiring, shy. Being a person with a great capacity for affection, she is not without friends ; but they are few, and even those of them who know her best sometimes remark on

how little of her they really do know. To strangers she appears self-conscious and aloof: this is because she finds it very difficult to be "natural" in the company of others. It is possible that she will never marry: not because she is a misanthrope, but because no man will ever get to know her well enough to penetrate below her reserve to the deep wells of affection beneath. She finds it next to impossible to discuss, even with her nearest and dearest, the things about which she feels most deeply. This applies to her religion, which is of the mystical type, and does not easily find itself at home in what is called "Church life." She is apt to be misunderstood and misjudged: her vicar, for example, who notices that she is frequently present at the weekday Eucharist, and that she often remains on her knees for half an hour or more after the service is over, cannot understand why she declines his repeated invitations to her to teach in the Sunday School, or to become a district visitor. He recalls, too, that, when he prepared her for Confirmation, though he was somehow certain that the instructions were making a real impression on her, and though, in particular, he guessed that she was going through something like an agony of repentance, she reacted very strongly against the idea of making her confession. He concludes that she is an odd creature.

The practical usefulness of these distinctions, general and liable to modifications as they undoubtedly are, is that they help us to understand many of the difficulties and incompatibilities of everyday life. It is clear, for example, that an introvert-thinking vicar is unlikely to be a hero to his extravert-feeling curate, while there are obvious opportunities of friction in a family which contains marked examples of several of the types.

To return to the broad distinction between introversion and extraversion. It should be remembered that these words apply to different types of *temperament*, that is, to different attitudes (having an ultimately physical foundation)

of the whole personality to the whole of experience. Temperament is to be clearly distinguished from *disposition*, by which (following McDougall<sup>9</sup>) we understand "the sum total of an individual's instinctive tendencies."

"When some one of the instinctive tendencies is disproportionately strong, that one characteristic becomes the individual's 'disposition.' Thus, when a man is by nature extremely pugnacious, we say that he has a pugnacious disposition."

The difference between temperament and disposition may be seen by remembering that, while a man's disposition is only manifested under appropriate conditions—a sociable man's, for example, being in abeyance when he is alone, and a greedy man's when he is replete—his temperament is concerned in every thought, word and action of his life. It would be an exaggeration to say that disposition is what we make ourselves, while temperament is what heredity makes us : but it is true that whether we are predominantly pugnacious, inquisitive, fearful, gregarious, etc., or not, is a matter very much more under our own control than whether we are introverted or extraverted. The ideal, presumably, would be a perfectly disciplined expression of all the instincts and a perfect balance between introversion and extraversion. And, before we decide that such an ideal would be cold and dull, pulseless and lifeless, we may reflect on the striking fact that the Perfect Man fulfilled it. Using the words in the senses just defined, you can describe neither our Lord's "disposition" nor His "temperament."

The dangerous potentialities of extreme introversion and of extreme extraversion should be noted. If, for whatever contributory reasons, the introvert falls a victim to mental disorder, it is likely to be some form of neurasthenia, possibly *dementia praecox* : the mentally deranged extravert, on the other hand, tends to hysteria. One or two clinical descriptions will make this clear :

<sup>9</sup> *Outline of Psychology*, pp. 351 ff.

"The patient was a puny, nervous child, with fears of the dark and of birds. He had to leave school at 16 because of 'timidity' and self-consciousness. At 23 he graduated from college and went on his father's farm where he has worked ever since. He had already at 22 begun to have depressed episodes. His personality was quiet, shy, book-loving, unaggressive, but ambitious and day-dreaming. For two years before admission to hospital he was gradually losing interest in his work, and was eating and sleeping badly, but his chief complaint was lack of energy, so that his work seemed difficult. His farming had not been financially satisfactory in recent years, and his love affairs, of which he had several, had not prospered. When first seen he was inactive, lying in bed a good deal. He admitted some depression, but his principal complaint was lack of energy and of interest. There was no difficulty in thinking and no evidence of emotional or intellectual defect. He discussed his condition willingly and accepted the explanations given him."<sup>10</sup>

The authorities here quoted remark that nowadays neurasthenia in pure culture has become very rare "since physicians ceased to expect it so frequently and to search for its symptoms so diligently."<sup>11</sup> Every mental hospital, on the other hand, contains cases of dementia praecox, so called because it tends to lead to a state of dementia and is so liable to arise (it need not: most cases begin in the early twenties) in childhood. The disease, says McDougall, "remains a mystery and a problem": the symptoms are so varied that at least three kinds of dementia praecox are commonly distinguished: but "there is one symptom which can be said to be common to all, namely, a loss of emotional or affective contact with their fellow-men."<sup>12</sup>

"Q.M., who was admitted to the Glasgow Royal Mental Hospital at the age of 26, was reported to have been always 'nervous.' He had stuttered at the age of 15, and as the consequence of a fright, when he had been left alone in a schoolroom, he was kept away from school for a year. He

<sup>10</sup> Henderson and Gillespie: *Text-book of Psychiatry*, p. 411.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>12</sup> *Outline of Abnormal Psychology*, p. 370.

was easily led by companions, and very obedient to his parents. Once at school his teacher had drawn his face on the board and said it was 'like the moon.' He remembered this bitterly, and his personal appearance became an increasingly sensitive point. Partly as the result of this, he was shy, and felt 'like a kind of clown' in company. When he left school at 16 he was apprenticed as an engineer, but as he developed Raynaud's symptoms his over-solicitous parents considered the work unsuitable. In 1914 (at 18) he enlisted and was not discharged till 1917, but he saw no service, having spent most of his time in hospital on account of a supposed heart lesion. On his discharge he had an operation for cervical adenitis. He became increasingly preoccupied about his health, so that if he read a book in which a disease was mentioned he at once imagined that he had that disease. At 22 he courted a girl, but 'I felt that if I kept it up I'd go wrong in my head.' He ceased seeing the girl, concentrated on his work, and felt better for a time. This failure only increased his general sense of insufficiency. 'I never felt I was just a man. I wasn't taking my right place. I was going about things apologetic. I could never talk right clear. I could never take the place I should have taken according to my age. . . . I never let myself go—for fighting or anything like that or taking up with a girl.' After discharge from the army he had worked for his father, but his anxious preoccupation about his health, his sensitiveness about his appearance and his general feeling of dissatisfaction with himself interfered so much with his concentration that his head 'buzzed,' and he had done no work for ten months before admission to hospital. After leaving off work, his preoccupation increased, he became more and more depressed about himself, and more and more secretive, so that he did not wish to see anyone, thought everyone was looking at him and hinted at suicide. When admitted to hospital he was quiet and co-operative, but very jerky in speech and movements, hesitating in the middle of sentences as if his thoughts had been interrupted. Soon he began to express definite persecutory ideas. He was 'being made an example of,' and to 'appear the biggest fool in the world.' Finally, there was 'a system being worked' against him. His conduct became impulsive—he escaped over the garden wall, and returned voluntarily, saying he thought 'a race might do him good.' Within four months of admission

hallucinations appeared, and at times mutism, verbigeration and flexibilitas cerea. Physically, there was no evidence of organic disease."<sup>13</sup>

It may be said that reference to such cases is unnecessary in a volume on Pastoral Psychology: they do not come within the purview of the clergy. But in fact they may, at least in their early stages. It is in most cases unlikely that the incipient signs of dementia praecox will be recognized for what they are by the patient's friends. Prevention is better than cure: and, as we shall see later, *the whole tendency of modern psychology is to emphasize the importance of readjusting and redirecting mental kinks and crookednesses at their earliest appearance*.<sup>14</sup> Apprehension, then, might reasonably be felt concerning a child who was abnormally shy and seclusive, shunning companionship in work or play, absorbed in his own society and his own phantasies, his only response to others being to accept complacently any suggestion made to him (though without taking any personal interest in anything he was led to do as the result of such suggestions). No less suspicious would be a boy in the later stages of adolescence whose general attitude to his surroundings betrayed a profound introversion: who became markedly apathetic and indifferent, to the point of being regardless of the impression he made (however surprising, disagreeable, or provoking) on other people; with whom it became more and more difficult to maintain really sympathetic relations; who was apparently incapable of regret, or pity, or enthusiasm; whose personal habits grew slovenly, or worse; who plainly regarded the world and its inhabitants as existing for his comfort and convenience, and interpreted trivial events and casual remarks, even by strangers, as directed either to his own harm or well being.

In either of these cases the observer would be justified in

<sup>13</sup> Henderson and Gillespie: *op. cit.*, pp. 189-190.

<sup>14</sup> Ὁ δὲ καιρὸς ὀξύς: there is no field in which this saying, attributed to Hippocrates, is more urgently to be borne in mind than in the field of psychological development.



warning the individual's family of the probable outcome of such traits of temperament if allowed to continue unchecked.

If the characteristic neurosis of the introvert is dementia praecox, that of the extravert is hysteria, a common feature of this disease being dissociation, that is to say the splitting of the personality into two currents flowing independently of one another. "Functional" paralysis, tics, fugues, and double or multiple personality are typical hysterical conditions: illustrative cases may be found in any text-book of psychopathology. But the potential dangers of even extreme extraversion are so small compared with those of the "shut-in," introverted temperament that we do not think it necessary to say more about them here.

Attention has been called above to the important distinction (for purposes of psychological discussion) between temperament and disposition. Both are to be distinguished, further, from *temper*, *mood*, *sentiment* and *habit*. Of the nature of a sentiment something has been said in Chapter II. We may follow McDougall in regarding a man's "temper" as expressing "qualities common to all his emotional tendencies" (steadfastness and fickleness are good examples) and "mood" as the persistence of an emotional state of mind, even after the object which evoked it has been banished from consciousness: thus, irritability is likely to continue for some time after an angry dispute. Finally, "habit" is "an acquired facility"—primarily of bodily movement.<sup>15</sup> McDougall carefully distinguishes between true habits (which may be good or bad, valuable or not) and such miscalled "habits" as punctuality, courtesy, thrift, etc.: these, as being "that consistency of conduct which comes from the sentiments," are *principles*. True courtesy, for example, comes from the soul: it is more than a certain automatic movement of the hand to the hat when meeting a lady.

<sup>15</sup> *Outline of Psychology*, p. 360; *Character and Conduct of Life*, p. 72.

The sum-total of the mental and physical states so far mentioned in this chapter constitutes *personality* or *character*: a man *is*, we might almost say, what his temperament, disposition, sentiments, habits and moods make him.<sup>16</sup> One of the most interesting developments of recent psychology consists in various attempts to devise means of discovering the "set" of an individual's personality, by methods more accurate and scientific, and less liable to distortion and error, than are those of either introspection or "ordinary, common-sense" observation. The practical value of such "tests of temperament and personality," if they could be perfected, is evident. It would, for example, save many young people from entering forms of employment in which they will find themselves square pegs in round holes. It would enable an employer, who knew what kind of man he wanted for a particular job, to avoid engaging another kind of man. It might even help a vicar to discover whether a prospective curate was really likely to be as "good with men and lads"—or at any rate with the men and lads of this particular parish—as the young man was confident he would be. "Vocational guidance" (in the choice of work) and "vocational selection" (in the choice of applicants for particular kinds of work), based on "tests" of temperament and character, are already much used in America, and their use is growing in England. An example or two may be given.

<sup>16</sup> This sentence may strike some readers as over-deterministically expressed. It should no doubt be balanced by the reflection that the overcoming of temperamental and other defects is the work of God, going on daily before our eyes. Cp. Von Hügel (*Essays and Addresses*, Series II, p. 242): "I used to wonder, in my intercourse with John Henry Newman, how one so good, and who had made so many sacrifices to God, could be so depressing. And again, twenty years later, I used to marvel contrariwise, in my intercourse with the Abbé Huvelin, how one more melancholy in natural temperament than even Newman himself, and one physically ill in ways and degrees in which Newman never was, could so radiate spiritual joy and expansion as, in very truth, the Abbé did. I came to feel that Newman had never surmounted his deeply predestinarian, Puritan training; whilst Huvelin had nourished his soul, from boyhood upwards, on the Catholic spirituality as it flowered in S. Francis."

The examinee is given a list of words and asked to cross out those which arouse unpleasant associations in his mind. Such a test, assuming the honesty and good faith of the individual, clearly gives some insight into his emotional make-up. Or he may be asked to arrange a series of delinquencies in the order of what seems to him their heinousness; this is a test of moral judgment. A boy known to us was told to write the alphabet as quickly as he could; then to write A 1, B 1, C 1, D 1, etc. and then A 2, B 2, C 2,—and so on till he was stopped. When he had got as far as K 4, the examiner suddenly rapped on the table and said, "Now make an 'S' backwards and then get on with the other job." This was presumably to test the ease with which the boy could be thrown out of his stride.<sup>17</sup> As an example of industrial tests, we may refer to one for tram drivers, the purpose of which is to measure, under conditions analogous to those of the streets, but without their dangers, the quickness of the men's response to stimuli representing various degrees of danger. (In view of the mortality from street accidents it is difficult to see why tests for pedestrians have not yet been introduced!)

The most obvious weakness of most tests of this kind is that they assume that the meaning and significance of any particular stimulus will be the same for all examinees: they ignore the infinite complexity of the human mind. It would seem that more reliable results might be expected from the supplementation of such "objective," "controlled" tests by a frankly "subjective" observation and interpretation of the examinee's spontaneous comments and behaviour when faced with the performance of a number of simple tasks under conditions as normal as possible.

<sup>17</sup> In the course of the same examination the boy was asked, "Do you think you are of inferior or superior intelligence?" to which he replied, "Oh, inferior." "Why?" asked the examiner. "Well, I shouldn't be here if I wasn't, should I?" said the boy, a youth of seventeen whose father was anxious to know what to do with him when he left school. Whether or not he was given full marks, as he deserved, for this particular test we do not know.

An extremely interesting series of such experiments has been made by Mr. P. E. Vernon, of the Cambridge Psychological Laboratory.<sup>18</sup> A dozen men and women were given a number of simple performance tests and games; these included the assemblage of a lock and door-handle mechanism from about nine component parts; the arranging, into any pattern the subject chose, of a number of pieces of card, triangles, squares, etc., of ten different colours; the doing of a post-card size jigsaw puzzle, representing a landscape; the piling on top of one another of fifteen irregularly and unevenly cut cubes of wood; and a puzzle consisting of guiding a steel ball up an inclined plane, beset with obstacles and pitfalls, by means of a knitting needle. No one, we think, could read Mr. Vernon's account of these tests without feeling that his inference is justified: namely that here (and *a fortiori* in improved forms of such tests) is a valid and reliable guide to the detection and measurement of such character-traits as the capacity for being interested, persistence, emotional instability, and degrees of introversion and extraversion. "I could guarantee," says Mr. Vernon, by means of the first two tests mentioned above, and one other,

"to diagnose in about an hour whether aesthetic or scientific tendencies are predominant in any subject, without any introspection on his part or previous knowledge of him."

One of the subjects was a rowing man, of whose capacities Mr. Vernon knew nothing:

"but I managed to deduce from all the tests that he was somewhat slow in the boat, but was very persistent, and not easily upset or hustled; also that, socially, he got on very well in any boat that he was in: these deductions were entirely confirmed by subsequent enquiry."

Work of this kind is in its infancy. But no one can doubt

<sup>18</sup> Article, "Tests of Temperament and Personality," *British Journal of Psychology*, October 1929.

that it will develop, and that improvements in such "applied" psychology will result in greater delicacy and accuracy of method and greater reliability of results. Its potential importance is enormous. The reader need only reflect on its bearing on the problem of vocation in many of its aspects in order to realise this.<sup>19</sup>

Having considered the general nature of temperament and of character, we now proceed to a somewhat closer analysis of their component parts.

(1) Of disposition something has already been said. Instinct is innate; the fundamental endowment with which every individual enters upon life. So much is indisputable, together with the fact that instincts are inherited, in varying degrees of strength, by different individuals.<sup>20</sup> The problems and arguments arise when the further question is asked: are the organization and combination of instincts, to form the bases of sentiments, character and personality (good or bad), also inherited? We cannot enter here upon the immensely complicated and debatable topic of mental heredity. But one or two points should be noted.

In the first place, even the most enthusiastic champions of the influence of "nature" against that of "nurture" are less inclined to-day than they were half-a-century ago to interpret the workings of heredity as simply the mechanical "evolution," in the sense of *unrolling*, of what is contained in the germ plasm from which any human being took his beginning. There is the fullest recognition, on the contrary, of the reality of novelty, individuality and "emergence." No individual is *merely* "a chip off the old

<sup>19</sup> A clergyman could easily devise ways of testing his boys and young men in this way, without their knowing what was being done.

<sup>20</sup> That is why genius and madness are so closely allied. A person born with certain powerfully developed instincts will be a genius if he becomes successfully adapted to the circumstances of life. If he fails completely in this, he will end in a lunatic asylum.

block." Secondly, the whole question of the heritability of "acquired characteristics" is far from having been settled. The relative independence and seclusion of the reproductive cells from the rest of the body led to the doctrine (associated with the name of Weissmann) of the "continuity of the germ-plasm," and thence to the view that the parents can hand on only what they themselves receive, nothing that happens to the rest of their bodies being able to affect the germ plasm of which they are, so to speak, the incorruptible trustees. But some recent experiments would seem to suggest the need of considerable modifications of this doctrine.<sup>21</sup>

The truth is, that far less is known about heredity than the popular mind supposes. Broadly speaking, it is of course true that like begets like, that neuropaths will breed children with neuropathic tendencies, and that the children of the mentally sound will be like their parents. But the Mendelian laws of inheritance are more complicated than some of our eugenically minded journalists (clerical as well as lay) suggest. On the whole, it is more important for two people contemplating matrimony to consider the character of the *stock* from which they come respectively—and this involves as complete (and as accurate and scientific) a record as possible of their forbears—than that of their parents.

Finally, we must be on our guard against the fallacy of simply transferring to psychology ideas and expressions

<sup>21</sup> "Professor Pavlov has recently given the results of an interesting enquiry. . . . While some white mice under observation were feeding, an electric bell was rung. After a time, association was established and the mice showed signs of expecting food on sound of the bell, though no food was there to stimulate the organs of vision or smell. So far the mice differed little in their mode of behaviour from one's dog Fido who runs in from the garden when he hears the luncheon gong. But the recent observations on mice disclose a new feature. It took them quite a long time to learn that the sounding of the bell means food. Some 300 lessons were required. But for the children of these mice 100 lessons sufficed; with their children only 30 lessons were needed; and in the case of their children, in the third filial generation, but 5." (Professor C. Lloyd Morgan's Essay in *Evolution in the Light of Modern Knowledge*, p. 143.)

derived from biology. "There is an important point," as Professor A. E. Taylor insists,

"at which the analogy between biological and psychological 'heredity' breaks down. On the biological side there is continuity of an unmistakable kind between the parent organism or organisms and the organism of the offspring. What becomes the organism of the offspring has been at one stage in its history an integral constituent part of the parent organism or organisms. Its history can be traced back to a stage at which the subject of the evolution is actually a part of its own ancestry. On the psychical side this condition is wholly absent. My mind has never, at any stage of its development, been a part of the mind of my parent or parents. . . . We can understand the notion of a 'continuity of germ-plasm'; to speak of a continuous 'psychoplasm' would be to speak unintelligibly. . . . The appearance of a new psychical subject of experience is a fact which is and must remain inexplicable by any theory of development."<sup>22</sup>

(2) We have already alluded to the curious parallel afforded by current theories of the influence of the endocrine glands to the ancient "humeral" doctrine of the physiological basis of the four classical temperaments. These "glands of internal secretion" are so called to distinguish them from those glands (such as the liver, the kidneys and the pancreas) whose secretion is discharged, through openings in themselves, either to the surface of the body (e.g., the sweat glands) or to the viscera (e.g., the salivary glands). The endocrines, on the other hand, are ductless; that is to say, they have no external opening, and their secretions ("hormones"), very minute in quantity, are conveyed to other parts of the body by absorption into the blood. The adrenal, the thyroid, the pituitary and the thymus are the principal glands of this character. (The last named, like the liver and the gonads or sex-glands, is a gland of external as well as internal secretion.) Their importance for our present purpose is their influence on temperament and char-

<sup>22</sup> Article, "Philosophy," in *Evolution in the Light of Modern Knowledge*, pp. 461-462.

acter. Thus, to take the best-known example, a deficiency of thyroid is associated with dullness, apathy and a lack of vitality: cretinism is its extreme form. Conversely, extreme emotional instability may be due to over-secretion of the thyroid gland. Less certainly, excess of thymus secretion is connected, in adults, with abnormal development of the secondary sex characteristics—in men, with slim waists and beardless cheeks; in women, with small breasts and hair on the face—hence it may be a predisposing factor in some cases of homosexuality.

Now, that temperament is susceptible to the influence of chemical substances is sufficiently proved by the influence of drugs, notably of alcohol. As McDougall points out,

“the introvert who takes successive doses of alcohol”—the effect of which “is to produce a state of relative dissociation of the brain, from above downwards in the scale of functions”—“is pushed by them towards the other end of the scale, and, with a sufficiently large dose, becomes markedly extravert.” Conversely, “the action of opium and such drugs is notoriously to induce day-dreaming, to throw the subject into the state in which he dreams rather than acts, and finds his waking dreams, his fantasies, more real than the life of action in the real world; that is to say *they* push the subject towards the introvert end of the scale.”<sup>23</sup>

The influence on temperament of such chemical substances as the secretions of the endocrine glands should, therefore, cause us no surprise. No shepherd of souls can ignore the practical certainty that in many cases of irritability, moodiness and abnormality of sexual desire, endocrine factors are concerned. On the other hand, our knowledge of these glands is extremely limited. Endocrinology is in its infancy: it certainly will not do all that some enthusiasts are claiming for it—an American writer, for instance, who divides humanity into *pituitary*,

<sup>23</sup> *Abnormal Psychology*, pp. 442-443.



*thyroid, thymic* personalities and so on, and can tell the reader to which group any figure in history belonged.<sup>24</sup>

(3) It was pointed out above that the characteristic neurosis of the extravert is hysteria, and that this always involves a greater or less degree of dissociation. The nature of the physiological concomitants of mental dissociation is a difficult and obscure problem, and we can do no more than mention it here. Dissociation would seem to be connected with a heightened resistance of the *synapses*, which are the junctions or weak points between the cells ("neurons") of the nervous system: the passage of the nervous impulse is thus inhibited, with the result that the lower-level activities of the brain (the instincts and their related emotions) find immediate expression without interference from the higher brain-levels. Conversely, when there is no such resistance or blocking of the current at the synapses, the lower-level functions are controlled and inhibited by the higher levels. Introversion and extraversion, therefore, are on this view related to peculiarities of nervous equipment.<sup>25</sup>

So far, we have considered the part played by "nature"—the given—in the formation of temperament and character. The old controversy, "nature *or* nurture," has lost most of

<sup>24</sup> L. Berman: *The Glands Regulating Personality*. More sober estimates of the influence of these glands will be found in the works of Professor McDougall quoted in the text: see also Henderson and Gillespie's *Text-book of Psychiatry*.

<sup>25</sup> On all this see McDougall: *Abnormal Psychology*, Chaps. 3 and 28. Broadly speaking, there are three "levels" in the nervous system of man—commonly known as the reflex, the sensation-reflex, and the association levels respectively. These appear to correspond to three stages in man's evolution. The simplest illustration to take of these levels is that in which the nervous system is under the influence of alcohol. The highest level, being the latest to be evolved and therefore the least stable, is the earliest to be affected; the man first loses his critical faculty, and talks volubly and wildly. Next, the sensation-reflex or intermediate level, is influenced, and he is unable to control his muscular movements. Finally, the drunken man sinks into a deep sleep, in which, however, the lowest reflex level is still operative, as may be tested by sticking a pin into his hand, which will be withdrawn immediately, while he continues to sleep soundly.

its point. No doubt much is "given"; much is beyond our control. But the whole tendency of modern psychology—and of all the schools of psychology: here, if nowhere else, the Behaviourists and their bitterest opponents speak with one voice—is to emphasize the immeasurable importance of environment, outside impressions, experience; of what happens to the individual no less than—many would say, incalculably more than—what he brings with him. Illustrations of this will be found in plenty in Chapters IV and VI. Here we will only refer to the enormous strength of parental and other early influences.

We need do no more than mention certain factors of obvious importance, such as over-crowding, vicious or brutal parents, absence of opportunities and facilities for play, and extreme poverty, involving undernourishment and a cramping material environment. Two points may be quoted from the discussion of these factors in Dr. Cyril Burt's book, *The Young Delinquent*. As to the influence of poverty, Dr. Burt says roundly, basing his conclusion on very careful statistical records, that "*over one-half of juvenile delinquency is found in homes that are poor or very poor*":<sup>26</sup> in London, the largest annual percentage of such delinquency occurs in a district which includes "the most densely populated parts," where "the death rate is all but the highest; and here, too, is one of the highest of the birth rates."<sup>27</sup> Dr. Burt is careful to add that "only in three per cent. of the male delinquents" studied by him, "and in not one of the female, could the effects of poverty be called the *prime* contributory factor. . . . If the majority of delinquents are needy, the majority of the needy do not become delinquents."<sup>28</sup> Nevertheless, "one delinquent in every ten comes from a family wretchedly poor; lives in a home grossly over-packed at night; and is destitute during the daytime of all means for rational occupation."<sup>29</sup> The second point on which Dr. Burt's opinion may be quoted is

<sup>26</sup> P. 69.<sup>27</sup> P. 71.<sup>28</sup> P. 92.<sup>29</sup> P. 92.

the influence of the step-mother in a poor home. "Whether she manifests the imputed prejudices of the legendary step-parent or not, the sense of such an anomalous relationship, even if but half-realized by the child, is bound to tinge and distort his developing outlook upon social relations as a whole."<sup>30</sup>

What constitutes the danger of such environmental factors as these is the mental disturbance and interior conflict which they may set up. Similar witness to the influence of such early conflict is borne by those schools of psychology broadly distinguishable as "analytical"; those schools, that is to say, which seek to discover the causation and explanation of an adult's mental traits by exploration of his earliest experiences—whether by means of the ordinary interview, of introspection, of psychoanalytical technique, or of hypnotism. The great names here are Freud, Jung and Adler. This is not the place to discuss the controversies to which their work has given rise. No doubt many of their conclusions will have to be revised in the light of further knowledge: indeed these men are, in the course of their own lifetime, beginning this work of revision themselves. But as to the fundamental soundness of their central tenets we can only here express, without attempting to justify, our profound conviction.<sup>31</sup>

One of these tenets is the immeasurable importance, in the formation of character and personality, of the child's mental life. The child's relationship to its parents, and especially to the parent of opposite sex, is of particular significance. It is plain that its first "love-object" is its mother; that is to say, if the child is a boy, his earliest affective attachments are (psychologically) "heterosexual": if a girl, "homosexual." If, now, we consider the process

<sup>30</sup> P. 94.

<sup>31</sup> The opinion of McDougall, who criticizes many of Freud's doctrines very severely, is striking: "I believe that Professor Freud has done more for the advance of psychology than any student since Aristotle." (*Abnormal Psychology*, Preface, p. viii.)

of normal, healthy development, we shall see that its course is slightly different in a boy's case from a girl's. The normal boy passes, at about the age of seven or eight, from a stage at which his mother comprises all but the whole of his universe (outside himself) to one in which his father is the centre of interest, the standard and measure of all things : from a heterosexual stage, that is, to a homosexual. This lasts till he is ten or eleven, when a third stage, another homosexual one, is reached, and the boy begins to find his closest attachments and interests among his own fellows : he becomes a scout, or joins a "gang," or goes to a preparatory school. This stage lasts until puberty is well advanced ; not until seventeen or later does he begin to take much serious notice of or interest in women and girls, and pass to the final and permanent heterosexual stage. The "emotional" development of the girl is clearly different, passing through two homosexual stages (mother 0-10, fellows 10-15) and a period (heterosexual) when her father occupies the centre of her picture (15-18), to a final heterosexual stage.<sup>32</sup>

Now, what seems to happen in too many cases is that this development is arrested at some point, and that the child's affective capacities (or, as Freud would say, its "sexuality") are "fixated" on one or other of the parents. The most obvious illustration of this is the case of the "boy who cannot grow up," the mother's darling who is very often not *allowed* to grow up, to pass on from the stage in which his mother is the dominating emotional, affective influence in his life.<sup>33</sup> It is no good pretending that this is a palatable truth. But neither can there be the slightest doubt—no priest of experience with even the smallest psychological knowledge would deny—that many failures of emotional readjustment in adult life are traceable to a "mother-fixation."

<sup>32</sup> On this paragraph see H. Crichton Miller : *The New Psychology and the Teacher*, Chaps. 4 and 5.

<sup>33</sup> The analogous mother-and-daughter situation is of course very common.

In cases within our experience, it has been a predisposing factor in masturbation and in homosexual behaviour, as well as in incapacity to choose a career, keep a job, or stand up to the knocks and blows of life. The matter is complicated by the fact that where such fixation occurs, repression inevitably occurs too. On the one hand, there is the "pull" of the mother, and of the son's complete attachment to her and dependence on her (often *rationalized* as "duty"): on the other, the "pull" of his own instinctive impulsion towards independence, curiosity, adventure, creativeness, and of the world of persons and things. That the causes of such "fixations" are sometimes obvious, almost inevitable and even excusable—as when a mother and son are drawn together by the former's neglectful, unfaithful or brutal husband, or by his death under circumstances (her own ill-health, for example) which makes it seem natural that the son should assume his father's duties of protection and devotion—do not make them less undesirable.

It is perhaps hardly necessary to stress the inadvisability both of over-demonstrative affection and of continual "repression." The spoilt child is likely to form an altogether exaggerated notion of his own importance, which (as he will incredulously discover) is not shared by the outside world, and perhaps not by his brothers and sisters.<sup>34</sup> Accustomed to his every whim and request being granted, or at least taken seriously, at home, he may come to take such submission as his right: at the least he will have learnt that he can always be sure of attention: he can be the centre of the stage. And this passion for the limelight may cling to him all his life. Open and unashamed, it may make him intolerably egoistical, obtuse and domineering: repressed, it may find disguised satisfaction in some form of exhibitionism, or as some kink or idiosyncrasy that marks him off as being not as other men are: or it may lead to a "double" life in which his

<sup>34</sup> Cp. the story of Joseph and his brethren.

repressed sense of superiority expresses itself in dangerous, anti-social or even criminal ways.

Adler's theory of "organ-inferiority" may be mentioned in this connexion. In Adler's view, the fundamental human impulse is the "will to power" or "masculine protest," the determination to be at the top of the tree. The sexual impulse, so central in Freud's thought, is in Adler's only one variety of egoism. And he points out that a condition which, unless carefully controlled, presents obvious opportunities of being made to serve egoistical interests is that of physical inferiority—sickness, malformation, or what not. Such a child may unconsciously find compensation for its weakness in the sense of power and domination to be obtained from the over-indulgence and inordinate affection of too sympathetic parents.<sup>35</sup>

The snubbed, ignored or bullied child, on the other hand, is exposed to even greater risks. He may be driven into extreme introversion. His initiative and curiosity will be repressed, to find their satisfaction, it may be, in lying, petty thieving, masturbation, eavesdropping and unhealthy prying.

Finally, the child's place in the family may be an important factor in the formation of his character. An only child, the first child, the last child—especially if, in the two latter cases, a long interval separates him from the child next to him in age—runs an obvious risk of being spoilt; though it is also true that "the child who comes second or later in the family, without being the last, may suffer and react just because another is indulged and he is not."<sup>36</sup>

<sup>35</sup> See Adler's *Individual Psychology* for a popular exposition of his views. R. Allers' *The Psychology of Character* contains a modified and more balanced statement of this point of view. And cp. Chap. IV, note 10, above.

<sup>36</sup> Burt, *op. cit.*, p. 95, note 1.

## ADDITIONAL NOTE

A TEMPERAMENTAL condition as to the physical basis of which we are as yet wholly in the dark is the sexually inverted variety.

It is of supreme importance, in any sane discussion of this subject, that we should disabuse our minds of certain popular fallacies : the more so, because they are shared by a large number of inverts themselves.

A clear distinction must be drawn between inversion and "perversion" on the one hand, and what has been called "bi-sexuality" on the other. The meaning of the former term is obvious ; it is bluntly described in *Romans* i, 27 : a pervert is, by any civilized ethical code, a grossly immoral person. Bi-sexuality may be thought of as the possession of a "homosexual impulse so weak that it is eclipsed by the presence of the heterosexual object" <sup>37</sup> : with this we are not here concerned.<sup>38</sup> The true invert, by contrast, is one whose sexual feelings are evoked *solely and exclusively* by members of his own sex. That is the fundamental fact, and the one which normal people find so incredible ; that to the attractions of women and girls the male invert is completely unsusceptible. The thought of sexual relations with any woman is to some inverts as abhorrent and "unnatural" as the thought of such a relationship with any man would be to their normal brothers.

We shall here confine ourselves to inversion in men, though the same abnormality is to be found among women.

<sup>37</sup> Havelock Ellis : *Sexual Inversion*, p. 87.

<sup>38</sup> But see Havelock Ellis : *op. cit.*, p. 166.

Havelock Ellis observes that "well-marked and fully developed cases are probably rarer in women, though a slighter degree may be more common."<sup>39</sup>

That there are such people is the first fact to be faced. But it has also to be recognized that the possession of the inverted temperament need not involve—and in numerous cases does not involve—conduct which in England (and in some other, though not in all European, countries)—is punishable with penal servitude. At the present time there is in some quarters a deplorable tendency to be sentimental about inversion, even to glorify it. This is silly and unnecessary. We do not underrate the possibilities of "sublimation": we may even allow that in some rare cases

"the invert who is genuinely and passionately 'in love' can, and does, rise to heights of heroic fidelity and devotion; . . . that this, like any other pure and self-sacrificing passion, incalculably exalts and ennobles the man who feels it—that it deepens and enriches his experience and marvellously purifies his imagination."<sup>40</sup>

Nevertheless, the fundamental facts remain, that inversion is biologically useless,<sup>41</sup> and that, if some great names can be quoted as having belonged to the inverted temperament,<sup>42</sup> it is no less common among criminals, degenerates and neurotics.<sup>43</sup> The case-histories given by Havelock Ellis hardly suggest that the world would be the richer for more inverts. We may rightly regret, then, much of the current cant on this subject. But we must be careful to avoid the

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 204.

<sup>40</sup> From a letter, written by one "with long experience as an adviser to young men," quoted in *The Invert*, by "Anomaly" (pp. 112-113). This book (by a Roman Catholic layman, with an Introduction by Dr. R. H. Thouless) is of great value.

<sup>41</sup> The children of inverts "in many cases bear witness that they belong to a neurotic or failing stock." (Havelock Ellis, *op. cit.*, p. 335.)

<sup>42</sup> E.g., Caesar, Virgil, Leonardo da Vinci, Michaelangelo, and Wagner, among others.

<sup>43</sup> Havelock Ellis: *op. cit.*, p. 24.



other extreme, of supposing that inverts as a class are incapable of self-control. As Havelock Ellis—a writer with whose ethical judgments we are naturally not always in agreement—remarks, after quoting a very pathetic confession by a man of obviously noble mind :

“However painful the sufferer’s lot may be, it is not without its consolations, and he would be best advised to pursue, as cheerfully as may be, the path that he has already long marked out for himself—that of ‘a pure celibate life as far as action is concerned.’ The invert sometimes fails to realize that for no man with high moral ideals, however normal he may be, is the conduct of life easy, and that if the invert has to be satisfied with affection without passion, and to live a life of chastity, he is doing no more than thousands of normal men have done, voluntarily and contentedly.”<sup>44</sup> (And, he might have added, thousands of normal women.)

The cause of inversion is a much-debated subject ; but we need here do no more than briefly indicate the principal current views. (It will be remembered that we are throughout this section speaking, not of passing homosexual inclinations, to which many men—perhaps the majority—are or have at some periods of their life been liable ; but of inversion, the position represented by the man who has never known, and cannot conceive himself as knowing—even if, which is rarely the case, he desires to know—“normal,” sexual feeling.)<sup>45</sup>

Broadly speaking, there are two main views, one emphasizing the influence of “nature,” the other of “nurture.” Of the latter school the principal representatives are the psychoanalysts. Freud, as is well-known, regards inversion as the result of a “fixation” on the mother (the “Oedipus-complex”), which prevents the patient being attracted by other women : his sexuality therefore finds an outlet by seeking members of his own sex. Adler, as

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 338.

<sup>45</sup> It is a curious fact that inverts appear to be capable of heterosexual dreams.

we should expect, sees inversion as an expression of the "will to power": the homosexual, "by excluding the conditions making for difficulties, succeeds in creating for himself a type of existence to which he is either quite adapted or which he can more easily follow than that of heterosexuality, which continually throws him into the current of life and brings him into relation with all the problems, demands and difficulties of social existence."<sup>46</sup>

Psychoanalytical literature produces abundant evidence that in some cases factors such as these do contribute to the situation. But the fact that many cases of homosexuality do not yield to analytic treatment suggests that this school is inclined to under-estimate the hereditary element: and, where complete inversion (as distinct from temporary homosexuality) is in question, Havelock Ellis seems to sum up the available evidence when he says:

"It may now be said to be recognized by all authorities, even by Freud, who emphasizes a special psychological mechanism by which homosexuality may become established, that a congenital predisposition as well as an acquired tendency is necessary to constitute true inversion, apparent exceptions being too few to carry much weight."<sup>47</sup>

<sup>46</sup> *Individual Psychology*, p. 188. Our own small experience of homosexuals lends little support to Adler's assertion that their "most salient traits" are "inordinate ambition and an extraordinarily pronounced caution or fear of life" (p. 187).

<sup>47</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 83. Cp. p. 308. "Any theory of the etiology of homosexuality which leaves out of account the hereditary factor in inversion cannot be admitted. The evidence for the frequency of homosexuality among the near relatives of the inverted is now indisputable." And cp. McDougall (*Abnormal Psychology*, p. 323): "The weight of authority favours the view that, in some small proportion of human beings, the sex instinct is innately inverted, is innately homosexual." "It is doubtful," he adds in a footnote, "whether such cases are susceptible to treatment or cure."

## CHAPTER VI

### SIN AND MORAL DISEASE

THE tendency of many psychologists to discard the notion of sin as a superstition, and to regard all forms of imperfect behaviour as so many varieties of "moral disease" and nothing more, is due to an inadequate understanding of the word "sin." It is a Christian word. Or, if this is putting it too strongly—and it is true that if we turn up the word Sin in the *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics* we shall find articles on *Sin (American)*, *Sin (Babylonian)*, *Sin (Buddhist)*, *Sin (Hebrew and Jewish)*, *Sin (Hindu)*, *Sin (Muslim)*, and others, as well as *Sin (Christian)*—at least we must insist that the word as used by a Christian has, not merely a religious, but a Christian reference.

It describes, to begin with, a universal condition of humanity; the condition (plainly not dependent on any theory of its origin) of "fallen-ness." And if we ask what fallen-ness means, we shall find the best answer in S. Paul's words, "All have sinned, and *fall short of the glory of God.*"<sup>1</sup>

It is not surprising that psychologists who do not thus interpret "imperfect behaviour" in themselves or in others should find unintelligible the language of those who do. The matter is further complicated by the deterministic tendency of much modern psychology. That Behaviourism is deterministic needs no demonstration. As to other authorities, the later writings of Freud represent an advance on his earlier ones in this respect, while "Jung and Adler, abandoning determinism, give us in its place, as Bergson

<sup>1</sup> *Romans* iii, 23.

does, a creative chaos, with hints of individual purpose here and there, but no intelligible goal or guiding principle in the whole."<sup>2</sup> But it must be recognized that the philosophical assumptions of most modern psychologists are poles apart from that faith in the possibility of a glorious liberty for the children of God which is fundamental to any Christian doctrine either of redemption or of sin. Such a faith clearly involves the belief, despite the fact that "the fixity of a large part of our nature—nay of all but the whole of it—is a moral and spiritual necessity,"<sup>3</sup> that the normal man is capable of self-conscious purpose, and that to every isolated action he brings some element, however small, of real initiation and spontaneous choice: in short, that he is made in the image of that Creative Lover who rules the universe. There can be no reconciliation between this creed and that of the man who limits the potentialities of the human *psyche* to its capacity, rigidly determined by past history, of responding to current situations. But this is not the place to justify the former hypothesis.<sup>4</sup>

Psychologists, then, tend to avoid the word "sin." "Moral Disease," on the other hand, they universally recognize, and we have now to notice that this phrase covers three things, commonly confused, which should be distinguished.

It may mean simply that condition recognized by the doctrine of original sin: so much of any man's sinfulness—so much of the extent to which he falls short of the glory of God—as is due, not to any refusal to reach that glory for which he might be reckoned personally accountable, but to the fact that he is a member of a "fallen" race. Something is wrong and awry with man *qua* man. His "natural," unregenerate relationship to God, as well as

<sup>2</sup> L. W. Grensted: *Psychology and God*, p. 234.

<sup>3</sup> F. Temple: *The Relations Between Religion and Science*, p. 92 (quoted by Grensted, *op. cit.* p. 21).

<sup>4</sup> See, for a recent discussion of the problem of determinism, H. G. Wyatt: *The Psychology of Intelligence and Will*.

to his fellows, is other than at his best moments he knows it ought to be and is meant to be. This awryness—this fundamental *kink*—"inheres in the human stock as a hereditary character, transmitted from parent to offspring through biological and not merely through what is called social heredity."<sup>5</sup>

The term "moral disease" is often used, secondly, to describe, not this universal condition, but an inborn tendency to particular moral weaknesses. It must be said, however, that the theory of "moral degeneracy" (associated with the name of Lombroso) is to be regarded as not proven. There is no conclusive evidence for the inheritance of a defective moral sense unrelated to other defects of the mind. Dr. Burt quotes the striking testimony of the American psychologist, Dr. William Healy, who made an intensive study of a thousand juvenile delinquents. "When we began our work," writes Dr. Healy,

"there was no point on which we expected more data. We have been constantly on the look-out for a moral imbecile—that is, a person intact in mental powers, but devoid of moral feelings. Many cases have been brought to us as such. We have not found one."<sup>6</sup>

It is true that, as Dr. Burt points out,<sup>7</sup> some investigators report very different conclusions. But after reviewing these, together with the statistics based upon his own enquiries, he concludes that the evidence adduced to support the theory of inherited moral degeneracy is better accounted for on other grounds.

<sup>5</sup> N. P. Williams: *The Idea of the Fall and of Original Sin*. We may notice Dr. E. J. Bicknell's suggestion (in his Essay in *Essays Catholic and Critical*) that original sin "is to be found not simply in the possession of animal impulses and passions imperfectly disciplined, and in the failure to discipline them by the individual, but rather in the positive misdirecting of such instinctive tendencies by bad social influences at every stage"—by, in short, what is often called, not quite accurately, "social heredity" (p. 220).

<sup>6</sup> Quoted by C. Burt: *The Young Delinquent*, p. 43, note 2.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 52, note 1.

"As in physical disorders, so in moral—contagion is too often mistaken for heredity. The only instances where the vices of the child stand in direct and apparently hereditary relation to the vices of the parent belong to specifically limited types—such as sex-delinquency (by far the most frequent), wandering, violent temper, and perhaps impulsive theft. Of these, every one may be accounted for by a single assumption—by supposing that certain human instincts, which by their very definition are acknowledged to be inherited, may be inherited in differing degrees of natural strength." What is inherited in the cases in question is "a vague and more general endowment, analogous to the congenital enfeeblement that may affect temperament, intelligence, or physique as a whole—extreme degrees of common weaknesses to which in a restricted measure we are all more or less susceptible. Such weaknesses, when excessive, may favour a moral lapse in later life; they in no way constitute an inexorable and fatal propulsion towards it."<sup>8</sup>

Finally, "moral disease" may describe certain *acquired* tendencies to vice: kleptomania, alcoholism, drug-addiction are obvious examples. It is in this sense that the term is used in such a passage as this of Dr. J. A. Hadfield's:

"The man who deliberately embezzles, gets drunk, gives way to his temper, gratifies his passions, is in a different category to the kleptomaniac, the alcoholic, or the victim of perverted sexual or angry passion. As the organic and nervous diseases have similar symptoms and yet arise from quite different causes, so moral disease and sin may give rise to very similar conduct—stealing or lying—yet their origin is as different as in the other case. Perhaps the simplest case for illustration is that of the drunkard and the alcoholic; to the policeman and the magistrate they are both simply 'drunks,' and must both be punished. Yet the former may be drunk because of a depraved and brutish nature, whereas the latter may be drunk because of a nature so sensitive that it cannot bear the assaults of life. . . . It will be recognized

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 57-58. The "moral disease" most commonly held to be heritable is alcoholism: but the evidence for this is quite inconclusive, and is better accounted for by the assumption that what is inherited is a vague and unspecific mental instability, which manifests itself as alcoholism under certain conditions (e.g., a drunken home, strong incentives to and opportunities of drink, etc.), and in other forms under other conditions.

that a very large number of disorders at present considered sins really come under the category of moral disease. Indeed it is probable that most evil actions of everyday life—vanities, aggressiveness, evil obsessive thoughts, persistent habits—which are the despair of those who have them and those who treat them, are at least partially due to moral disease, and, if this is the case, our methods of treatment, whether on the religious and moral side, or on the legal, need very radical revision.”<sup>9</sup>

We have, then, to recognize, as Dr. Hadfield implies, that in their respective spheres the psychotherapist and the minister of religion are dealing with *mixed states*. We never come across “sheer” sin, unaffected either by original sin or by moral disease in the last of the three senses distinguished above. On the other hand, there is an element of sin, over and above original sin, in all cases of acquired moral disease: the present condition of the alcoholic patient, for example, for which he cannot be held wholly responsible, is complicated by the past occasions on which he drank (perhaps to drown his sorrows, or to escape into oblivion from intolerable misery) when he *was* responsible.

We propose now to discuss in some detail one or two of these “mixed states.” But we shall do this from one point of view only. The conditions to be described would be recognized as sinful by any instructed Christian: we shall, however, for our present purpose, ignore so far as possible their moral and religious aspects, and confine ourselves to the psychological factors likely to be concerned in producing them.

1. **RECIDIVISM.** This problem is discussed (not very helpfully) by Aristotle in the seventh book of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, and described in immortal terms by S. Paul in *Romans* vii.

“Not what I would, that do I practise; what I hate, that I do. . . . For the good which I would I do not: but the evil which I would not, that I practise. But if what I would

<sup>9</sup> *Psychology and Morals*, pp. 47-49.

not, that I do, it is no more I that do it, but sin which dwelleth in me."

S. Augustine's statement of the problem is as follows :

"Whence is this monstrousness? and to what end? The mind commands the body, and it obeys instantly: the mind commands itself, and is resisted. The mind commands the hand to be moved; and such readiness is there, that command is scarce distinct from obedience. Yet the mind is mind, the hand is body. The mind commands the mind, its own self, to will, and yet it doth not. Whence this monstrousness? and to what end? It commands itself, I say, to will, and would not command, unless it willed, and what it commands is not done. But it willeth not entirely: therefore doth it not command entirely. For so far forth it commandeth, as it willeth; and, so far forth is the thing commanded not done, as it willeth not. For the will commandeth that there be a will; not another, but itself. But it doth not command entirely, therefore what it commandeth, is not. For were the will entire, it would not even command it to be, because it would already be. It is therefore no monstrousness partly to will, partly to nill, but a disease of the mind, that it doth not wholly rise, by truth upborne, borne down by custom. And therefore are there two wills, for that one of them is not entire: and what the one lacketh, the other hath."<sup>10</sup>

Every priest is familiar with this phenomenon in his dealings with penitents. Again and again a man falls into sins which he recognizes for what they are, and with his whole soul detests. No: not with his *whole* soul; that is the problem. S. Paul said that it was "sin" *in* him—to be distinguished, as it were, from his real self—that produced the paradoxical result that "the evil which I would not, that I do": "if what I would not, that I do, it is no more I that do it, but sin which dwelleth in me." And this is part of the truth; the recidivist, like the rest of us, is affected by "original sin," that "inherited inferiority of will" which we have already discussed. But there is more to it than this. The recidivist's will—that is to say, the man himself—is *divided*:

<sup>10</sup> *Confessions*, VIII, 9.



the struggle is not between what he wants and what he does, but between what he wants with one part of him and what he wants with the rest of him. Circumstances are indeed capable of unifying him—in different directions. He repents, in the presence of God, because—with his whole soul—he wants to : and he sins, in the presence of temptation, because—with his whole soul—he wants to. (We are not in this chapter concerned with the problem of how to reinforce the weaker, God-ward side of his will ; nor are we discussing those types of recidivism (e.g., alcoholism) in which the chief aetiological factors are to be found in physical and chemical degeneration of the organism—physiological recidivism, as it may be called to distinguish it from psychological recidivism, in which the casual factors are chiefly mental.)

It is useful to distinguish between two types of psychological recidivism, the mild and the acute. In the latter case—kleptomania is a good example—the sinner is truly in bonds, as much as the physiological recidivist : he is powerless to escape by any efforts of his own, though his trouble is likely to respond (and his spiritual adviser should know this) to psychotherapeutic treatment. The mild recidivist, on the other hand, is not so bound. His trouble is that he is extremely *suggestible* : that is why he responds as readily to temptation as he does, at another moment, to circumstances evoking the idea of repentance. He does not seek temptation, but is powerless to resist it when it comes. His suggestibility accounts, further, for his mind being *obsessed* by the thought of his sin : this obsession, in turn, produces a fearful certainty that his sin has taken such a hold on him that he will never be able to overcome it, and that when next the temptation to it occurs he will, in spite of his previous prayers and good resolves, be helpless in its toils.

A further distinction may usefully be drawn between recidivism which arises from evil *habits* and recidivism arising from wrong *sentiments*. In the former case, what is

involved is an habitual, careless tendency to yield to the suggestions of environment in regard to a particular class of actions. Very often it has to do with some trivial matter : we may instance the case of a man who, believing that gambling is wrong in principle, nevertheless succumbs to the annual temptation to take part in the Derby sweepstake organized in his office or club. "Sentiment-recidivism," on the other hand—especially when considered from the point of view of treatment—presents, as we shall see in a later chapter, a more serious problem. It occurs when some evil thing has become a magnet to which an individual is irresistibly and invariably drawn. The "habitual" drunkard (wrongly so called, if the distinction we here maintain is justified) is a case in point. The difference between the two types is important. The "habit-recidivist," though he succumbs in nine cases out of ten, succumbs because he does not trouble to resist ; not because, at the moment of temptation, he has not sufficient self-control to resist. The "sentiment-recidivist," on the other hand, *cannot* resist : he is the victim of "moral disease" of the "acquired" type.

An important factor of suggestibility is liability to dissociation. In the case of the recidivist, this means that his besetting sin, with all the impulses and desires connected with it, tends to form a watertight compartment functioning in practical separation from the rest of his personality. It is for this reason that the recidivist (who is in most cases an extravert) can generally, at the moment of temptation, find excuses : he will convince himself, either that this particular thing is so unlike his real self that it is not his real self that is going to do it ; or that as he did not seek the temptation he cannot be blamed for succumbing to it ; or that this is positively the last time that he will commit this sin ; or that it is foolish and dangerous to be fussily scrupulous. Indeed, it is certain that *at the moment of committing the act* the recidivist's sense of the wrongness of the sin is at a very low level : this is true of the "mild type," at any rate.

It is possible that some extreme cases of recidivism are instances of alternating personality. There are men and women who, at more or less regular intervals, seem impelled to courses of action entirely out of harmony with their real character and desires. Thus, a man devoted to his wife and children, and normally living (without any difficulty or unreality) on terms of the deepest affection with them, may suffer from periodical and inexplicable "bouts," during which he behaves brutally to his family and may even be troubled by impulses to murder them. Or a pious woman (as in a case known to us) may, at intervals lasting for a week or more, give herself up to promiscuous sexual relationships with any men she can seduce. Such cases bear an obvious resemblance to some of the classical cases of dual or multiple personality. These make a psychological study as fascinating as it is difficult.<sup>11</sup> We quote one famous case.

"Mary Reynolds, the daughter of a prominent Baptist, is said to have been of good normal capacities; 'though in no respect brilliant, she seems to have been naturally endowed with an uncommonly well-balanced organization, physical, mental and moral.' She had, in short, displayed no peculiarities of a striking kind, but remained a somewhat commonplace, unadventurous girl, until, when eighteen years of age, 'she became subject to occasional attacks of fits.' In the following year she one day took a book to read in a meadow and was found there insensible. These facts suffice to show that she was an hysterical subject, one liable to dissociative accidents. Three months after this episode, when she seemed to have nearly recovered her usual health, she continued one morning to lie abed in a profound sleep from which she could not be roused. She awakened spontaneously after some hours and then, 'as far as all acquired knowledge was concerned, *her condition was precisely that of a new-born infant*,' except that she pronounced a few words. But 'she differed from an infant in this, that *her faculty of acquiring knowledge was that of a person in the possession of mature intellect*, fully

<sup>11</sup> The subject may be studied in the following books among others: Morton Prince: *The Dissociation of a Personality*; T. W. Mitchell: *Medical Psychology and Psychological Research*; W. McDougall: *Outline of Abnormal Psychology*.

capable of dealing at once with the facts of existence. She therefore rapidly acquired a knowledge of the world.' After five weeks in this condition, she woke again in her former state, knowing nothing of her life in the intervening five weeks. After a few weeks she again, after an unusually profound and prolonged sleep, woke in the second state and took up her second life and process of learning from the point at which the second state had disappeared. She continued for many years to alternate between these two states; in each state she was amnesic for the events of the other state, but had normally a good memory for the events of previous periods of the same state; that is to say there was reciprocal amnesia as between the alternating states.

"If the two states had differed only in respect of their memories, it might seem inappropriate to describe the case as one of alternating personalities. But there was another great difference between them: namely a difference of character and tastes. In the primary state Mary was, as we have seen, a somewhat commonplace person. In the secondary state she was extremely adventurous: she would take long rides alone through the forests, and was in many ways more lively and enterprising. The second state gradually increased in duration relatively to the first; and towards the later part of a moderately long life, the primary state remained latent or absent. In this late period *she sometimes seemed to have dim dreamlike memories of her life in the first state.* And once, when in this second state, *she dreamed of a sister who had died before the second state appeared*: the sister so dreamed of was identified by her relatives from her description."<sup>12</sup>

Such cases are of different kinds. The one quoted is an instance of "reciprocal amnesia": that is to say, neither phase remembers what happens in the other phase. In other cases there is amnesia of one phase for the other (or others), but not of the latter for the former; in a third group, commonly described as "co-conscious personalities," the same train of memory seems to serve both (or all) the dissociated elements.

The most intelligible account of these extraordinary phenomena seems to us to be that of Professor McDougall.

<sup>12</sup> McDougall: *Outline of Abnormal Psychology*, pp. 483-484.

He suggests that the "master-sentiment," the "sentiment of self-regard,"

"undergoes actual disruption. Its two fundamental dispositions, that of self-assertion and that of submission, become divorced; and each forms the nucleus of a partial, one-sided personality. . . . The hierarchy of sentiments, no longer held together in one system, becomes divided between the two partial personalities, and perhaps even the instinctive dispositions themselves, or some of them, go wholly over to one or the other side."<sup>13</sup>

2. **SCRUPULOSITY.** This consists of grossly exaggerated anxiety about trifles: not infrequently it takes the form of acute perplexity as to whether this or that act or habit, which has a particular attraction for the subject, is or is not sinful. In extreme cases, this may be carried to the pitch of complete inability to do anything, or to enter upon any course of action, lest it may be sinful, or may become an occasion of sin. A few illustrations within the present writers' experience may be given. An able undergraduate worked himself into such a pitch of uncertainty as to his "vocation" that for three years after leaving the University he could settle down to nothing whatever, being quite unable to make up his mind which (if any) of the various jobs that turned up was really God's will for him. A young woman was haunted by the recollection of a sexual peccadillo at the age of twelve. A married man wished to make his confession daily, principally in order to discuss with his director the degree of sinfulness attaching to his conduct during the

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 538. In Chapter 22 of this work the author, discussing a form of insanity known as "manic-depressive" (alternating phases of acute excitement and acute depression), points out that "most of us, perhaps all of us, are liable to mild alternations of this kind, moods of 'excitement' and of depression," and suggests that manic-depressive insanity is the exaggeration (resulting from "the upsetting or disturbance of the normal balance and co-operation, within the sentiment of self-regard, of the two primary instincts of submission and self-assertion") of the constitutional liability of certain individuals to unpredictable, and apparently uncontrollable alternations of mood. So marked a liability to "ups and downs" is clearly pathological, and requires expert psychological treatment.

previous twenty-four hours. As this course did not approve itself to the priest concerned, the penitent wrote him daily letters of portentous length, all dealing with his scruples. The conscience of a youth of twenty-five became obsessed with the recollection of having cheated at cards six or seven years ago, and with having taught another how to do so : this suggested the question, whether or not it was his duty to start a raging, tearing campaign among his associates against card-playing. A common scruple among penitents is that of having concealed something in a previous confession, or of not having performed the penance given.

Scruples are symptoms ; that is the thing to remember : and they are symptoms, in the vast majority of cases, which, once interpreted, reveal some repression. The "complex" repressed may be one of intense egoism<sup>14</sup> of a moral or spiritual kind : then the scruple will mean, "See what a saint I am, when such a trifle can trouble me so much." Or it may be that some gross moral offence, driven from consciousness because the facing of it would be too painful, too obviously incompatible with the individual's self-regarding sentiment, or with the estimation in which he is held by others, is hiding itself behind the scruple.<sup>15</sup> In such a case the penitent may be unable to tell whether his scruple is real or imaginary : the man referred to above, for example, could not say positively whether he had ever actually cheated at cards or not ; there were times when he was sure the recollection of having done so was a delusion.

There is an obvious similarity between scruples and certain *phobias*, in which the patient suffers from intense fear in the presence of certain objects or situations : fear

<sup>14</sup> Frank, self-conscious egoism is of course excluded from consideration here. Cp. Chap. 4, p. 92.

<sup>15</sup> Cp. Jung, quoted by McDougall : *Abnormal Psychology*, p. 378: "When we dare not acknowledge some great sin, we deplore some small sin with the greater emphasis."

of open spaces (agoraphobia) or of closed spaces (claustrophobia) are typical examples. McDougall says of this class of phobias :

“In each case the phobia clears up rapidly as soon as the patient has been led to recollect the original incident, and to understand its etiological significance. In each case there is a ground or motive for repression of the memory of the incident over and above the fear, a motive arising within the sentiment of self-regard, in accordance with the general law of repression, that is to say, the incident is of such a nature as to evoke in the subject self-reproach or shame or a sense of guilt.

“It is probable that a phobia, in the special sense of the word illustrated by these cases, is not formed without this last factor ; that fear alone does not produce a phobia.”<sup>16</sup>

The last point is of very great importance : it is borne out by cases within our experience.

A typical phobia is quoted by McDougall :

“A man of fifty-five years had suffered since early boyhood a fear of being seized from behind. When on the street he was impelled frequently to look back over his shoulder ; and, when indoors, he preferred to sit with his back against the wall. In his fifty-fifth year he returned to the home of his childhood, and incidentally paid a visit to the neighbour who had kept the same grocery store since the patient's childhood. In the course of reminiscing the grocer said ‘You used to go by this store on errands, and when you passed you often took a handful of peanuts from the stand in front. One day I saw you coming and hid behind a barrel. Just as you put your hand in the pile of peanuts I jumped out and grabbed you from behind. You screamed and fell fainting on the sidewalk.’ The incident, we are told, was then recollected by the patient, and ‘the phobia, after a period of readjustment, disappeared.’ ”<sup>17</sup>

It is quite unnecessary to accept Freud's pan-sexual theory of the aetiology of all phobias. But upon one kind of fear he has thrown considerable light : upon, namely, that

<sup>16</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 382.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 306.

not uncommon form of *anxiety* which is general, vague, "floating," not requiring particular objects or situations to arouse it. It may express itself in various ways: in unreasonable fear of cancer, or consumption, or insanity; in unwarranted nervousness about one's business or profession or health; in uncontrollable suspicions that one has left the engine of the car running, or forgotten to lock up for the night, or to post one's letters. (Such vague dread may or may not be accompanied by symptoms such as sweating, palpitations and breathlessness.) There is abundant evidence that this condition is very frequently the result of an accumulation of sexual tension the adequate discharge of which is frustrated. *Coitus interruptus* is one of the commonest causes.<sup>18</sup> "Innumerable examples," says Freud, "show that the anxiety-neurosis vanishes when the sexual malpractice is given up."<sup>19</sup>

3. PATHOLOGICAL LYING. By this term is meant useless and senseless, apparently motiveless, lying. It occurs more often in children than in adults, and is particularly common in pubescent girls. It tends to be habitual rather than sporadic. It frequently takes the form of self-accusation: when another person is accused, it is likely to be of some sexual misdemeanour—more often than not, of interference with the liar herself.

The most aggravated cases of pathological lying are those in which the subject is either of a definitely hysterical type, or abnormally introverted, his phantasies and day-dreams having reached such proportions that he has become incapable of distinguishing between fact and fancy. How far such self-deception can go may be illustrated by two cases within our own recent experience.

In the first case—which was doubtless complicated by the woman concerned having recently suffered the loss of her

<sup>18</sup> McDougall denies this (*Character and the Conduct of Life*, pp. 277-8).

<sup>19</sup> S. Freud: *Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis*, p. 335.



husband—a widow of thirty told completely unfounded stories of two married priests having attempted to kiss her : the charges were made “in the strictest confidence” to several people, all of whom knew the clergy in question.

In the second case, a lady, on opening the door of her house, found her (only) domestic servant lying unconscious just inside. She rushed to the gate and fetched a policeman. Together they brought her round. Her first words were : “Where is the man? He has gone upstairs ; he has got the coat.” On being asked who the man was, she described how she had been to the door and taken a visiting card from a caller, and then how a parcel of books had been brought by a young man. She had closed the door, and was carrying the parcel of books to the hall-stand, when she had been knocked over from behind by a man who had entered the house unnoticed by her. After knocking her over, he had gone into a room on the left, at the foot of the stairs. He then went to the hall-stand and took a new overcoat from it. She picked herself up, and caught hold of the coat. They had a tussle with it ; she was knocked down again, and after this remembered nothing more. In due course detectives arrived, and the girl repeated her story. She was cross-questioned, and in reply she described the face of the man, and the clothes he was wearing. She was unable, however, to say why the visiting card was not crumpled, why the coat was still hanging on the stand with no signs of the conflict upon it, and why she herself was not bruised. The detectives finally came to the conclusion that the story could not possibly be a true one, which *a priori* it was unlikely to be, seeing that all these things were alleged to have happened in broad daylight. The girl persisted that it was true. It was not until a day had been taken up by an examination of the case that she finally admitted, in response to the suggestion of the detectives and the doctor, that she must have imagined it all. It transpired that she had had

hysterical fits before. The face she described turned out to be that of the person who had brought the books. There is no doubt at all, however, that she firmly believed that she was speaking the truth, until she had been made to see the inconsistencies in her story.

Both these cases, it may be noted in passing, serve to indicate how completely such pathological liars have their victims at their mercy. There can be little doubt that many "clerical scandals" would turn out to be mere mare's-nests, if the accusers were subjected to a competent psychological examination.

Burt points out that subjects of this type are invariably endowed with "an over active imagination" and "an overflowing facility in the use of words."<sup>20</sup> There are further considerations to be borne in mind. In the first place, it has been proved up to the hilt by modern psychological investigation that many children's lies (as well as petty dishonesty of other kinds) are the outcome of thwarted sexual curiosity. The lie, or the theft, would seem to be a sort of compensation for unattainable knowledge.<sup>21</sup> The second consideration is simple: it is that lies of this kind are nearly always expressions, more or less disguised, of desires which the conscious mind will not acknowledge. The "pathological" lies of adolescents, when they are not the outcome of repressed sex, betray a hidden conviction of the liars' importance and superiority.<sup>22</sup>

In the case of young children we have to remember the difficulty under which they labour, some of them in a marked degree, of distinguishing, in a coldly critical and

<sup>20</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 382.

<sup>21</sup> Cp. the statement in *Pathological Lying, Accusation and Swindling* (Wm. and M. T. Healy), p. 10, that whereas other offences are often accompanied by marked truthfulness, this is less true of sexual delinquencies.

<sup>22</sup> Mention should perhaps be made at this point of Freud's elaborate theory (which, however, is difficult to apply in some cases) that paranoia (delusions of persecution) is always a neurotic escape from homosexual inclinations which have become unbearable. (See *Introductory Lectures*, p. 354.)

grown-up way, between real persons and things, and creatures of their own imagination. The present writers once knew a small boy in whose life "Michael's friend" was a very "real" person indeed. To talk to his "friend," Michael would climb trees, trudge to the end of the garden, or mount the stairs into the attics; for the friend's hearing he would sing and tell stories; to please the friend, he would be brave and fearless if he hurt himself; in the friend's company he knew no fear of the dark. Yet it would have been ridiculous to call Michael a pathological liar!<sup>23</sup>

4. MASTURBATION. Modern discussions of this topic are a good example of the swing of the pendulum. Medical works of half-a-century ago devoted a special section to "masturbatory insanity"; to-day a specialist in medical psychology can write that masturbation

"is almost a normal phase of sexual development in adolescence, and that no physical or mental injury need accrue in the absence of great excess and the fears that may be implanted from outside sources. . . . Unless this practice is carried on to an inordinate degree and is prolonged into adult years, the term 'perversion' is not scientifically applicable."<sup>24</sup>

The truth probably lies somewhere between these two

<sup>23</sup> Cp. *So wherever I am there's always Pooh,  
There's always Pooh and Me,  
"What would I do?" I said to Pooh,  
"If it wasn't for you," and Pooh said: "True,  
It isn't much fun for One, but Two  
Can stick together," says Pooh, says he.  
"That's how it is," says Pooh.*  
(A. A. Milne.)

<sup>24</sup> C. Stanford Read: *The Struggles of Male Adolescence*, pp. 153-4. Cp. what Rudolf Allers (a Roman Catholic) says:—"The imputation of unsociability, reserve, pessimism, reduced efficiency and the like to (solitary) sexual malpractices, together with various and special kinds of injury to health and morals, is unquestionably mistaken . . . the assertion that health suffers from such practices is quite false. It is a survival from an antiquated period of medical knowledge and arose from inadequate or insufficiently understood observations and various prejudices which cannot stand examination." (*The Psychology of Character*, pp. 313-4: the italics are the author's.)

extremes. We are not here concerned with the neurasthenic conditions which are the commonest consequences of "great excess"; or with the moral and spiritual aspects of the vice—though we may quote a psychologist of the first rank in virtual support of the Christian view that masturbation is essentially *selfishness*, and therefore is, precisely, a "perversion" of God-given powers, a defiance of the Divine will:

"Physically, masturbation is self-stimulation of orgasm. Psychologically, it is incitement of genital sensations without the psychic accompaniment of love."<sup>25</sup>

The first factor to be taken account of in a psychological understanding of masturbation is its invariable concomitant of interior conflict. This conflict is the result of repression—inevitable in a community that condemns solitary sex-indulgence as strongly as the conventions of modern civilization do; and it constitutes the real peril. It is possible, we suppose, that masturbation, practised in moderation, would be free from any *observable* ill effects whatever, mental or physical, in the case of a savage, or of a civilized person quite untroubled by conscientious scruples.<sup>26</sup> But we are not dealing with either of these classes: and nine-tenths of the danger of the habit in the case of a modern English youth or girl lies in the conflict generated by sexual desire, its furtive gratification, fear of detection (some subjects convince themselves that "people guess" what is the matter with them),<sup>27</sup> and the pressure of remorse after each act of self-indulgence. A vicious circle is thus set up, and the unhappy victim passes through desire, struggle, gratification, remorse, to renewed desire and the

<sup>25</sup> MacCurdy: *Problems in Dynamic Psychology*, p. 313.

<sup>26</sup> Malinowski (*The Sexual Life of Savages*, p. 395) says that among the Trobrianders the masturbator is regarded as a contemptible creature.

<sup>27</sup> We have been told on good authority that the success of a certain evangelist, well known on both sides of the Atlantic, is in part attributable to his intuitive capacity of knowing a masturbator (and a homosexual) "at sight."

repetition of the whole dreadful process. In many cases the situation is complicated by one of two obsessions, both of them the outcome of repression. Either the patient is convinced that self-abuse is the sin against the Holy Ghost, "which hath never forgiveness"<sup>28</sup>: or he is sure that he is becoming, or is likely to become, insane—a suspicion in which he is sedulously nursed by the authors of quack literature and the purveyors of quack medicines. No wonder that neurasthenia is often the result.

The sheer force of the sexual impulse is, of course, the prime factor in solitary vice, which takes this form because its "normal" outlet is forbidden. But contributory factors are nearly always involved. We have known cases in which the habit was certainly a compensation for unpopularity, for lack of success at games, for a position in the family or in the community which the subject felt to be disproportionate to his real worth: in such cases the unconscious motive would seem to be self-assertiveness, a determination to utilise frustrated power. This is perhaps the commonest explanation in the case of adolescents. In children of fourteen and fifteen masturbation may be hardly more than frank experimentation with new powers, though here again it is very often complicated by sex-knowledge acquired in undesirable ways. Among older people the habit will often be found to represent an unconscious regression to stages of development which ought to have been left behind. It may, for example, express the choked and perverted sex-impulses of a man suffering from an unconscious "mother-fixation," which disables him from being emotionally attracted by other women.<sup>29</sup>

There is, as we have seen, an element of "disease" in

<sup>28</sup> This perverted exegesis is very curious: it would obviously be impossible to anyone who took the trouble to look up the various references in the Gospels.

<sup>29</sup> As we saw in Chapter V, such a "mother-fixation" may also be responsible for—or at least a contributory factor in—homosexuality. And again, masturbation may be a substitute for repressed homosexuality.

all sin. That is why some knowledge of psychology is essential in pastoral work. † In some cases it will be necessary to refer an individual to a psychologist for treatment. But it must be remembered that

“the proclamation of forgiveness . . . is the first and greatest need of those who are involved in moral distress.” And that “psychology, for all its outward appearance of charity, knows no forgiveness.”<sup>30</sup>

We may therefore say a word, finally,—still moving on the psychological plane—on the subject of forgiveness.

In psychoanalysis—and to a less clearly-recognized extent in all psychotherapeutic treatment—the factor on which success finally depends is that known as “positive transference,” the personal attitude of the patient to his physician. As a consequence of this attitude of confidence and affection, the patient is able to “transfer,” and so to get rid of, his burden of depression and conflict and fear. In the hands of an inexperienced or unscrupulous analyst the transference is obviously capable of abuse: it should be his task to “resolve” it by getting the patient to recognize that the strong attachment which he is experiencing is abnormal and temporary, due to the fact that his emotions have now been released from the objects to which they were previously riveted (in the neurotic state), and must, so to speak, find an immediate resting-place somewhere else: as the treatment proceeds, these emotions and attachments will find new and natural satisfactions in the activities of a healthy life.

But no analysis will wholly remove the sense of *guilt, stain, sin*. Psychologically speaking, the assurance of forgiveness comes when God Himself is the object of a transference, based (as in analysis, though at a higher level) on the sinner’s faith and love. No victim of moral disease—of drug-addiction, for example, or uncontrollable impulses of cruelty, or sexual perversion—will be easily persuaded that

<sup>30</sup> L. W. Grensted: *op. cit.*, pp. 155-156.

he is personally blameless ; and the less easily, as he has "the mind of Christ." The "disease" elements in his troubled state will be "transferred" to whomsoever treats him psychologically. But the "sin" element remains—till it is transferred to Him who alone knows the sinner and his sin as they really are, and still loves him, and who, at the supremest cost to Himself, has made forgiveness possible : not forgiveness understood as meaning that "it doesn't matter," but forgiveness which includes the fullest recognition of the utter hatefulness to God of all that comes short of His glory, together with the assurance of pardon and the promise of new power to overcome.

PART IV  
PASTORAL METHODS





## CHAPTER VII

### INDIVIDUAL TREATMENT

WE shall deal with the problem of individual treatment only along the lines of broad principles. To enter into detail a whole treatise would be required for this part of our subject alone. At the same time, it must be emphasized that we are concerned with the problem of *individual* treatment by the pastor. It is this which is so intensely important, and which, only too frequently, is far to seek. It must be firmly grasped that problems such as those raised by the recidivist or the masturbator, for example, will not be solved by the most assiduous attendance at a P.S.A. nor by "sitting under" the most eloquent of preachers regularly for years on end. It is only by skilled, individual treatment that anything will be accomplished in such cases. In other words, there is need in these matters of a true priestcraft, despite all that prejudice may have to say against it.

We cannot escape this conclusion by saying that such cases may be handed over to "the modern substitute for the priest," the psychotherapist. The best psychotherapists, indeed, fully recognize the limitations of their powers, and the need in their therapy of the compelling force of the Ideal fully and freely embraced. This force, as they well know, is something which they cannot themselves supply. The whole *raison d'être* of the pastor, however, is to provide it. But if the clergy are to rise to meet their responsibilities in this respect, they must be more than well-intentioned amateurs, and they must make a careful and scientific study of the problems of the soul. In some instances, it is to be

hoped, they will have the time and the opportunity to become real experts in this matter, so as to be competent to deal with the more difficult cases, and even to carry out a thoroughgoing analysis. There is no objection to an expert priest undertaking these tasks, provided that he works in conjunction with a medical man, who will be able to make a thorough examination on the physical side. The majority of clergy, it is clear, will never be able to become experts in this sense. Nevertheless, they should have sufficient knowledge to be acquainted with the dangers of amateur analysis, on the one hand, and to recognize definitely pathological cases when they see them, on the other, so as to be able to pass them on to the expert for treatment.

Unfortunately, there are almost as few facilities for access to an expert medical psychologist at the present time as there are for access to clergy who have skilled knowledge in these matters. It is to be hoped, however, that before another generation is past every town of considerable size in this country may have at least one expert medical psychotherapist, and one expert priest capable of handling cases of moral and spiritual disease, the number of which is far greater than those with no experience in these matters would suppose. Let the Church, at any rate, see that her share in this task is not unfulfilled, even if the medical profession lags behind, as at present it is doing. Indeed, to judge by the almost negligible amount of attention which is given to psychological medicine in the six years' course of training required of medical students, the outlook is far from hopeful in this direction. There are still dark clouds of prejudice to be dispersed. The day, however, will inevitably dawn, when psychological medicine will come to its own. That will be a proud day for the Church, if she has been the pioneer in this reform, and, perhaps, her work here will be regarded as an act of reparation for her somewhat reactionary influence upon the growth of scientific, non-psychological medicine.

Our intention in the present chapter is to lay down some fundamental principles underlying the technique of individual treatment in the hope that many clergy (especially young clergy) may be given sufficient insight into the subject to assist them in dealing with the simpler cases which they meet,<sup>1</sup> and (more important still) may be stimulated to prosecute their studies still further in this direction, so that they may gradually become worthy of the honourable title, physicians of souls.

We have to consider three different sets of problems : Sin, Moral Disease, and Physical Disease, on its psychological side. For convenience we shall take these separately, though, of course, in practice they are often closely interconnected.

*Sin.* We have seen in a previous chapter that sin consists essentially in a voluntary perversion on the part of the individual of one or more of the primary instincts, i.e., in a direction of them to unworthy ends, with the resulting creation of evil sentiments. Descriptive psychology, as such, takes no account of sin, involving as it does moral and spiritual factors. Indeed, modern psychologists are inclined from their point of view to be impatient with it. It can undoubtedly be shown that some teaching about sin (e.g., crude teaching given to children about Hell fire) is psychologically harmful and endangers the balance of the mind. But we may not on this account leave it out of our reckoning altogether as part of "a creed outworn," as some psychotherapists and others would have us do. There are one or two important considerations which have to be borne in mind in this connexion.

First, the psychotherapist does not deal in his consulting room with sinners, *as such* ; he is concerned with them only as sick men and women. As Professor Grensted has said,

<sup>1</sup> It is scarcely necessary to add that very young clergy are, as a rule, not the most suitable persons to deal with some of the problems which we discuss in this chapter.

the psychologist never has to deal with the open and wilful sinner, as such, and "it must be remembered that he only sees our failures and not the immense company of those whom (our) preaching has brought through shame to peace."<sup>2</sup> Secondly, even psychotherapists require an ideal for successful therapy, and sin is essentially a rejection of the ideal. Their very science, therefore, runs up directly into theology. Our standpoint is precisely the double one which embraces not only psychology but theology as well. In other words, we are concerned with sin in its psychological aspect.

Broadly speaking, there are two methods of dealing with the perverted forces which give rise to the evil sentiments which we call sins. The first is the method of self-control. Repression is harmful, we are continually told. This is beyond question true, so long as we very carefully define repression in such a way as to distinguish it from self-control. Popularly the word "repression" is used in such a loose way as to be practically indistinguishable from it. Such a confusion is most unfortunate. In order to make this distinction perfectly clear, we cannot do better than cite the following quotation from Dr. McDougall :

"Of all misinterpretations (of Freud's teaching), that of the dangers and evil consequences of 'repression' is most widely accepted, just because it seems to give licence to unrestrained indulgence, to excuse us from all efforts at self-control. And so we hear much nonsense about living out our nature, and about free self-expression and about our rights, and especially about women's rights, to happiness and experience and what not; and much scornful comment on old fashioned conventions and restraints. . . . Neither Professor Freud nor any other judicious psycho-analyst countenances the popular deductions to which I refer. They recognize rather that (to put it in the epigrammatic form of one such psycho-analyst) repression is civilization. Without repression in the wide and general sense of the word, without restraint, without self-control, without deliberate choice

<sup>2</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 146.

between good and evil, between the greater and the lesser good, without laws and without conventions, there can be nothing but chaos and savagery in the worst sense. . . . Repression in the technical sense, the repression that undermines our self-control and threatens the integrity of our personality, is that which consists in disguising from ourselves the nature of our emotional stirrings and impulses."<sup>3</sup>

A firm grasp of this distinction is of great importance for the priest. He must endeavour to strengthen the power of self-control in the sinner, and on no account to say anything which may suggest that there is no need for it, and, still less, that there is any danger in it. It is, in fact, the last of the fruits of the spirit which S. Paul puts before us in his celebrated list.<sup>4</sup> Perhaps the fact that it comes last is not altogether accidental, but may be taken to suggest that it is in some sense the crown of them all.

The second method of treatment is that which is commonly known as sublimation, or, to use a better word, deflection. Although self-control is necessary, the great danger of repression must be avoided, and this can only be by means of a greater or lesser degree of deflection of instinctive energy from the sinful sentiment or sentiments into good sentiments. This truth has always been subconsciously divined by the great spiritual directors who have constantly asserted that sin can never be rooted out, but only crowded out. This principle found classical expression in the famous phrase of Dr. Chalmers, "the expulsive power of a new affection." Ultimately, this is the only satisfactory method of dealing with sin. The instincts, as such, are good and not evil. Just as dirt has been described as matter in the wrong place, so sin may well be described as "mis-directed psychic energy." Thus the old idea of sin as *ἀμαρτία*, or missing the mark, finds a fresh application.

The crucial problem, however, is, How is this deflection

<sup>3</sup> *Character and the Conduct of Life*, p. 38.

<sup>4</sup> *Galatians* v, 22 and 23.

to be achieved? The sinner cannot by an act of "will" redirect his instinctive energy. We cannot love or hate to order, even when we order ourselves. The sinner cannot simply say to himself, I am going to deflect my psychic energy from S., the evil sentiment (which is the object of his attraction) to G., such and such a good object. Even if he *wants* to do so, he cannot; and the trouble is that only too often he does not want. What, then, is to be done? A power external to himself is required, or, to vary the phrase of Chalmers, the *redirective* "power of a new affection." It is the Christian's belief that such a power exists in the Cross of Christ, which is the culmination of a life of complete self-oblation. "I, if I be lifted up, will draw all men unto me." This is the essential psychological truth underlying the doctrine of justification by faith; we are not concerned now to discuss the precise relation of it to sanctification. The point is that man has no power of himself to help himself. Yet we must not overlook the fact that there is danger of over-emphasis here. The fire must indeed descend from above; this fire, we would maintain, constitutes the essence of forgiveness. It is that fire of love which alone can save. We shall return to this later. Meanwhile we have to notice that the sinner must prepare the sacrifice and lay the wood in order before the fire from heaven can fall. Consequently, the task of the priest is two-fold. Not only has he the supreme function of mediating the divine fire in absolution,<sup>5</sup> but it is also his duty and privilege to help the penitent to prepare the sacrifice. This all-important task seems, broadly speaking, to consist of three parts.

First, he must assist the sinner to tackle the question of the removal of occasions of sin. A full treatment of this problem will be found in any competent text-book of moral theology. It is, therefore, unnecessary to enter into a

<sup>5</sup> When the members of his flock have been taught about it and "humbly and heartily desire it."

detailed discussion of it here. All that we are concerned to do now is to emphasize its psychological significance. There are four main types of occasions of sin, known respectively as free and necessary, proximate and remote. A "free" occasion of sin is a set of circumstances which conduces to sin, but which we are at liberty to abandon if we choose. A "necessary" occasion is constituted by similar circumstances to which we are tied. Psychology does not throw any further light on these, but it can do something to reveal the full significance of the other two varieties—proximate and remote. A "proximate" occasion is one which almost inevitably causes us to fall; a "remote" occasion is one which is, generally speaking, unlikely to do this.

In the language of psychology, an occasion of sin is a stimulus to an evil sentiment, or to an evil habit. It is because no two individuals have exactly the same evil sentiments, or the same evil habits, that the same objective set of circumstances may be a proximate occasion, or stimulus, to one person, and remote to another. For example, in the case of a person who has a gambling sentiment, a racecourse is a proximate stimulus. But if a person has no such sentiment, it is a remote stimulus; if he has a hate-sentiment for gambling, it is a still more remote stimulus. A knowledge of a person's sentiments, therefore, is indispensable for obtaining a right estimate of what are for him occasions of sin.

The most acute problem which arises in connexion with the removal of occasions of sin is how to advise a person who is faced by an occasion which is both proximate and necessary. For instance, such would be the case of a married man, with a family, who had a powerful sentiment for strong drink, and who earned his living by working as a barman. To give up his job might mean starvation for his wife and family; to remain, would be to run the appalling risk of becoming a hopeless drunkard. Can



psychology give any assistance in advising such a person how to act, if it is inevitable that he should remain in the job? The answer dictated by psychology would be something like this. Although the sin in this case is based on an evil sentiment, and is not merely a habit, the man should be urged to make a complete and sudden break. "Tapering off" is impossible in the case of sins arising from occasions which are both proximate and necessary. This is an exception to the general rule of dealing with sentiments as contrasted with habits.<sup>6</sup> It should be pointed out to the man that his sentiment will gradually weaken if it is not stimulated by drink, and it will greatly assist him if he makes the resolution to abstain in the first instance for a limited period, and then renews it.<sup>7</sup> Further, the man should be shown the value of faith, and should be taught how to make acts of faith in God, to the effect that He will surely give him the victory. But, above all, he must be shown the great importance of stimulating his good sentiments, which in the case before us, are especially those of love for his wife and children. This brings us to the next element in the priest's task in assisting the penitent.

In the second place, the priest will seek to put before the sinner occasions of virtue. In some ways this is even more important, for whereas there are some occasions of sin which are "necessary" and therefore not removable, there are no circumstances whatever which exclude occasions of virtue, whereby the good sentiments of the penitent may be stimulated. And fortunately there are no sinners, however bad, who are without some good sentiments. The wise selection of such occasions of virtue is a task of first rate importance, demanding much skill and insight. It is, indeed, a matter wherein every priest must feel himself to be thrown back completely upon God. Even while he is listening to the penitent's confession he

<sup>6</sup> See p. 173.      <sup>7</sup> See p. 174.

will be pouring forth an unceasing petition for divine illumination.

These occasions of virtue may be otherwise described as occasions of sublimation, whereby the fundamental energies of the penitent may be deflected from evil channels into good. The choice of such "occasions" plainly requites some knowledge of the main interests of the person concerned. In cases where the confession itself does not reveal them, the priest should, if necessary, not hesitate to elicit them by questioning. For without this knowledge (however it may be obtained) it is plainly impossible to give the right kind of counsel.

Thirdly, and in close association with the foregoing, the priest will put before the penitent as persuasively as he can the Ideal, which is something with which even the agnostic psychotherapist cannot dispense. Thus will be enkindled in the penitent's heart an increasing desire for God. Unfortunately, however, it must needs be that this desire is inseparably bound up with devotion to the person who thus mediates the Ideal. In those cases in which there has been any degree of repression this is what is technically known as the "transference." Freud, who first isolated and named this phenomenon, has sought to maintain that it is essentially a sexual relationship. The evidence, however, does not warrant this view, which is not generally accepted by other psychologists. A simple and adequate theory is to regard it merely as a species of suggestion. Such, for instance, is the opinion of Dr. William Brown.<sup>8</sup> The transference comes into operation in proportion to the degree of sympathy and mutual understanding which exists between the penitent and the priest, who not without good reason is called "Father." And it is here that the crucial task arises of "resolving" the transference, or, in other words, of directing the liberated emotion from the person of the pastor on to the Ideal,

<sup>8</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 141.

which, in the case of the Christian, is Christ. It is at this point that the fire should descend from heaven ; in other words, at this point the penitent is ready for absolution, the significance of which should be carefully explained to him. It is far from being generally understood, even among the devout.

This is both the climax of forgiveness and also the culmination of the work of the true pastor on behalf of the sinner. In the English Church it is the task and privilege specially singled out for mention in the solemn words of ordination to the priesthood. It is, therefore, somewhat strange that there are so many Anglican priests who appear to exercise this privilege hardly at all. We are far from suggesting that pressure should be exercised almost indiscriminately on all and sundry sinners to make use of sacramental confession. On the contrary, we hold that such a method of procedure would tend to defeat its own object, and to bring the confessional into discredit anew. This would be particularly unfortunate at a time like the present, where there are signs on all sides that its value is being "rediscovered" in more ways than one. Nevertheless, we do not deny that we hold strongly to the opinion that this means of grace is not yet known or used nearly as extensively as it ought to be by those who are fighting a hard battle against sin. Consequently, we have not hesitated to imply in what follows that the priest will, as a matter of course, avail himself of the help which it brings to distressed sinners in the difficult cases which we discuss below, wherever recourse to it is wisely possible.

Moreover, while we are truly thankful for the fact that the value of confession is being recognized widely by nearly all sections of the English Church to-day, it is a matter of regret that there is still a good deal of unwillingness to see its full significance. It is fashionable in some quarters to assert that "the benefit of absolution" is nothing more than a declaration of God's forgiveness, and, further, that

the priest, as God's minister, in no wise acts in the capacity of judge.

Such a view appears to us to be gravely inadequate. The fact surely is that it is precisely because the priest *is* a judge, and is known by the penitent to be such, that the way is made open for the full benefit of absolution. By the act of confession the penitent, who, if he is contrite, is *ex hypothesi* in a state of some mental uncertainty, submits his problem to the confessor. If the latter proceeds to pronounce the words of absolution, he then knows that he is, in the judgment of the priest, in a fit state to benefit by it. Apart from this knowledge, it is clear that he would receive the benefit of absolution with a doubtful mind, and consequently without faith. Let anybody who is in the habit of making use of this means of grace look into his heart and see if this is not the case. Then there follows the grace of absolution, which, put into the language of psychology, surely amounts (as we have seen) to the resolution of the transference, and the lifting of it up to God, through the power of the Holy Spirit, who is "comfort, life and fire of love." This is a task beyond the power of mortal man. Indeed, even in the power of God, it is more often than not a gradual rather than a sudden process. Hence we would urge the need in the majority of cases for regular and continued confession. Psychology endorses very fully the truth of the old saying, "Confession is good for the soul," although it may, from the nature of the case, know nothing about "the benefit of absolution."<sup>9</sup>

Before we pass on to the consideration of moral disease, there is need to mention one important warning, which modern psychology brings very clearly before us. The forgiveness of sin is not a way of *escape*. On the contrary, it consists in the holding fast to reality; it is sin itself in

<sup>9</sup> It is sometimes alleged that confession is harmful. Where this is the case, it is due to the bungling of inexperienced confessors, and not to confession as such. The same criticism might be made, with equal truth, of medicine and surgery.

all its forms which is an attempt to escape from the facts. Nevertheless, there has been a most persistent tendency in history to evade the truth in this respect, and in one way or another to confound the fact of forgiveness with the remission of the penalty. As is well known, this was the central abuse which roused the wrath of Luther in connexion with the sale of indulgences, which remitted the temporal penalty due to be paid in purgatory. Dr. Pullan has pointed out in his Bampton Lectures<sup>10</sup> that essentially the same mistake was made in connexion with the Methodist revival, where salvation from Hell was purchased by a specific variety of emotional experience, named "conversion." Indeed, it is not untrue to say that the average Protestant is no better and no worse than the average Catholic in that he has been more concerned to seek escape from the consequences of his sin, than from the sin itself. Psychology has exposed this fatal error from a new angle. It has revealed the innumerable evils which result from the attempt to run away from reality, leading as they do in the more serious cases to definite forms of insanity. In dealing with sinners, the pastor should be careful to teach that forgiveness is not an escape from reality, but that, on the contrary, it involves an acceptance of the truth about both oneself and God, which ultimately leads on in some form to that sternest of all realities, the Cross. In more senses than one this is the *crux* of the matter for the true appreciation of the meaning of forgiveness.

*Moral Disease.* Here the pastor may well find himself out of his depth. Nevertheless, it is a large matter if he has enough knowledge to "spot" cases, so that he may pass them on to some expert for treatment. There are, however, many cases which a well-instructed priest should be able to handle himself; and it is the more necessary that he should have as much knowledge on these matters as possible, since the number of available experts is at

<sup>10</sup> L. Pullan: *Religion since the Reformation*.

present lamentably few. We confine our attention to those abnormalities already discussed in Chapter VI and the Additional Note to Chapter V.

RECIDIVISM. Here it is a most important matter to be able to place your man. Hence, the value of distinguishing between different types of recidivist, as we have already done. The physiological recidivist is usually fairly easy to recognize, although there is some danger of confusing him with the acute psychological type. In the case of the physiological type, of which dipsomania and drug taking are obvious instances—it must be remembered that the case is by no means hopeless. Expert medical aid should be sought, and the pastor himself should endeavour to keep in touch with the patient, since moral and spiritual factors play an important part in such cases.

The acute psychological type may, at first sight, look like the physiological variety, but it is, in fact, fundamentally different, in that its cause and its continued existence are due to psychological factors. Kleptomania is a good instance. Here, again, expert medical aid must be sought.

Since both these types are beyond the capacity of anyone but the expert, it is a matter of prime importance to be able to distinguish them from the type which any capable priest should be able to help, and which we have called the “mild” psychological type, which is fortunately the commonest of the three. We, therefore, repeat what was said in Chapter VI, that the distinguishing mark is whether *at the moment of committing the act* the sinner recognizes it as sinful. If he does not, then it belongs to the mild type. We call it “mild,” not because it is comparatively harmless (which unfortunately it is not) because there is here more sin than moral disease, whereas in the other types there is more moral disease than sin. In dealing with such cases, as Prümmer reminds us, the priest should be mindful of the old saying, *Fortiter in re suaviter in modo*.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>11</sup> M. Prümmer: *Manuale Theologiae Moralis*, Vol. III, p. 313.

This type of recidivism may be due primarily either to evil habits, or to evil sentiments. Since the method of treatment in the two cases is somewhat different, it is worth while for the priest to try to find out which it is in any given instance. Gaume gives us some guidance as to how to answer this question, although, of course, he does not make use of the scientific distinction between habits and sentiments. He writes : " There is generally less malice in easy rapid acts, such as interior consent to thoughts of hatred or impurity, than in exterior acts, which for the most part require more deliberate acts of will. Again, among exterior acts, there is less malice in such as are the work of a moment, relapses into sins of the tongue, blasphemies, oaths, injurious words, than in those which take more time and allow a longer space for reflection ; such as drinking to intoxication, or using the hands for an unlawful purpose ; less malice in sinning alone than with another ; in being seduced than in seducing."<sup>12</sup> A consideration of the nature of the particular instance, together with a little judicious questioning, will often serve to elucidate this rather important practical distinction. In what follows, we shall, for the sake of convenience, assume that the priest has discovered in any given case under which heading the sinful acts fall, and accordingly we shall deal separately with the treatment of those which are due primarily to evil habits and of those which are due to evil sentiments.

First, those due to evil habits. Here the rules for the breaking of habits, as put forward many years ago by William James,<sup>13</sup> must be borne in mind. They may be summarized as follows : (1) The sinner must summon all possible aids on the side of the good, so as to make, if possible, a complete break with the past. Here the personal influence of the priest is an important factor, and should be

<sup>12</sup> E. B. Pusey's edition of the Abbé Gaume's *Manual for Confessors*, p. 288.

<sup>13</sup> See his *Principles of Psychology*, vol. i, chap. 4.

used to reinforce the penitent's will. (2) The sinner must be shown the danger of allowing a single exception to the resolution to break the bad habit. A single exception will undo the good gained by a long period of keeping straight just as a ball of string, which it has taken a long time to wind up, will unroll itself, if dropped, in a few seconds. (3) In severe cases, it may be necessary to adopt the "tapering off" policy, but whenever it seems to be possible the sinner should make a complete break. In this connexion it is worth while to observe that, if the penitent is an extravert, he will be able to stand more severe treatment without "crumpling up" than if he is an introvert; but he is more likely to backslide. If he is an introvert, on the other hand, he is less likely to backslide, but severe treatment may cause him to lose heart altogether and to give up the struggle.

Secondly, we come to recidivism due to evil sentiments. Here the trouble is obviously more deeply rooted, and consequently harder to tackle. In such cases, it is vitally important to recognize the danger of employing the methods for the breaking of bad habits. This may lead to grave disaster. What is to be done? In the first place, a very great deal depends upon the general attitude of the priest, which the penitent will be quick to discern, at any rate subconsciously. The pastor should never allow himself to give way to the very natural temptation to be impatient with such cases. He should remember that the mere fact that the penitent comes to him at all is of immense significance, and proves that there is at any rate a considerable part of him on the side of good. The significance of his coming should also be strongly emphasized to the penitent himself. It should be pointed out to him that it is a sign of the operation of grace in his heart, and an earnest of ultimate victory. Much may depend upon a wise adoption of this point of view. Further, the priest will impress upon the penitent in connexion with this that the conquest of his sin can be carried out only by the power of God, and that his



aim must be not so much to try harder as to trust harder. The inherent drawback in "trying" as a method of combating sin is that it inevitably concentrates the attention upon the evil to be overcome; consequently, it throws the sinner into the arms of his evil imaginations, in accordance with the Law of Reversed Effort. Trust in God, on the other hand, enables him to forget about the sin in the sure and certain anticipation of what, by God's grace, he is going to be. Thus is avoided the danger which S. Paul evidently had at the back of his mind when he contrasted works unfavourably with faith. He had "tried," and he could testify to the inadequacy of the method from bitter experience.

At every step the priest must give to the penitent the impression that he is quite confident of his ultimate victory. So much for the general treatment of such cases. In addition, there are certain detailed methods to be borne in mind.

(1) In the case of recidivists, there is often great value in short period resolutions. Gaume cites the case<sup>14</sup> of S. Bernard in dealing with a young man who had lapsed into habitual sins of impurity. He told him to go away for three days, during which he was to abstain from the sin, in honour of the Three Divine Persons of the Trinity. The penitent returned without having fallen. Then he sent him away for another three days, and then for another three days. At the end of the third period, the young man having avoided his sin, Bernard gave him absolution. This method will often be found helpful. It is a valuable instance of the "tapering off" method.

(2) There can be no doubt that in such cases confession immediately after a fall may be the right method of treatment. In this way, the back of the sinner is stiffened. Before such a method is adopted, however, the priest should feel fairly clear in his own mind that the sinner has a sufficiently strong desire to rid himself of the sin, and to put up a

<sup>14</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 280.

real fight ; otherwise, the last state of things may possibly be worse than the first, since repeated failure under such circumstances has a deadening effect upon the conscience.

(3) Much assistance can often be given by teaching the penitent to acquire the art of anticipating temptation, so that he can "nip it in the bud," before it has got hold of him. A little reflection will reveal the fact that enormously strong impulses can thus be strangled at birth, whereas if they had been allowed to grow they would have overpowered their victim.<sup>15</sup> Many recidivists fail, because they have never realized this most important point. They are continually taken by surprise in their temptation. Forewarned in such cases is forearmed.

SCRUPULOSITY. We have seen that scrupulosity is a form of morbidity akin to phobias. So those gifted with true insight divined even before the days of modern psychology. Thus Jeremy Taylor wrote : "Fear is the disease"<sup>16</sup> in such cases. And he shows a still greater degree of insight when he remarks that a scrupulous person is like a woman who is terrified of touching a frog, although she knows perfectly well that it cannot harm her. We are able to find a scientific basis for these gifted speculations when we say that scrupulosity is due to repression of fear—not fear in general, but fear of one's reputation in some form. Hence the self-righteousness of the scrupulous penitent, and his unwillingness to listen to his confessor. As Dr. Allers has put it, "At bottom it simply means, 'The confessor can say what he likes ; I am right.'"<sup>17</sup>

Now, since the root of this trouble lies in the lower or unconscious levels of the mind, a scruple cannot always be dealt with satisfactorily in the confessional. In an extreme case, a careful exploration should be undertaken by an expert in psychotherapy. The confessor should tell the

<sup>15</sup> See p. 41.

<sup>16</sup> *The Rule of Conscience*, Chap. 6, Rule 5.

<sup>17</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 356.

penitent this, and, if necessary, ask leave to make the necessary arrangements. So Prümmer advises. "*Si causa scrupulorum est pathologica qualitas corporalis, haec mediante bono et timorato medico eliminanda est.*"<sup>18</sup> This treatment will consist (in the words of a famous psychotherapist) "in clearing up the nature of the facts, in removal of erroneous notions dating from childhood, in frank discussion and treatment of the exaggerated ambition, and lastly, in isolating the patient's self-love from hyper-anxiety tendencies."<sup>19</sup>

In milder cases, however, the pastor can deal with the case himself, either in the confessional or out of it; preferably the former, for reasons which will appear in a moment. The first thing which the priest has to bear in mind is that the scrupulous invariably belong to the introvert type. Hence their need of very careful handling. Laxity is fatal, but, on the other hand, undue severity is almost as bad, since the penitent will become still further introverted as a result; in addition, he will probably go off to some other adviser. Broadly speaking, the remedy is to reinforce the non-fear energies of the *psyche* against the phobia, always remembering that the latter is a symptom of unconscious egoism. Hence the need for complete obedience. Since this depends upon authority, there is an obvious advantage in dealing with such cases in the confessional, which carries much prestige and authority with it. Obedience to God and to the confessor; this is what is required to strengthen by suggestion the forces which will resolve the conflict. That is why the priest should assert (with kindness) and not argue. He should emphasize the need for submission. In this way he undermines the unconscious egoism of the penitent. That egoism is deep seated in such cases is plain from the fact, to which Allers draws attention, that lack of love for one's neighbour is never a source of scruple! In the case of those who are

<sup>18</sup> *Op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 200.

<sup>19</sup> A. Adler: *Individual Psychology*, p. 207.

scrupulous over evil *thoughts*, it will sometimes relieve the situation to point out to them (what so many penitents fail to realize) that temptation is not the same thing as sin. Thoughts, however bad, are not sin unless we consent to them. In this connexion they may be referred to the account of our Lord's temptations in the Gospels, wherein it is clearly seen that He was tempted with evil thoughts, yet without sin.

The foregoing treatment applies to those who are scrupulous on some particular point. The generally scrupulous are in a somewhat different category. As we have said in a previous chapter, we may suspect the presence of sexual causes here.<sup>20</sup> Such persons should be encouraged to act with faith. In all cases of scrupulosity alike, we should bear in mind the wise counsel of Jeremy Taylor : " This is the right course in the matter of a scruple ; proceed to action."<sup>21</sup> *Solvitur ambulando* is a true saying in many of these cases. This is because action leads to extraversion, which is one of the fundamental needs of the scrupulous.

PATHOLOGICAL LYING. It has been already pointed out that the root of this is imagination or " phantasy " in some form. Animals do not lie because (so far as we can judge) they cannot harbour phantasies in the waking state. When lying is deliberate it is due to the conscious expression of phantasies ; when it is the unconscious expression of phantasies, we call it pathological. The most obvious symptom of the latter is that the lie seems to be disproportionate to the end in view ; in other words, there does not appear to be an adequate motive for it. It has been already shown that in the order of development of the child's mind the phantasy stage precedes the " reality " stage, when it learns to grasp the nature of facts as distinct from the creations of its own mind. The transition to this

<sup>20</sup> Especially in the case of women. They should be recommended to consult a competent physician.

<sup>21</sup> *Op. cit.*, Chap. 6, Rule 2.

stage usually takes place more or less gradually, beginning at about the age of seven. Lying, therefore, in a young child of eight or nine years *may* not be a very serious matter. False statements coming from such a child can, indeed, scarcely be said to be lies at all, if they lack the *voluntas falsum enuntiandi*. The same, to some extent, holds good with primitive, or savage, peoples, who are slow to distinguish between fact and phantasy. Dr. McDougall relates how he has more than once been informed by primitives that they have had conversations with animals, and that he began to think that all natives were appalling liars, until it suddenly dawned upon him that the distinction between fact and fancy had scarcely arisen in their minds.

In the case of civilized peoples, however, particularly with those who have been influenced by the ethical traditions of Judaism and of Christianity, such lying in adults can only be described as pathological. Extreme cases come under the heading of what is known to psychologists as "regression." That is to say, they are an unconscious return to an infantile state of mind, due to serious conflict owing either to some specific traumatic experience in the past or to a general lack of adjustment to outward circumstances. Cases of this kind can be handled only by the expert. In milder instances, however, the pastor can do much to help. He should bear in mind two broad principles in his treatment. First, lying of this description is due to introversion; it is a retreat from reality. Secondly, its root cause is self-love which refuses to face the facts of life, a refusal which is more or less unconscious, according to the precise degree of introversion.

This refusal, generally speaking, may spring from one of two causes. On the one hand, it may be due primarily to fear. To quote Allers again, "The first real lie is born of fear, and is almost without exception a lie to escape punishment."<sup>22</sup> The remedy here is to encourage the patient by

<sup>22</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 163.

means of suggestion (in conversation and otherwise) and to point him to the source of deliverance from all fear. Especially is such encouragement vitally important in dealing with a child. For, as Burt remarks, "children, like savages, feel that frankness and confidence are precious gifts, pledges of affection. . . . Veracity, therefore, is a thing to be wooed and courted, not a thing to be ordered and enforced."<sup>23</sup>

On the other hand, there is another cause of pathological lying, and that is excessive desire for pleasure—in particular the pleasure which springs from the exercise of power. It is most important to realize that successful lying is *power on the cheap*. In the case of lying of this description, much sterner treatment is demanded.<sup>24</sup> The penitent must be firmly shown the complete selfishness of such forms of activity, and gradually be brought to see the Christian ideal of self-sacrifice in its attractiveness and beauty. Further, he must be shown the futility and delusiveness of such cheaply gained power. It must be pointed out to him that there are no short cuts to any power which is really worth having. In short, he must be taught that there is no lasting power but that of God, and he may be reminded of the ancient wisdom of Gamaliel that it is merely stupid to attempt to fight against Him.

A further point to be remembered in dealing with such cases generally is that it is important to warn them of the danger of day-dreaming. This is a peril from which few of us are free, although a little of it is harmless enough for normal persons. Yet probably most people indulge in it to an undesirable extent, and it must, at all costs, be avoided by the type of persons we are at present considering. They

<sup>23</sup> Burt : *op. cit.* p. 395. It need hardly be said that under no circumstances whatever should a child be told anything which is not true; for, once the deception is discovered, the child's trust will almost certainly be forfeited.

<sup>24</sup> Though, of course, children require to be treated less severely than older persons. Yet, even when gentle, treatment should never be weak and hesitating. This is fatal.

should be warned straitly against it, and urged not to spend too much time alone. Advice should also be given them concerning the substitution of good thoughts for the vain wanderings of the imagination. Here is a grand opportunity for inculcating the value and necessity of ejaculatory prayer.

MASTURBATION. This is one of the most obstinate and difficult of evils to overcome. In dealing with this extreme moral nuisance (such seems to be the best way to describe it) the mean must be steered between two extremes. On the one hand, the pastor must avoid giving the impression that it is a very grave sin indeed ; on the other, he must equally avoid the suggestion that it is really hopeless (and unnecessary) for the penitent to expect to overcome it. To adopt the first extreme causes one of the most serious complications which arise in connexion with this particular vice, namely the fierce conflict between it and conscience. Moreover, this conflict is still further increased when the offender is told (what is admitted by all competent authorities to be false) that he is damaging his health by a moderate indulgence in this evil practice. To adopt the other extreme, is merely to encourage the appalling tendency to recidivism which exists in connexion with this sin. It is of the first importance to realize that some persons—either consciously or unconsciously—take refuge behind this evil habit to excuse themselves from the necessity of making any attempt to progress, whether morally or spiritually. Dr. Allers quotes a striking instance of this from his own experience.

“In conversing with a girl of about eighteen, who had sought advice on account of recurrent sexual offences, I chanced to mention S. Theresa. The girl admitted that one could be saintly even in these days, but, for her, being saintly meant being a great saint. To my question, ‘and if you could break yourself of your sexual habits, would you be a great saint to-morrow?’ she blushing answered, ‘Yes.’”<sup>25</sup>

The essence of right treatment here is to grasp the value

<sup>25</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 315.

of complete self-knowledge in this matter. A right understanding of the situation is half the battle. The offender must be shown that masturbation is not specially wicked beyond other sins, and yet he must somehow be made to see that it is quite definitely wrong, *not, however, because it is sexual, but because it is selfish.*<sup>26</sup> *Until he does see this, there is no hope of victory.* He must also be warned here against the subtle danger of rationalization. The masturbator only too easily deceives himself by thinking that indulgence in this vice is justified on the ground that it saves him from falling into graver sexual sin, or because it is necessary to relieve the sexual tension. The truth is that the result of this indulgence is merely to inflame the sexual desires still further, and to aggravate the trouble instead of relieving it. It does nothing really to relieve the tension, which is two-fold, physical and psychical. The physical tension will be relieved automatically by nature in sleep; he need not trouble himself about that. The psychical tension (which is the more serious), when it cannot find its normal outlet in married love, can be permanently relieved only by sublimation. Masturbation—at any rate in the case of a person living in a society which disapproves it—can do nothing to relieve it; on the contrary, it increases it.

The situation is further complicated by reason of the fact that the masturbatory act is frequently accompanied by self-centred phantasies. It is owing to the presence of these phantasies that masturbation, from the psychological point of view, is harmful. They minister to the sinner's egoism, conscious or unconscious, and they constitute a grave moral and spiritual peril. Until the sexual impulse which gives rise to them can be sublimated, the sin cannot be conquered. The essence, therefore, of any really satisfactory treatment is to enable the penitent so to order his manner of life that such a sublimation of self-love into the more absorbing love of God may be achieved.

<sup>26</sup> See the quotation from MacCurdy on p. 153.



Having explained on the foregoing lines the essential nature of this vice, the priest will then have to decide, if possible, whether the evil in any given case is based on a sentiment or merely on a habit. In order to settle this point, he will have to question the penitent as to whether he has any phantasies during the act. If he has strong phantasies, then it may be safely assumed to be a sentiment; if he has not (or, if they are weak and vague), then it is probably nothing more than a bad habit. In the former case the trouble is very obstinate, and difficult to tackle. It may be due to a definite homosexual perversion. We must leave the consideration of this possibility on one side, until we come to deal with the question of homosexuality. It may, however, arise from self-love, or auto-erotism, in the widest sense of the phrase. If this is so, the only chance of victory, as we have said, lies in the penitent being brought to realize this, since no treatment is likely to be successful until the root cause is removed. A right self-knowledge in the matter, accompanied by wise advice as to the circumstances conducive to sublimation, however, should by the grace of God ultimately lead to victory. It will, nevertheless, often prove a long and a bitter struggle, and, where it can be obtained, help from an expert psychotherapist will be of great assistance.<sup>27</sup>

When this vice springs merely from a bad habit, contracted almost haphazard in childhood,<sup>28</sup> as it is in so many instances, it is much easier to handle. In this case, the priest should boldly recommend the adoption of the methods for the breaking of habits—a policy which in the case of masturbation arising from a sentiment would probably fail disastrously. That is to say, he should insist upon a complete and sudden break with the past. Nevertheless, because this evil, even when hardly more than a bad habit, is terribly

<sup>27</sup> It should be borne in mind that the most hopeful time for tackling this evil is prior to puberty.

<sup>28</sup> It arises not infrequently, in the first instance, from physical irritation of the sex organs by unsuitable clothing.

strong, he should advise the penitent to make the resolution to break the habit, in the first instance, for a limited period (say a week or a month). At the end of this time, he should come back to the priest and renew his resolution for another similar period, and so on, gradually increasing the length of these periods, until the habit is finally broken. In this way, the strain will be greatly eased, and the penitent will be prevented from losing heart, should he by any mischance have a relapse.

In this last instance, the sinner will be able to make a fresh start without feeling utterly hopeless and disgraced, as he would have been likely to do if he had made and broken the resolution never to fall into the sin again. The priest will explain as carefully as he can to the penitent the great significance of not allowing a single exception, and he will cause him to appreciate the fact that every day he holds his own brings final victory steadily nearer. The priest will also take pains to discover what are the precise circumstances under which this temptation usually assails the penitent, and he will give him detailed guidance as to how to act under these circumstances. As Healy says, "The temptation frequently centres about some association ; it occurs at the same hour, or in the same place. The old associations should be broken up as much as possible."<sup>29</sup> There are three important principles to be observed in connexion with the giving of such guidance. First, there is the possibility (to which reference has already been made) of nipping the strongest tendencies in the bud, if they are tackled in time. The penitent must be clearly taught the significance of this, and shown the immense value of taking whatever steps may be necessary the very instant he perceives the temptation coming upon him. Secondly, it is often of great value, in dealing with this sin, as Jeremy Taylor pointed out, to run forth into the company of others. It thrives in solitude and is apt to diminish with society.

<sup>29</sup> *The Individual Delinquent*, p. 410.

Thirdly, some employment of the hands is a matter of very great value here.

Along such lines as these, then, the priest will give to the penitent detailed directions as to how to act in the face of temptation.<sup>30</sup> It is hardly necessary to add that he will constantly warn him against making the mistake (so fatally easy for an Englishman) of trusting, almost unconsciously it may be, in his own power. Above all, he will encourage the sinner by pointing out to him that this temptation really affords him a great spiritual opportunity. He should be encouraged to regard it as a kind of test case. If he wins a victory here, not only will this particular vice have been destroyed in him, but he will also have made considerable spiritual progress. More important still, the way will be open for still greater progress in the days to come. It is often a very great encouragement to the penitent if he can thus view his temptation against a wider background. There is a rather serious danger that, by becoming absorbed in the struggle with this sin, he may lose all true sense of proportion. If, however, the priest handles the case in some such way as we have suggested, the penitent's sexual desires (which, however difficult to control, are, it is necessary to insist, not in themselves evil) will find that higher satisfaction, which is known to psychologists as sublimation.

**SEXUAL INVERSION.** In dealing with this very difficult matter the greatest care must be taken to distinguish between true inversion and "bisexuality." It is usually possible to distinguish fairly easily between a bisexual and a genuine invert by finding out if the person concerned has ever felt the faintest stirrings of sexual desire in relation to the opposite sex. If so, then we may be sure that we are dealing with a case of bisexuality; even if not, however, we must

<sup>30</sup> This applies, of course, to cases where the vice is rooted in an evil sentiment also, but there they will only be a palliative, until the root cause is laid bare.

not jump to the conclusion that we have a case of true inversion. It is always possible that heterosexual tendencies may reveal themselves later, especially if we are dealing with a very young man or woman. A subsidiary consideration which throws light upon this question is that there is some evidence to suggest that among men, a strong attraction towards young boys is a characteristic of bisexuals rather than of inverts.

If it should turn out that the individual with whom the priest is dealing is a bisexual, the case is, on the whole, fairly straightforward. The penitent must understand his condition, and realize that it is one which he may hope to overcome, *provided that he is honest with himself*. The fatal mistake for him to make is to delude himself into thinking that his romantic attachments are nothing more than deep friendships. The priest must accordingly warn him against doing anything to stimulate his homosexual tendencies. In other words, he must urge him to avoid occasions of sin, and to seek what we have called "occasions of virtue," especially by cultivating the society of the opposite sex. If he is really anxious to get rid of his weakness, then true enlightenment, together with the grace of God, will frequently make a fresh adjustment possible. He must, however, be warned against trusting in his own power, for the saying, "Pride comes before a fall," is pre-eminently true here, since the very tendency to homosexuality in such cases is a form of auto-eroticism. If, however, a case proves to be stubborn, the priest should urge the person concerned to have recourse to an expert and trustworthy psychotherapist.

True inversion presents a very different problem. Here it is useless to recommend a person to seek association with the opposite sex; still more so, to urge him to get married. The first requirement in the priest is that he should show the invert that he understands his case. At all costs he should not manifest any kind of horror or repulsion towards an

invert. Such an attitude is both un-Christian and unscientific. The invert is no more responsible for his condition than if he had been born with a club foot. The horror which is popularly felt and even expressed against inverts is largely responsible for making them (what, as such, they are not) pathological, and sometimes leads them to run amok, on the principle that one might as well be hanged for a sheep as a lamb. The priest, therefore, will do his utmost to prevent the invert from thinking himself a moral degenerate or a "lonely victim of some obscure disorder."

What he needs most is sympathy. It should be carefully pointed out to him that there is nothing in his condition of which he need be ashamed, and, in fact, that, until and unless God wills him to be changed, it is his vocation to be an invert. He should be shown how his peculiar temperament affords him various opportunities of service which are denied to his more normal brethren. Inverts, it has been well said, occupy a position "in the middle of the road." This gives them a special advantage as advisers, and it is perhaps the secret of their undoubted gift of friendship which leads others naturally to turn to them for help. If the invert be a man, he should be shown that his position is not essentially different from that of many normally constituted women. For his real privation and trial is that he must cut the possibility of marriage out of his life; and this is the case with many normal, heterosexual women.

Secondly, the invert must be taught at all costs to be honest with himself, and not to blink the facts. The question at once arises, Is he to be given to understand that his case is incurable? This is a point on which there is some difference of opinion. But nothing but good can come from consulting a skilled and trustworthy psychotherapist. Even if his inversion remains, he will gain a deeper understanding of himself, which will greatly ease his difficulties. In most cases, however, financial considera-

tions will rule out this possibility. Under these circumstances, the priest will have to help him and to advise him as well as he can. Like others, the invert must avoid occasions of sin, and seek opportunities which will favour sublimation. For example, he can with some degree of safety (provided he is a decent fellow) undertake activities which bring him into touch with *large numbers* of males. There is safety in numbers here. In setting down the kind of advice which should be given by the priest to the invert, we cannot do better than quote again the experience of one who is himself an invert, and who has, by the grace of God, evidently found his vocation therein. Let us begin with his negative advice :

“Don’t commit to writing any admissions as to your inclinations ; don’t masquerade, on any occasion whatsoever, in women’s clothes, take female parts in theatrical performances, or use make-up ; don’t be too meticulous in the matter of your own clothes, or effect extremes in colour or cut ; don’t wear conspicuous rings, watches, cuff-links or other jewellery ; don’t allow your voice or intonation to display feminine inflection—cultivate a masculine tone and method of expression ; don’t stand with your hand on your hip, or walk mincingly ; don’t become identified with groups of inverts which form in every city ; don’t let it be noticed that you are bored by female society ; don’t persuade yourself into believing that love is the same thing as friendship ; don’t become involved in marked intimacies with men who are not of your own age or set ; don’t let your enthusiasm for particular male friends make you conspicuous in their eyes, or in the eyes of society ; don’t occupy yourself with work or pastimes which are distinctly feminine ; don’t, under any circumstances, compromise yourself by word or action with strangers.”<sup>31</sup>

His positive advice is as follows :

“Hold frank conversations with suitable persons, thereby avoiding mental repression ; encourage every symptom of sexual normalization ; cultivate self-esteem ; become deeply

<sup>31</sup> *The Invert*, p. 135.

engrossed in a congenial occupation or hobby; observe discretion and practise self-restraint."<sup>32</sup>

The same sort of advice, *mutatis mutandis*, may be given to women invert, although their condition is never so dangerous (for obvious physical reasons) as that of men in like circumstances.

*Physical Disease.* Bodily disease may be tackled primarily from one of three sides, the physical, the mental, and the spiritual. The medical man's approach is predominantly physical, the mind-curer's is predominantly mental, the pastor's is predominantly spiritual. In none of these cases, of course, is one method of approach necessarily exclusive of the others. Of the three, however, the most inclusive is clearly the pastor's, since, as a rule, the other two ignore the spiritual aspect, while he not only introduces it, but (if he knows his business) is not unmindful of the other two also. Broadly speaking, his method is to seek the health of the body *via* the health of the soul, as a by-product of the latter, and thus to make men "every whit whole."

There is a good deal of evidence to show that this is ultimately the only sound method of approach for the pastor to adopt. To aim directly at bodily health is to court failure, and to run the risk of the patient's becoming a hypochondriac; just as, to take a parallel case, the only sound way of securing happiness in life is to obtain it as a by-product. To aim directly at it is to miss it. Accordingly, the pastor must aim at nothing less than leading the patient to the knowledge and love of God, who is our first beginning and our last end. Even to seek the salvation of the soul is not sufficient.

We cannot here discuss the difficult theoretical question as to the relation between disease and evil. We take it for granted that the pastor is right in hoping and praying for

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 137.

the recovery of his sick folk, and that there is no Christian authority for the strange statement (based on still stranger exegesis) in the Prayer Book that God sends sickness. He clearly allows it, but we may not say that He sends it. Accordingly, we are right to pray directly and unhesitatingly for its removal. This point of view is unconsciously adopted by everybody who sends for a doctor when he is ill. If God has sent the sickness, and if he is not sure that it is God's will that he should recover, what right has he to send for the doctor, lest haply he should be fighting against God? To be consistent, if we are justified in calling in the aid of a doctor, we are also right in invoking with faith the far greater aid of the Heavenly Physician. Nor, in many cases, is this best done by merely saying, "Thy will be done." No doubt, if we understand what we are saying, this meets the case, but the phrase has quite the wrong associations in the average person's mind. It has almost become tantamount to the adoption of the policy of "grinning and bearing it." It can be rightly used only when it is firmly realized that we have no ground for saying that disease is the will of God, and when men have been brought to see that all the unpleasant associations which exist in their minds regarding the will of God are "blasphemous fables and dangerous deceits."

What, then, is to be the pastor's method of working? Whatever the solution of the ultimate philosophical problem, sin and disease are clearly not unconnected. For example, recovery is obviously retarded by such sins as anxiety, discontent, or anger. The first problem of the pastor, therefore, is to put the patient right with God. In other words, as we have said, he tackles the problem from the spiritual side. He must endeavour to point out to the sick person how these sins (and, therefore, why not others?) prevent him from recovering. It is a complete error to suppose that the call to repentance is harmful to the physical



condition of the patient. The reverse is true, although, of course, some tact and common sense are required of the pastor.

Once the patient is right with God, the priest has firm ground on which to plant his feet. The greatest dangers which beset "spiritual healing"<sup>33</sup> are obviated. These are two-fold. The first is the danger of raising false hopes of recovery in the mind of the patient. Where such hopes are raised, and recovery does not follow, bitterness and disillusionment arise in the minds of those *who have had nothing in view beyond their recovery*. But in the case of those who have put union with, and knowledge of, God first, and physical health second, there is no such danger. Even where the patient does not actually rise to such heights himself, if the priest has consistently put first things first, the danger is obviated. Secondly, an opposite danger is likely to arise where health *is* recovered. There is the danger that the patient will forget God, and that he will be no better than he was before the illness. Indeed, in such cases, he will be worse, for he will have wasted a great spiritual opportunity. In this connexion we must remember the old adage :

"The devil was sick, the devil a saint would be;  
The devil was well, the devil a saint was he."

If the disease is one which is directly or indirectly the outcome of the patient's moral failure in any form, then the importance of this method of procedure is even more obvious. Clearly, no cure can take place until this has been rectified. It is necessary that the sick person should hear the words, "Thy sins be forgiven thee," before he can hear the command "Arise and walk." In the case of moral disease, we have already seen that the psychotherapist realizes the

<sup>33</sup> Lest there should be any prejudice against this expression, it seems worth while to point out that any religious adjunct whatever to medical treatment (and on its purely medical side at that) comes under the heading of spiritual healing, which is simply the introduction of spiritual values into the curative art.

need for what he calls readjustment with reality, which, put into terms of religion, means reconciliation with God. It is too easily forgotten that this same readjustment is a vitally important factor in more specifically physical diseases.

Here the true pastor, who knows his job, has his opportunity. We have seen the importance of what is called the transference in dealing with moral disease. If we adopt the broad meaning of the transference, by which it is regarded as a species of suggestion, then it clearly has a place in the treatment of physical disease also. In other words, there is need for faith. But there is a big danger here, as in the case of moral disease. Everything depends upon the *quality* of the faith. There is a widespread tendency to suppose that all that really matters is its quantity. Thus, for example, some say roundly that it does not matter in what a person believes; whether it is the power of pink pills, or the power of Aesculapius, or the power of Christ, it is all one, so long as he has enough faith. This is a profound error. Everything depends ultimately upon the *object* of the faith, which in turn determines its quality. In order to avoid the dangers of mere suggestion, this faith must be in the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ.

It is a matter of great importance to realize this. The dangers of treatment by mere suggestion are very great. In some cases, it is quite easy to see this. For example, where the physical symptom is palpitation of the heart, it is possible to relieve it by direct suggestion. But if the heart is diseased, the last state may well be worse than the first. The patient, supposing himself to be better, will make too big an effort, and will suddenly collapse. The same disastrous result can sometimes be seen in the treatment of mental disease by mere suggestion. Professor Grensted cites a memorable case. A certain doctor by repeated suggestion cured a patient of the conviction that he was a dog. The cure was reported triumphantly with the appended

note, "Unfortunately he now believes that he is a water rat."<sup>34</sup>

It is supremely important to realize that even in those instances in which the ill effects of crude suggestion are not obvious, as they are in the instances we have cited, they nevertheless exist. This is the case in the spiritual realm especially, where, in fact, they are never visible or immediately obvious. It is only when the patient's faith, far removed from its cruder varieties, is fixed upon a right apprehension of God that no ill results can arise. In other words, the faith required must be an understanding faith, which does not shirk reality nor fly into the realm of selfish phantasy. It must be a faith which is grounded upon God, who is unselfish love, and which therefore itself works by selfless love.

Where the pastor has to deal with an urgent case, as for example, with pneumonia, clearly he has little time at his disposal, in which to give instruction along the foregoing lines; he will have to adopt very different methods from those which are appropriate in chronic or long drawn out illnesses. He will have to act first, and then, if the patient recovers, attempt to supply most of the teaching afterwards in the convalescent period. It is the lingering illnesses, however, which give him his greatest opportunity. He should attempt to give a systematic course of instruction in his ministrations, and so gradually to arouse in the patient the right kind of faith, which is able to remove mountains. He should at all costs avoid the haphazard visiting which consists in a more or less aimless piece of Bible reading and prayer, without any definite scheme of progress in his mind. In such cases, it is quite a good plan to work through the Apostles' Creed, for example, taking a small piece at each visit, thus giving the sick person an opportunity to think over it in between times. In this kind of way he may

<sup>34</sup> See L. W. Grensted: *op. cit.*, p. 117. His whole treatment of this question is most admirable and should be carefully studied.

well lead up to the laying on of hands, or to Holy Unction.

There is no difficulty whatever as a rule about the employment of the laying on of hands. All that is necessary is to explain to the patient how our Lord went about healing the sick, wherever He could find faith (and, after all, even the most ignorant as a rule know something of this) and that His power is still the same to-day as it was then. At the same time, it will be evident from what has been already said, that the priest will be at some pains to stir in the sick person the right kind of faith. He will attempt to arouse in him the desire to be a better man, and not to regard the relief of his sickness as the most important consideration of all. In bringing him to this state of mind, he will, as we have already suggested, point out to him the intimate connexion between sin and disease, and thus lead him to repentance. Once the right standpoint has been reached by the patient, then the priest can say to him, "Now I can promise you that, if you ask in faith, you will either get back your bodily health or something better, i.e., something which you yourself will recognize as the best." Then may follow a solemn laying on of hands.

In some cases, however, especially where the sick person is a devout communicant, the laying on of hands can take place at the first visit. And, in general, where the pastor takes care to give the right kind of instruction, not only to the sick, but also to the whole, in the regular course of his teaching in Church, his task is far simpler. Difficult and onerous as is the work of sick visiting, it is made infinitely harder than it need be because the clergy so seldom give clear and direct teaching on these matters in the ordinary course of their preaching.<sup>35</sup>

There can be little doubt that some persons are possessed

<sup>35</sup> The Parish Magazine also affords an excellent opportunity for the imparting of such teaching.

of a specific gift of "healing."<sup>36</sup> When such lay their hands on the sick, recovery is more rapid, and sometimes spectacular. Whatever be the ultimate explanation of this gift, it should surely be used more widely than it is. Like any other gift, it must be consecrated to God; otherwise, it may do harm instead of good. But there is nothing to be said for burying it in the ground, nor for being afraid to use it. Any priest may make use of the laying on of hands, and, in virtue of his office as the Church's representative, he may rely upon the co-operation of the Holy Spirit. Those clergy, however, who, having a specific natural gift of healing, use it for the glory of God may expect to see still greater works. Such priests need all the more to be on their guard against stirring up a false or shallow faith. Nevertheless, they have a very precious gift, which may be productive of immense spiritual results, if only they will use it aright.

Finally, a brief word may be said about the anointing of the sick. This ancient and Biblical custom, if it is properly explained, will arouse no prejudice even in the most Protestant quarters, so far as the experience of the writers goes.<sup>37</sup> But it must be carefully prepared for by repentance and confession in some form. The most satisfactory method is for absolution following upon a general confession to be given first, where the strength of the patient (and his prejudices) will allow. In that way there will be secured that right and living faith which will call down the fulness of the divine response.<sup>38</sup>

<sup>36</sup> *Cp.*, 1 *Cor.* xii, 9.

<sup>37</sup> One of whom has worked as a parish priest in Lancashire.

<sup>38</sup> On the question of Unction, reference may be made to P. Dearmer's excellent book, *Body and Soul*.

## CHAPTER VIII

### PREACHING

THERE are probably some who think that there is not likely to be much profit in the attempt to apply psychology to the question of preaching. It will be said that a man can either preach or he cannot, and there is an end of the matter. Although it is undeniably true that preaching, like many other human activities, is in some sense a gift, nevertheless the application of psychology to it has a twofold value. In the first place, it enables us to understand more fully the reasons why certain kinds of preaching are effective and others are not. In the second place, it brings within the reach of the average preacher truths which hitherto have only half-consciously been divined even by those who have been giants in the art.

In what respects, then, does psychology throw light upon the practice of preaching? First of all, let us consider the *method* of preaching. There are two psychological factors which may profitably be considered in this connexion, namely, suggestion and instinct. It will be convenient to deal with them separately.

It would probably be generally agreed that the work of the preacher is twofold. He has the task of conversion and the task of instruction. The former of these has always been recognized as containing emotional elements, but not so the latter. One of the important truths recently brought to light by psychology is the extent to which, even in what is usually considered a purely intellectual process, such as teaching, there is a powerful working of emotional forces also.

Let us, then, consider these two tasks in the light of what we have learnt from modern psychology about suggestion ; and first of all let us take conversion. This was one of the first religious experiences to be studied by psychologists, but they made the mistake of selecting their examples from a narrow circle of experience (American Protestantism) and this tended to give the impression that it was always of a sudden and strongly emotional variety. It is now recognized that, in point of fact, conversion is never, strictly speaking, sudden. It may *appear* to be sudden, or it may not, but in either case it is the result of a gradual working of forces in the unconscious. When it comes, if it is worthy of the name, it involves an orientation of the whole personality towards God. This is a matter in which the unconscious plays an important part ; and there is Biblical evidence which leads us to suppose that the sphere of the operation of the Holy Spirit is perhaps normally, and at any rate frequently, the unconscious.<sup>1</sup> In short, conversion is due to suggestion.

The same thing is in a large measure true of instruction, though usually this is scarcely recognized. The commonly accepted idea is that man is a reasoning animal, whose opinions are formed purely as a result of rational processes. This conception psychology has exploded. Long before we learn to think for ourselves we are forming our opinions. We receive them by suggestion, on some sort of authority ; it may be that of our parents, or our schoolmasters, or some friend. Whatever be the precise nature of the authority, it is always there. Later on, we discover that everyone is supposed to have some reason for his opinions, and so we begin to think for ourselves, but more often than not it is a thinking in chains ; our reason limps lamely behind our desires ; our opinions march boldly on in the strength, not of reason, but of the emotion under the influence of which they were first formed. To change the figure,

<sup>1</sup> See p. 22.

reason is used not to arrive at the truth, but to bolster up opinions already formed on authority. This habit of using the reason as a slave of the emotions is called by psychologists rationalization, a process to which reference has been made in previous chapters. It explains two things. First, it explains why it is that argument is only too often a waste of time. If our opponent's opinions (or our own) do not change when the reasons for them have been shown to be wrong, this is because they are not based primarily upon reason but on emotion, so that they can never be undermined by intellectual forces. "A man convinced against his will (i.e., his emotions) is of the same opinion still." Secondly, it explains why it is so hard to attain a state of intellectual honesty. For example, it is fatally easy when some new factor is presented to us in the course of an argument, to attempt to find reasons against it, on the spur of the moment, instead of taking time to weigh it as dispassionately as we can. Such a practice is simply a form of intellectual dishonesty, and one which is by no means rare in the history of theological controversy. In view of this there can be little doubt that emotion has a large part to play in the matter of instruction, as well as in that of conversion. In other words, suggestion plays its part in the former no less than in the latter.

It is plainly very important, therefore, that the preacher should have knowledge of the conditions underlying successful suggestion, since both the work of converting and the work of instructing are largely achieved by means of it. There are three factors which govern successful suggestion. They are (a) authority, (b) definiteness, (c) environment. Let us consider them.

(a) First of all, authority. It is important to bear in mind that authority is always emotionally founded even when it appears to be entirely reasonable. "Even in rational demonstration," writes Dr. Thouless in his *Introduction to the*



*Psychology of Religion*, "it seems probable that the conviction with which a proposition is received owes a great deal to suggestion over and above the influence of the perceived rigidity of its proof."<sup>2</sup> That is why a name works such wonders, and also why the kind of preaching which constantly uses the phrase, "the Church says," or some such expression, seldom produces conviction; for, in England at any rate, the idea of the Church is not one charged with strong emotional authority in the mind of the average person. Nor, as a general rule, are people inclined to accept the authority of the priest as such. When he has authority, it is much more likely to be that of a personal kind, and this is plainly a matter of emotion. Thus arises a tremendous danger which becomes greater with the outward success of the priest. It is the danger of attracting the people to himself rather than to our Lord; the final result of this is nearly always shipwreck of one kind or another. If he is to influence the opinions of the people to whom he ministers, there must pass from him to his hearers an emotional current which can bear on its bosom the various suggestions which he has to make. But unless this stream is that which flows from the side of the living Christ it can never really satisfy their souls. When we read of our Lord that "He spoke as one having authority and not as the Scribes," the primary meaning of this, no doubt, is that He spoke from the depths of His own experience, whereas the Scribes' religion was only second-hand. We may, however, perhaps divine a secondary meaning in this statement to the effect that in the case of our Lord there was an emotional contact between His hearers and Himself, based on the fact that He loved them, and that they knew intuitively that He loved them, while the Scribes, they felt, cared nothing for their souls. Hence they accepted His teaching readily, but the utterances of the Scribes left them cold and unmoved.

What psychology has to teach us on the nature of

<sup>2</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 25.

authority, therefore, should give the preacher furiously to think. For, in the first place, if his authority is to be really effective, people must like him. Unless, however, he can lead them past himself to the living Christ, the last state of affairs will be worse than the first. This is not to deny that in certain cases where his hearers are instructed, and understand something of the authority of the Church as the Body of Christ, much of this danger will be obviated. Yet it is never far away even then, and he will do well to guard against it. Once again, this conception of authority will impress the clergy with a grave sense of responsibility for what they teach. They will beware of being dogmatic without good reason, and of laying down the law on uncertain points. For if it should happen that they are "found out" subsequently by their hearers to have been teaching what will not stand the test of reason, their authority will be gone for ever; or, failing this, their hearers will stand by them rather than by the truth, which will be more disastrous still. The writers recently heard an interesting example of the latter kind of process in the case of a man who for some time had been making use of a certain quack medicine. He imagined himself to have been very considerably benefited by it, with the result that he had conceived an almost passionate affection for it, and had come to "swear by it," as the phrase is. When the time came for it to be exposed by the *Daily Mail*, he was furiously angry, and, instead of giving up the medicine, he gave up the *Daily Mail*!

(b) After authority, the next factor needed to make a successful suggestion is definiteness. It is essential that the preacher should be fully aware in his own mind as to what it is that he wishes to suggest. This may sound like a truism, but as applied to preaching, unfortunately, it is not. At the conclusion of not a few sermons, it would be difficult to improve upon the celebrated remark of the yokel, who, when asked what the sermon was about, replied: "Summat about summat." It has been said

that, unless one can put the main burden of a sermon on the back of a postage stamp, it is not likely to leave a permanent impression. There is much truth in this remark. This does not necessitate preaching in clear-cut formulae all the time. On the contrary, we may succeed better by a roundabout method, just as it is often wiser to make a flank, rather than a frontal, attack on a position. But the preacher must never fail to be absolutely certain in his own mind as to the position which he desires to capture, i.e., what the truth is which he wishes to impart. We may here remind ourselves of the story of the student who had just finished reading his first sermon to the Principal of his theological college. He was greeted by a prolonged silence, during which he became more and more uncomfortable. "It will do, won't it, Princeps?" the unfortunate man finally blurted out. "Do what?" came back the reply. Every preacher should stand to himself *in loco principis* in this matter. It is also well to remember that one of the essentials of suggestion is repetition: but in public speaking it must be repetition never recognized as such by the audience. This is a truth subconsciously divined by the greatest preachers. Nor should we forget that the unconscious mind (to which we are addressing ourselves when we make suggestions) thinks in picture language rather than by means of abstract thought; hence the well-known value of illustrations.

There is, however, a curious phenomenon to be noticed in this connexion, and that is the way in which certain people revel in the obscure. Such persons seem to prefer *not* to understand a sermon. Thus, one Yorkshireman who was a market-gardener, and who thought himself somewhat of a connoisseur of sermons, commented on a sermon preached by a clergyman known to us by saying that he heard all he said, but it was worth "nowt"; he understood it all. He went on to say that another parson not far off was "a real good preacher, and was a grammarian

by the big words he used." It was presumably the same standpoint which induced fifty men and women to take a course of lectures entitled, "Where dwells the I am." We may quote the following sentence as a specimen of these lectures: "Through involution we are carried back to the nativity or primary life through material form, which is the first expression of love through earth form or upon this earth plane."<sup>3</sup> The preacher will do well to avoid this method of collecting a congregation; *vox et praeterea nihil*.

(c) The third factor we have to consider is what for lack of a better term we may call environment. It is a well-known fact that when psychologists are using hypnotic methods they make the patient fix his gaze on a candle-flame or on some bright object, the effect of which is to fatigue the conscious attention and so to allow the unconscious mind to become uppermost. A condition of light hypnosis midway between the waking state and that of complete hypnosis is called the hypnoidal state. The environment of the church is, therefore, a factor not to be disregarded in thinking of the suggestible power of preaching. Probably most preachers would agree that it is easier to preach in a church than in a drill-hall. This difference is due to the influence of surroundings upon suggestibility. In this connexion Dr. Thouless writes again:

"I am convinced, too, that the unintended production of the hypnoidal state is present in religious services to a much greater extent than is commonly recognized by writers on the psychology of religion. . . . The prestige of the preacher is increased by the wearing of distinctive clothes. . . . A monotonous voice in the reading of the service, the rhythmical sound of the music, and the points of light produced by lighted candles,"<sup>4</sup>

all tell in the same direction. But, of course, he hastens to point out that he does not imply that this is the deliberate purpose underlying the use of these things. Nevertheless,

<sup>3</sup> Quoted by E. J. Swift: *op. cit.* p. 78.

<sup>4</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 24.

psychologically there can be no doubt as to their effect. This same effect is to some extent attained in Protestant worship by vigorous hymn singing and by the peculiar methods of revivals.

At this point it is necessary to say something on the subject of crowd psychology ; for one of the most striking characteristics of a crowd is its suggestibility. Now, psychologically speaking, not every concourse is a crowd. As Dr. McDougall has said, there is a huge concourse of people at the Mansion House in London each day, yet it is not what the psychologists mean by a crowd. If, however, a fire-engine were to dash suddenly through the midst, the attention of all eyes would be for a moment fixed on it, and it would to that extent become a true crowd. The characteristics of a crowd, according to McDougall, are the following : (1) It must have a common object of mental activity ; (2) it must have a common feeling-tone in regard to it ; (3) it must have some degree of reciprocal influence between the members of the group.

The reasons for the increased suggestibility of a crowd are largely obscure, but of the fact itself there can be no doubt. It has been supposed that it is to some extent at least due to the telepathic communication between the members composing the crowd. This may be the case, but what we know of telepathy suggests that it takes place only between persons who are in fairly close sympathy with each other. Another theory is that a crowd has a kind of collective consciousness, but this is a piece of pure speculation unsupported by any real evidence. McDougall inclines to the view that the characteristics of crowds are due to two things. First, in a crowd a person tends to lose a sense of his personality ; in a word, to be depersonalized. Secondly, and following closely upon this, he loses a sense of his responsibility, or, perhaps one should rather say, his critical faculty of independent judgment, and this makes him more open to the influence of suggestion. It is this lessening of

the power of the critical faculty which explains what is also undoubtedly a fact, and that is that the mental capacity of a crowd is not high. That is why the orator must rely on simple intellectual processes. To quote McDougall again,

“He must rely on abuse and ridicule of opponents, or unmeasured praise of friends; on flattery; on the *argumentum ad hominem*; on induction by simple enumeration; on obvious and superficial analogies; on the evocation of vivid representative imagery, on confident assertion and reiteration, and on a display of the coarser emotions.”<sup>5</sup>

What McDougall has said applies with more literal accuracy, no doubt, to a political crowd than to a congregation in church, but much of what he says is true of the latter also. To what extent any particular congregation exhibits the qualities of a psychological crowd will naturally vary greatly. During missions and in crowded congregations generally, especially in the evening, it will tend to approximate very closely to it—particularly perhaps when the folk are simple and untutored. Other congregations, such as a respectable Matins congregation, will hardly resemble it at all, and that is why it is so hard for the preacher to make an impression on such occasions. It is worth noting also in this connexion that the well-worn question as to whether sermons should be read or not can, in the light of psychology, be answered in only one way. *Ceteris paribus*, it is plain that they lose enormously by being read. For the power of suggestion necessitates for its operation a state of *rapport* between the speaker and the hearers, and this is to be maintained only by looking at the faces of the audience. A speaker of experience will in this way be able to “sense” the unconscious minds of his hearers and make his suggestions accordingly; while, of course, they on their side will become far more suggestible by seeing his face turned full upon them. Reading must be almost brilliant (to say nothing of the matter read) to make good the loss of all this.

<sup>5</sup> *The Group Mind*, p. 44.

Before leaving the subject of suggestion, there are two other things which are worth saying. The first is, that we need to recognise the existence of contra-suggestibility. This is the state of mind in which the hearer thinks or says the exact opposite of that which is put before him. He is what is called "contrary." Some people adopt this as a permanent attitude to life, in which case it is due to some repression. But anyone may be brought into this state of mind once we have "put his back up," as the phrase has it. Care to avoid this is necessary in preaching, or else nothing will be achieved. The difficulty is to steer a course between being too blunt in our suggestions and so producing this attitude in our hearers' minds, and being too vague and nebulous to suggest anything definite at all. Thus it is mere waste of time to talk of "the ministry of reconciliation" to the average congregation and expect them to receive any suggestion in favour of sacramental confession. The capacity for striking this happy mean is what is usually called "tact."

A second thing to be said is that we have to bear in mind that the danger of relying too much on mere suggestion in preaching is that it tends to make the hearers more suggestible generally. In other words, their characters will be weakened and they will tend to receive the suggestions of whatever environment may happen to dominate them at any particular moment. That is why the preacher should always try to give his suggestions a good support of solid reason, which will stiffen the backs of his hearers and enable them to stand fast in the faith. This was what Socrates meant when he distinguished between true knowledge, and "right opinions." These, he said, are like the statues of Daedalus, which, though they are very beautiful and true, run away, unless they are fastened by the tie of causes.<sup>6</sup> In other words, even true ideas are apt to have no permanence unless we know the reasons for them, and the *most* that suggestion can give is "right opinions." An almost perfect instance of

<sup>6</sup> Plato : *Meno*, 97c.

this is presented in a recent book, entitled *Ex-Jesuit*. The author was a Jesuit priest for some twenty years. In this book, which is auto-biographical, he shows how his religion grew out of attachment to his mother, who was a devout Roman Catholic. That is to say, it was based almost entirely on suggestion. Although Dr. Boyd Barrett, the writer, became a scholarly man, the real basis of his religion still remained emotional. The consequence was that when he quarrelled with the Jesuits, and left their Society, he ceased even to call himself a Christian.

Let us now turn to the other factor which we have set ourselves to consider under the *method* of preaching, namely, instinct. It will be remembered that on page 46 we named the following primary instincts: hunger (food-seeking), flight (fear), repulsion, curiosity, pugnacity, mating, parental, gregarious, acquisition, self-assertion, submission. We have seen that suggestion works through the unconscious, lower levels of the mind because it appeals to the primitive instincts. We have also said that our nature is emotional rather than intellectual. That is only another way of saying that our instincts guide us rather than our reason in the majority of cases.

The importance of all this for preaching is that instinct determines interest. It goes without saying, we suppose, that sermons must be interesting. If they do not interest people, it is impossible that they should influence them. And normally they are interesting only when in some way they can touch one of these springs of action which are called instincts. It is a great fallacy to suppose that it is novelty which primarily determines interest. There are some preachers who are ever casting round for some novelty for their sermons in order to make them interesting. It is quite unnecessary. So long as instincts are touched, novelty can go by the board. In simple proof of this we may note the popularity of the cinema theatres where the majority of the films, to judge by the advertisements, are for ever



harping on the sex instincts. That is only one example of a principle which is widespread in its operation. There is, of course, a kind of preaching which holds the interest by reason of its brilliant originality, but even here we shall find that its real appeal is due to its contact with the instinct of curiosity. It is, indeed, possible to arouse interest by appealing to men's sentiments rather than to their instincts, but by comparison this is a less satisfactory method, and that for two reasons. First, instinct has a broader appeal than sentiment, since all men have the same instincts, whereas their sentiments differ widely; and secondly, in appealing to instincts we are *ipso facto* appealing to the sentiments which are built upon them.

This appeal to the fundamental instincts will not be made most effectively, it is hardly necessary to say, if the preacher as he begins the preparation of his sermon says to himself: "Next Sunday morning I propose to deal with the instinct of self-preservation," and then proceeds to search for a text accordingly. He may rest assured that if he preaches the Gospel the text may be allowed to look after itself in this respect. But in outlining the *method* by which he is proposing to present his message he will do well to enquire how far it is calculated to arouse the fundamental instincts, and to modify his plan if it seems to fall short in that respect.

It is worth while in passing to analyse the nature of boredom. Boredom is a state of mind in which we are unable to express ourselves. All enjoyment involves some measure of self-expression; and even when we seem to be passive spectators, as at the theatre, we must ourselves live through the incidents of the play if we are to enjoy it. We must "enter into it" as the phrase goes. A play in which we cannot do that bores us.<sup>7</sup> In psychological language, boredom means a damming up of *libido* or psychic energy; and that is why sermons which are remote from

<sup>7</sup> Aristotle noticed this, for he shrewdly remarks that the audience in a theatre eats more sweets when the acting is bad. *Ethics*, 1175b.

the springs of our being are likely to bore us, because it is difficult for us to express ourselves through them. Whenever we hear the preacher echoing the feelings of our own hearts, we are able to express ourselves in and through his words, and then it is impossible for us to become bored.<sup>8</sup>

There is, however, in all this a great danger, namely that of sentimentality, a subject to which we had occasion to allude in Chapter I. We must, however, consider it now rather more in detail. In every normal and complete action, as we have seen, there are three parts. There is, first of all, a cognitive element. We recognize some object before our eyes. Then there is an affective or emotional one. We feel either pleased or sorry, even if in only a very mild kind of way. Lastly, we proceed to the action which follows from the emotional play which has taken place in our minds round the object in question. What happens with sentimental persons is this: their emotion, instead of growing into an action, sprouts on its own and runs to seed. In other words, they substitute an excess of emotion in the place of action. Now, the more we indulge our emotions in this way concerning any particular object, the harder it becomes for us to act. To use a different figure, our *libido* or psychic energy gets short-circuited on the emotional plane instead of issuing in useful action. When this happens, we have become sentimentalists, and such people find it very hard to act in a sensible way. This is the reason, for example, why flirts are usually the last to get married. They have been short-circuiting their sex emotions so persistently that they can never make up their minds to take a decisive step.

The application of all this to preaching is surely obvious and of great importance. There are certain persons who find much pleasure in listening to sermons, and who tell

<sup>8</sup> Inattention may, of course, be due to sheer mental fatigue. Hence the value, in sermons of any considerable length, of introducing some lighter passage or anecdote, in order to enable the hearers to relax the strain of their attention for a few moments. Gladstone did this in all his speeches.

the preacher how much they "enjoy" his discourses, but he cannot fail to notice that they do not apply them very much to their lives. What they have been doing is to substitute the enjoyment of sermons for the activity which they enjoin.<sup>9</sup> This is, as a rule, a quite unconscious process, but it is most common. It should warn the clergyman against stirring up too much emotion in his preaching, unless he can see that it has very obvious channels of activity in which to express itself.

In this connexion we cannot forebear to quote an eloquent passage from William James :

"Every time a resolve or a fine glow of feeling evaporates without bearing a practical fruit is worse than a chance lost ; it works so as positively to hinder future resolutions and emotions from taking the normal path of discharge. There is no more contemptible type of human character than that of the nerveless sentimentalist and dreamer, who spends his life in a weltering sea of sensibility and emotion, but who never does a manly concrete deed. Rousseau, inflaming all the mothers of France, by his eloquence, to follow Nature and nurse their babies themselves, while he sends his own children to the foundling hospital, is the classical example of what I mean. But everyone of us in his measure, whenever, after glowing for an abstractly formulated Good, he practically ignores some actual case, among the squalid 'other particulars' of which that same Good lurks disguised, treads straight on Rousseau's path. All Goods are disguised by the vulgarity of their concomitants, in this work-a-day world ; but woe to him who can only recognize them when he thinks them in their pure and abstract form ! The habit of excessive novel-reading and theatre-going will produce true monsters in this line. The weeping of a Russian lady over the fictitious personages in the play, while her coachman is freezing to death on his seat outside, is the sort of thing that everywhere happens on a less glaring scale. Even the habit of excessive indulgence in music, for those who are neither performers themselves nor musically gifted enough to take it in a purely

<sup>9</sup> They may also in a like manner substitute the *praise* of the sermon. Thus it has happened more than once that a sermon addressed to men on the subject of bad language has been praised in the most powerful, though unprintable, terms !

intellectual way, has probably a relaxing effect upon the character. One becomes filled with emotions which habitually pass without prompting to any deed, and so the inertly sentimental condition is kept up. The remedy would be, never to suffer one's self to have an emotion at a concert, without expressing it afterwards in *some* active way. Let the expression be the least thing in the world—speaking genially to one's aunt, or giving up one's seat in a horse-car, if nothing more heroic offers—but let it not fail to take place.”<sup>10</sup>

Sentimentality is surely one of the greatest hindrances with which we have to contend in the work of preaching. It is well to remind ourselves of the rebuke which our Lord meted out to the woman, whom Mr. S. C. Carpenter has truly called “a sentimental sermon taster,” when she came to our Lord after He had finished speaking and said, “Blessed is the womb which bare thee and the paps which thou hast sucked.” To which comes back the prompt reply: “Yea, rather, blessed are they that hear the word of God and keep it.” Moreover, we need to realize that it is not only the people in the pews who are assailed by this danger. The preacher himself is not free from it. It is quite possible for him unconsciously to allow the emotion which he himself experiences in preaching to act as a substitute for the actions which he recommends. This is not an altogether uncommon occurrence.

There are two practical methods which may be adopted as a remedy against the evils of sentimentalism. The first is to arrange for the Sunday evening service to be followed by a discussion based on the subject of the sermon. This is best carried out in the parish room wherever it is readily accessible. It is not necessary to enlarge upon the value of discussion here since this aspect of pastoral work falls under the subject matter of the next chapter. But we note it on account of its great value as a remedy against sentimentality. If the emotion and interest aroused by the sermon find an

<sup>10</sup> W. James: *Principles of Psychology*, Vol. I, pp. 125, 126.

outlet in this manner, no small success has been achieved; provided, of course, that the discussion is not merely argumentation.

Another practical remedy against mere emotionalism is to follow up the sermon by prayers lasting for five or ten minutes at the most—best conducted from the pulpit by the preacher himself. In this way some at least of the emotion aroused will be turned into the useful activity of prayer. For example, if the preacher has been discoursing upon some particular sin, he might follow it up by some prayers of self-examination upon it, and petitions for protection against it. Such prayers should, it is hardly necessary to say, be carefully prepared, as they will, in fact, provide the climax of the sermon. Again, a missionary sermon might suitably be followed by intercessions for missions. There is plainly a large and important field of spiritual activity here, and one which at present has hardly begun to be exploited. There are no sermon-subjects which cannot be turned into prayers in this way. At least, if there are any, there ought not to be.

Let us now turn from the *method* of preaching to its *matter*. We may remind ourselves once more of its two-fold purpose of conversion and instruction. To take the latter first, the matter of our teaching will, of course, be the Faith once for all delivered to the saints. It is interesting to note, therefore, how this intertwines itself with the fundamental instincts. We begin with the mystery of the Incarnation, where the parental instinct is immediately stirred. The whole of our Lord's hard and strenuous life, with His summons to follow Him, appeals to the instinct of pugnacity. Before the Cross we feel fear and self-abasement, while in the Resurrection we feel hope and self-assertion.<sup>11</sup> In the Church and the Saints we touch the

<sup>11</sup> In the psychological rather than the popular sense; psychologically it has nothing necessarily offensive about it; it signifies rather the desire to live and grow.

gregarious instinct : in the Holy Communion, hunger and thirst ; in the sacrament of Penance, both self-abasement and self-assertion in one. And yet, in spite of all this, it is quite possible to preach these great mysteries in such a way as to make them seem remote from those very instincts with which they are really so closely connected. Some preachers treat them in as inhuman a way as if they were discoursing upon *lepidoptera* ! Above all, of course, we preach Christ, who is Representative Man, as well as Incarnate Son of God, and in Him all our human instincts find their ultimate and their only satisfaction.

It is necessary, however, to remind ourselves once more that these fundamental instincts of our being to which such frequent reference has been made, are not only full of possibilities for good, but are also the cause of all our sin. It is easy to see, as Dr. Kirk has shown,<sup>12</sup> that each of the seven deadly or capital sins has its root in a primary instinct. Hunger and thirst are the source of gluttony ; pugnacity, of anger ; self-assertion, of pride ; sex, of lust ; acquisitiveness, of avarice ; while sloth (*ἀκηδία*) is the sin which results from the damming up of the emotion of any instinct. Envy alone of the root sins cannot be traced to any instinct, and yet it is not difficult to see how even this can be accounted for by a fairly simple combination of them. It is plain, therefore, that the appeal to them, though, as we have seen, it is inevitable if we are to arouse interest, is fraught with much danger. The right method of dealing with them is by means of sublimation. A certain amount of emotion will, of course, always find an outlet through the normal instinctive outlet, but in many cases there will not be much scope for this, because the conditions under which we live are so very different from those of primitive man, when everyone, it may be supposed, lived more or less simply in accordance with instinct. The work of education and development consists very largely just in this diverting

<sup>12</sup> K. E. Kirk : *Some Principles of Moral Theology*, pp. 266 ff.

of emotional force from a primitive outlet into one which, if we may use an ethical term in a psychological discussion, we may call "higher." And this sublimation is precisely what we do obtain by a simple presentation of the Faith. It does not attempt to crush out instincts, but rather it leads them to find expression in a contemplation and following of the fullest and completest way of life that we know.

In the light of this it is interesting to observe how our Lord in His teaching is constantly occupied in this process of sublimating primitive instincts. In fact, if we make an attempt to group His teaching round these same instincts, we get a by no means disproportionate conception of it. Thus, in response to the instinct of hunger, we have His intimate teaching about the Holy Communion. In response to gregariousness, there arises the whole conception of the Church and the Kingdom of God. Self-assertion and self-abasement find their meeting-place in His teaching on forgiveness, and in the crucial paradox: "Whosoever would save his life shall lose it; but whosoever shall lose his life for My sake the same shall save it."<sup>13</sup> Pugnacity is called out by the appeal to follow Him at all costs. The two sex instincts (the parental and the mating) find their sublimation in His tremendous claim to supersede all family relationships. There is not much insistence on the instinct of acquisitiveness, but nevertheless He did allow for it, and He sums it up in the brief saying, "Where your treasure is there will your heart be also." While, as for curiosity, one is impressed throughout by the reserve in His teaching, which we know stirred that instinct in the disciples. The same thing is true of his thought-provoking parables (so different from those of the Rabbis): these provided Him with His favourite method of teaching. It would not, we think, be inaccurate to say that this summary of our Lord's teaching along the line of the primary instincts does not

<sup>13</sup> *S. Luke ix, 24.*

leave out any vital element in it. In the most striking way He leads on from each of the primary instincts to Himself as the only ultimate source of satisfaction for it. He sublimates them all in His own Majestic Personality.

There is one other kind of preaching concerning which we have so far said hardly anything, and that is the preaching of repentance. We have spoken of the nature of authority in connexion with conversion in general, but the question of the preaching of repentance is of such first-rate importance that it is worth while to deal with it separately. It is convenient to divide the unrepentant into two classes; those who go regularly to church, and those who do not.

To begin with the type of unrepentant sinner whom we find in our churches. We must all have wondered how it can be possible for people to be regular in their reception of the sacraments, and yet for their heart and will not really to be orientated towards our Lord; in psychological language, for their religion to be a complex of habits rather than of sentiments. They are in fact hypocrites; for we have already seen how great a mistake it is to suppose that hypocrisy is necessarily or even usually conscious. There are two ways in which psychology throws light on these persons. In the first place, sentimentality, of which we have already spoken at length, is often at work. It is possible to sentimentalize everything in religion, even the Holy Communion itself. In like manner, we may sentimentalize the Cross instead of bearing it. We put it up in our churches; we hang crucifixes round our necks; we make the sign of the cross on our bodies. In each of these cases we *may* be mere sentimentalists. This is the psychological reason for the real danger which exists in connexion with externals in religion. But there is another reason which helps to account for the presence of unrepentant sinners among the ranks of regular communicants. It is the principle known to psychologists



as projection, of which we have already had occasion to speak. When a person is guilty of a certain failing or sin, there is always a tendency for him to "project" it upon other people, and having done so to condemn it roundly. By this means he obtains (still unconsciously of course) the cheap satisfaction of condemning his sins without condemning himself. This is the reason for the familiar fact that we always tend to be hardest on other people for the sins which are most glaring in ourselves.<sup>14</sup> Our Lord was pointing to this truth when He said "Judge not that ye be not judged," since by the judgments we habitually pass upon others we are really judging ourselves. If we consider certain individuals to be found in most congregations, we shall not fail to find one or both of these principles at work, and in any attempt to bring repentance home to these people the pastor should take careful note of them.

In the case of unrepentant sinners outside the Church, there is always a possibility, nay more a likelihood, that we shall find the principle of projection in evidence, but there is perhaps less chance of finding a habit of sentimentality in regard to religion. This means that, if during a mission we can get them into church, the appeal of the Cross, when it is made, is less likely to fail.

Of what kind then ought the preaching of repentance to be? It is admitted, of course, that it must ultimately be the work of the Holy Spirit, but the question the pastor has to face is whether he can best prepare for His working if his appeal is addressed chiefly to the emotions or to the intellect. The popularly received idea seems to be that it ought to be primarily emotional. But we have had occasion to notice the dangers connected with the stirring of emotion; and there is a deeper psychological objection. Attempts to awaken a strongly emotional sense of guilt are an appeal to the more primitive and infantile elements in our nature,

<sup>14</sup> Cp. p. 93.

and may often weaken rather than strengthen the soul and hinder its progress towards true autonomy.<sup>15</sup>

It is interesting to compare the methods of S. John Baptist and of our Lord in this matter. There can be no doubt that the preaching of the former must have been what is commonly called "powerful." We read that the whole city of Jerusalem, together with the whole countryside, went forth to hear him. Everyone accounted him as a prophet. And yet the effect of his preaching, so far as we can judge, was for the most part transitory. In marked contrast with this was the method of our Lord. In every case He shunned crowds and emotional displays. His chief work He evidently believed to lie in the quiet education of the Twelve. But he was not unconscious that in His Divine Cross there would be a supreme emotional appeal. "I, if I be lifted up, will draw all men unto Me." We may perhaps conclude from all this that there is a place for definitely emotional preaching of repentance, but there can be little doubt that from the point of view of psychology there is a great need for an increase of what we call teaching missions. Under these circumstances, with due observance of the right principles of successful teaching, we shall be gradually turning men's hearts towards the truth without incurring the very real dangers of encouraging a sentimental habit of mind, or of provoking the reaction which is apt to follow upon emotional preaching. By the aid of the Holy Spirit we shall gradually bring men to repentance by leading them to Him in whom all the desires of our being find their ultimate satisfaction.

There can be no doubt, however, that the sermon, like any other form of public speech, is gravely inadequate as a means of instruction, unless it is accompanied by other methods. There is a wealth of truth in the familiar story of the visiting preacher who delivered himself of an eloquent discourse to a country congregation on the proofs of the

<sup>15</sup> See L. W. Grensted : *op. cit.*, p. 146.

existence of God. At the close of the service, one of the churchwardens said to him, "That was a fine sermon, Mister, but for all you say I still believes in God." Complete failure to understand the preacher's meaning is unfortunately by no means a rare phenomenon. And even where there is some considerable measure of understanding, it frequently happens that the sermon is interpreted in flatly contradictory ways by different persons present. Professor E. J. Swift records an interesting example of this. A friend of his gave a lecture on mind-cures. The lecture was purely descriptive, giving the positions and beliefs of various schools of thought on the subject. At its close, a New Thought advocate, a metaphysical healer, and a Christian Scientist went to the platform to express their pleasure at finding the lecturer in their ranks. Yet, so far as he had expressed any opinion at all, his intention had been to show that suggestion was the common factor and operating cause in all mind-cures.<sup>16</sup> The reason for this strange phenomenon is that we naturally tend to hear that which we *desire* to hear; this desire, therefore, must be disciplined by serious study and thought. Our Lord was well aware of this when He said, "Take heed how ye hear." On the other hand, in one respect "hearing" of sermons is likely to have an advantage over the "hearing" of lectures, and the "hearing" of discussions. There is perhaps less danger of the hearer being in an "unspiritual" frame of mind in Church than in a lecture-room, for we must not forget, as Professor A. E. Taylor has recently reminded us, that "it is as easy to hear or read unspiritually as it is to receive a sacrament unspiritually."<sup>17</sup> Even accurate hearing, therefore, is not enough for the perception of spiritual truth.

<sup>16</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 16. Swift also reminds us of the very important fact that, generally speaking, we cannot follow a line of reasoning which is antagonistic to a strong emotional prejudice.

<sup>17</sup> *Op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 307.

It is a necessary conclusion from the considerations which have been brought before us in this chapter that, if the clergy are to be effective in teaching the Faith, they must not rely solely upon their preaching, however good it may be ; they must supplement it by other methods. To some of these methods we now turn our attention in the next chapter.

## CHAPTER IX

### TEACHING

MANY volumes have been written on the Psychology of Education ; dozens pour forth from the press every year. It is obvious that all we can attempt to do in this chapter is to select, from an immense mass of material, two or three topics which seem to illustrate most usefully, from the point of view of the teaching aspect of the pastoral office, the developments in educational theory and practice which have accrued from recent study of the mind. There is room, perhaps, even for so slight and superficial a treatment as this. No one who knows even a little of the methods of imparting "religious instruction" in schools—schools of every kind—can fail to be depressed at the reflection that on the whole, and in spite of some splendid exceptions (again, in every kind of school), the teaching of religion is still carried on by methods which have been discarded in the teaching of all "secular" subjects for many years. In hundreds of elementary schools and Sunday Schools it is still assumed that the only way to teach the Bible is to begin at the beginning—that is, with *Genesis* i, 1—with the beginners—that is, the infants' department. Children of nine and ten are still made to memorise things (e.g. the more difficult parts of the Catechism) which they have hardly begun to understand. Public School boys still use the *Acts of the Apostles*, not as the record of the beginnings of a Divine Sovereignty in human society which is still operative, but as a sort of A.B.C. to the travels of S. Paul.

The end and objective of Christian Education can be simply stated. It is consecration: the progressive surrender of the entire personality to the love, and worship, and service of God, through Jesus Christ, in the power of the Holy Spirit.<sup>1</sup> Everything that ministers to that end is, in the true sense, education. And a pastor's work is, simply, the education of souls: which means, not (as a dubious, popular etymology would lead us to suppose) the "drawing out" of anything—from anywhere—but the "growing," "nurture," "development" of fruit; the fruit of Christian character and devotion.

We are in this chapter directly concerned with only one of the instruments of education, namely with teaching, instruction, the development of knowledge, the growing of true ideas as to the character of God and His relations with men. But we must notice at the outset the inter-relation of knowledge with other aspects of Christian discipleship. It has often been pointed out that these aspects correspond to the three elements of which the psychologist sees every act to be compounded: cognition, affect, and conation. The Christian's knowledge about God is cognitive; his love, prayer and worship are also affective; and his service conative. Together these elements form a unity, which is preserved by a proper balance between them, and marred either by the neglect of any of them, or by the disproportionate development of one at the expense of the others. Thus, we are all familiar with the danger of theological knowledge (*about* God) which is not fortified and sweetened by that personal knowledge *of* God, which is the fruit of prayer and worship and the doing of His Will. On the other hand, it has to be remembered—and is so often forgotten, and even (at least implicitly) denied—that neither our worship nor our service will be what they might be unless they are based upon and related to a sound theology, which alone can keep us from idolatry—the acknowledgment (whether

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Plato: *Republic*, 401e.

in thought, or prayer, or conduct) of some other God than Him whom Jesus reveals. Someone has pointed out that nearly the last words of the New Testament to be written—"Little children, keep yourselves from idols"—contain the same warning as the First Commandment of the Old Dispensation. The deadly danger of idolatry; that is the "case" for regarding *teaching* as the Christian minister's primary task, together with the never-to-be-forgotten fact that our Lord's earthly ministry was primarily one of teaching: not the bare fact that He said, "Go ye and teach all nations."<sup>2</sup>

The aim of our teaching is knowledge—not mere information. It is possible to have the one without the other. To "know" the date of the Battle of Hastings is to be in possession of a certain piece of information, but not necessarily to have any "knowledge" of the meaning and significance of that event—which is the only thing about it that matters. Information can be attained by the mere process of swallowing: not so, knowledge. For that—the "knowledge that interprets what it draws"—mental digestion and assimilation are required. And if we were to name the aim and purpose which, more than any others, underlie the best educational practice of our time, it would be this: to ensure that what the pupil is getting from his teachers is knowledge, as distinct from information, and the desire and the capacity to grow in knowledge when the ties which bind him to his teachers are relaxed. To this end is directed, for example, all that emphasis on "self-expression" which is now so marked a feature in the teaching of children; its object being to ensure that what the child gets from books or teachers is coloured and moulded by his own mind before it is incorporated into his growing personality.

<sup>2</sup> It is a disturbing reflection that a large part of the only theology which thousands of English people ever hear—that of the Yellow Press—is idolatrous.

It is at the pre-adolescent stage that the child first becomes—as he remains—markedly more capable than hitherto of profiting by this kind of education. The recently published “Hadow Report” on the education of adolescents speaks of the years eleven *plus* to fifteen *plus* as “the age at which the powers of the rising generation are most susceptible of cultivation and sensitive of neglect.” And again :

“With the transition from childhood to adolescence, a boy or girl is often conscious of new powers and interests. If education is to act as a stimulus—if it is felt to be not merely the continuance of a routine, but a thing significant and inspiring—it must appeal to those interests and cultivate those powers. It must, in short, grow and expand with the growth of those for whom it is designed.”<sup>3</sup>

It is greatly to be regretted, in view of the fact that it is from the age of twelve or so onwards that the individual is most capable of the kind of knowledge described, that the Church has tended to concentrate her attention on the years prior to adolescence, and to neglect (comparatively speaking) the teaching of the “young person” and the adult. Precisely at the point, for example, at which it is vital that the educational principle summed up in the catchphrase “no impression without expression” should be stressed and developed, it is abandoned, and the religious education of most people, or at least of those whose “secular” schooling ends at fourteen, consists almost entirely of “impression” only, through sermons and the like. The limitations of the sermon as an instrument of education are obvious.<sup>4</sup> The teacher is here precluded, by convention and tradition, from doing anything but talk continuously for a period varying from twenty to fifty minutes, to an audience which has often been—or ought to have been—“on the stretch” mentally for perhaps

<sup>3</sup> *The Education of the Adolescent*, pp. 44, 75.

<sup>4</sup> The lecture, with no background of discussion or private reading by the members of the audiences, labours under the same disabilities.



an hour.<sup>5</sup> The students are ungraded either as to age or educable capacity : and they are given no encouragement—either by opportunities of discussion, or of asking questions, or of other forms of self-expression—in the direction of those assimilative, creative processes which we have noted as essential to any truly educational activity.<sup>6</sup>

We shall now draw attention to one or two of the principal features in the best present-day educational practice, and attempt to indicate their psychological justification.

We begin with the principle that our teaching should be “pupil-centred,” rather than “subject-centred.” We have learnt to think of the human *psyche* as a bundle of impulses, driving forces—the instincts, and to realize that these forces are called into action by appropriate stimuli. The task of education is the co-ordination of these impulses and emotions, and their unification into right sentiments : of Christian education, their incorporation into a Christ-sentiment which shall govern the whole life. Christ Himself, then, is the “stimulus” in response to which the developing personality must learn to expand. But this will only happen, in the case of any individual, if religion is presented in such a way as to appeal to *him* ; and here we have to remember two things. In the first place, as was pointed out in a former chapter, the instincts are inherited in differing degrees of strength by different people ; which means that their *dispositions*<sup>7</sup> vary. Secondly, different stages in the growth of the mind are marked, broadly speaking, and having regard to the normal majority, by their own particular characteristics. Thus, children between eight and eleven, and at adolescence, tend to be more active, independent and “creative” than between

<sup>5</sup> This objection has less force in the case of short “instructions” at a Sung Eucharist.

<sup>6</sup> Experiments in these directions should be warmly welcomed. Cp. p. 209.

<sup>7</sup> See p. 114.

eleven and the onset of puberty, a period in which they are mostly very suggestible and responsive to outside influences.

It may be objected that we cannot possibly take account of factors of this sort. Like the schoolmaster in his teaching of "secular" subjects, we have to deal with people in the mass. We cannot, for instance, apply tests of temperament and disposition to all the children in the Sunday School or Catechism and grade them according to the results. And of course this is true. Nevertheless, the best teacher is not the man who, seeing the utter remoteness of the ideal, makes no effort in its direction: and we should try to embody as far as we can the truth that different people require different treatment.

We can, for example, bearing in mind the great influence of friendship with older people on children of the age of twelve and thereabouts, their extreme suggestibility, and the immense importance of this period as a preparation for adolescence, make real efforts to know many of these children individually, getting them to think of us as friends with whom they can share their difficulties and their interests, and using any opportunities that may occur of directing along the right channels that real interest in theology which sometimes begins to manifest itself at this stage. We shall remember, in giving religious instruction to such children, their responsiveness to the implied suggestion that they have arrived at, or at least are on the threshold of, years of discretion, and may therefore reasonably be expected to do work which requires real thought and imagination of their own. If, for example, after a lesson on Jonah, we want to test their appreciation of it, we shall ask, "What was the new thing about God that Jonah learnt?" rather than "What swallowed whom? going to where? and why?"

This seems a suitable point to utter a protest against the waste of time involved in too many schools in "learning by heart." It is clear that a child can take no intelligent

interest in memorising a hymn, or a passage of Scripture, or a portion of the Church Catechism, of the meaning of which he is ignorant ; and one would think that the story (to quote one chestnut only out of hundreds illustrating the same point) of the child who was disappointed at not seeing "all the tinnamies" as well as the sea on his first visit to the coast would have put an end long ago to the futile practice referred to. Yet we have seen schools in which toddlers of eight were taught to recite things which must have been so much gibberish to them : we have met teachers who actually congratulated themselves that these children could assure the Diocesan Inspector that the inward grace of Baptism is "a death unto sin and a new birth unto righteousness ; for being by nature born in sin, etc., etc." The right principle surely is that understanding should precede memorization ; that a child should learn nothing by heart which has not first been explained to him. The contrary practice is sometimes defended by teachers on the ground that such memory-exercises, though meaningless when learnt, will "come back" to the mind at times of crisis in later life. Our own experience does not support this. We have not, for example, derived any help that we have been aware of, in the observance of Sunday as a day of worship, from knowing by heart the Commandment which enjoins Saturday as a day of complete inactivity ; nor are we sure that it would have been otherwise if we had memorized it in fancy.

The importance of "pupil-centredness," of having regard to the character and interests of the person in whom we are seeking to foster the growth of true ideas about God, rather than to our own interests, or to what we think (or even "the Church" thinks) the young thing *ought* to be interested in, finds its most obvious illustration in the case of the adolescent. The simultaneous *expansion*, both physical and psychical, which characterises adolescence throws great responsibilities on the teacher. We may note

one or two of the more obvious elements, on the psychical side, in this expansion. There is an intense curiosity, often manifesting itself in voracious reading, the boy or girl being daunted neither by the difficulty of a book nor the novelty of its subject, so long as it promises to provide fresh knowledge and experience. Alongside of this thirst for what is new comes a spirit of criticism of all that is "old," especially of the traditions and beliefs in which the adolescent has grown up. He is apt now to swallow unquestioningly the most iconoclastic views in religious matters. This is a period, too, of rapid aesthetic development: many a man can look back to his early teens as the time when he first came to have any appreciation of art or literature or music. These characteristics—the search for new experiences, and romanticism—are apt to be, with others—including, sometimes, a marked subjectivism and introspection—manifested at adolescence with an intensity and passion which may have found no expression in the child's life hitherto. Finally, this welter of new and uncoordinated impulses produces inevitable conflicts—between reason and imagination, between idealism and the grim facts of life, between conventional morality and new and only half-comprehended physical impulses.

The priest, then, who is concerned with teaching religion to adolescents will bear these and similar factors in mind, choosing those aspects of Christ and Christian truth which seem specially to appeal to them. The adolescent is "made," as it were, for teaching about the nature and history of the Church, the Body of Christ, and the individual Christian's heritage, privileges and powers for good or ill. A world-wide view of the meaning of the Gospel for to-day is the only one likely to make any appeal to him. His adventurousness, romanticism and enthusiasm often lack just that sense of a life-goal worth aiming at which is expressed in the ideal of the Kingdom of God. On the other hand, he will not take Christ for his leader, or the

Church for his spiritual home, or the Kingdom for his ideal, uncritically and without question : his head must be convinced as well as his heart. And very many clergy will bear witness to the extraordinary readiness with which most young people will respond to the attempt to put Christianity before them as a reasoned, intelligent view of life. Many of our difficulties in dealing with adolescents come from our forgetting the *conflicting* nature of their chief characteristics, and unknowingly basing our attitude towards them on one part only of their mental and spiritual make-up. Thus, for example, we are continually being told that the adolescent responds to leadership. That is an important truth, but one that must be balanced by the complementary fact, that he will insist on choosing his own leaders, and that *authority as such*, so far from appealing to him, offends his passionate sense for independence. The only authority he will respect is one which he can understand, and which asks for his co-operation rather than for his submission : he will be led, but not driven. On the other hand, we may make the opposite mistake, of building solely on the adolescent's intolerance of authority, forgetting his need of a guide.

It must be insisted that the much-debated "problem of the adolescent" is more than a question of "teaching," of presenting him with true ideas about God. The fundamental fact is that the adolescent is seeking—often without knowing it—precisely that which Christ alone can give ; not so much a satisfactory philosophy or interpretation of life (though these are included) as a satisfying way of living. But his judgment of Christ as "The Way" finds itself confronted by certain suspicions and uncertainties suggested by his own observation of Christ as reflected in the lives of many of the Christians he comes across. *Does Christianity foster, in practice, an "all-out" idealism, a remorseless and absorbing warfare against the really and obviously evil things in the world—war, cruelty, race-hatred, prostitu-*

tion, poverty, disease? Does it encourage, among its adherents, intellectual alertness and a passion to serve truth though the heavens fall? Does it make them more sensitive than other people to beauty in nature or in the creations of the spirit of man? These are the adolescent's doubts, none the less real for being largely inarticulate. It is trite but true to point out that they are never solved save when he *sees* them solved—in the lives of some at least of the Christians he knows (not merely in the lives of the Saints); when, with the thought of such people in his mind, he might say to our Lord Himself, "I had heard of Thee by the hearing of the ear; but now mine eye seeth Thee."

It is as a corollary of "pupil-centredness" that modern educationists emphasize the importance of *freedom*. New methods, such as the Dalton Plan, and the systems known in America as "Projects" and "Purposeful Activities," take as their starting-point the pupil's will to learn, rather than the teacher's will to teach, and it is clear that the will to learn is greatly increased if the pupil can be made to feel that he is co-operating in an activity which he has a real share in initiating and directing.

"Wholeness, synthesis, syncretism, integration, globalization, then, would seem to be the keywords of the new education view of mind: suggesting negatively, antagonism to any conception of human experience which over-emphasizes the constituent atoms, parts, elements, and neglects or denies the significance of the whole fact—thing, crystal, life, mind, spirit—in which the parts have their being. The opposition is really very old and very familiar. It is the opposition between the scientific way of approach to the universe, relying primarily on the method of analysis and classification for its mastery of natural and social conditions, and the aesthetic (religious, philosophical) way of approach which gets at reality by an intuitive participation in it. The new education having sprung up in a world movement of revolt against a scientifically based industrialism, which treats persons as it treats things, naturally has its affinities with the latter

rather than the former. And the faith in intuitive insights which give acquaintance with values that elude the analytic method, finds confirmation in the experience of the new schools where the child is set free for creative activity in music, art, poetry. Under these conditions, powers akin to those of genius, which the older education with its external, impersonal, analytical procedure never suspected, manifest themselves in the normal life of childhood in various forms of spiritual interest and activity.”<sup>8</sup>

No doubt it is true that in the hands of inefficient and uninterested teachers this emphasis on freedom and co-operation may be abused. Freedom may develop into licence instead of self-discipline, and co-operation degenerate into inaction on the part of both teacher and taught. In practice, some compromise between authority and freedom is inevitable. But in any case *abusus non tollit usum*, and there can be no doubt about two things. In the first place, the best results are obtained in schools in which “control” of the children by the teachers is reduced to a minimum, and the teachers have so far succeeded in getting inside the child’s mind and looking at the process of learning from his point of view that the acquisition of knowledge really appeals to him as something that he intensely desires. Secondly, individual freedom and self-discipline are clearly Christian ideals, no less than participation in the faith and worship of the Great Church. It is the teacher’s task to strike a balance

“somewhere between the two extremes of allowing freedom for the child to discover religion for himself, and of dictating to him what he should feel and believe, and how he should worship. The experience of the new education in other domains makes it certain that if there is vital religion in the communities in which a child grows up, and particularly in the home, and no attempt is made at premature instruction and training, the child will react to religion as he reacts to all spiritual experiences—according to the measure of his

<sup>8</sup> *Towards a New Education* (the Report of the 1929 Conference of the New Education Fellowship), pp. 350-1.

undeveloped powers, but freshly and spontaneously and personally. The important point is that religion is a way of life : and ways of life, in the words of the familiar tag, are ' caught ' rather than ' taught.' ”<sup>9</sup>

It is difficult to exaggerate the extent to which the religious education of grown-up people depends for its usefulness upon these twin principles of pupil-centredness and freedom. The Adult Religious Education Movement, which has developed rapidly in this country in recent years, has always stressed them. It is an essential feature of the Church Tutorial Class system, for example, that the subject to be studied shall be chosen by the students, and not settled for them by the vicar of the parish or by the person who is prepared to conduct the Class. In theory—though for obvious reasons it is not easy to translate this into practice—the Class also has a voice in the choice of a tutor. The C.T.C. Association insists, further, that a Class is not a series of lectures. A Class meeting may begin with a lecture—but it need not ; some of the best Classes never have a formal lecture at all, and in any case the most valuable part of the Class's activity consists in the reading, essay writing, and discussions of the members. The tutor's function is to guide and stimulate, not to spoonfeed.

Some reference to suggestion is inevitable here, though the subject has already been touched on in previous chapters. So much has been written about suggestion and suggestibility in recent years that no lengthy descriptions are necessary. Briefly, suggestibility is the mental factor which enables suggestion to operate, and we may accept McDougall's definition of suggestion :

“ a process of communication resulting in the acceptance with conviction of the communicated proposition in the absence of logical grounds for its acceptance.”<sup>10</sup>

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 237.

<sup>10</sup> *Social Psychology* (14th ed.), p. 97. Dr. Bernard Hart (*Psychopathology*, p. 27) notes further, the “ neglect or inhibition of ideas incompatible with the communicated idea.”



In considering this factor in connexion with children we should bear two further points in mind: that children are, on the whole, more suggestible than adults, and that the prestige of parent and teacher gives their suggestions a greatly added force; the latter being, in the language of the psychoanalysts, a "parent-surrogate."

The responsibility laid upon parents by the suggestibility of their children is obvious. How many children grow up with the idea of public worship as a poor substitute for other joys, because father and mother played golf or drove in the car if it was a fine day, and only went to church if it rained? What interior conflicts may not be born in a boy's mind when he realizes that the parents who urge him to be confirmed are themselves utterly neglectful of the Blessed Sacrament, which he has learnt, in his preparation classes, to think of as the highest privilege of full Churchmanship?

The teacher's opportunities, for good and evil, are second only to those of the child's parents. It is easy to say "how *not* to do it." Our lessons about prayer, for example, will go for very little if, at prayer-time, we are given to looking up the next hymn while we mechanically repeat a number of collects, or if by anything in our manner we give the impression that, after all, what we have assured the children is the highest activity of the human spirit does not mean very much to us.

The notion of God which the children come to hold will depend quite as much on our implications as on our positive teaching. Hence the importance of making it quite clear that our own idea of God is that manifested in the Lord Jesus. This is quite impossible, in dealing with young children, unless the amount of Old Testament material used is all but negligible in comparison with that drawn from the story of our Lord or the lives of His saints. If we must use Old Testament stories, no pains are wasted which are devoted to ensuring that the imperfections and

inadequacies of the Judaistic conception of God *become so clear to the children as not to require insisting upon*. Let us be careful not to give, either by teaching or by suggestion, ideas of God which will later on have to be corrected or abandoned if the developing mind is to attain to the truth about Him.

It is part of the teacher's task to eliminate fear from the child's mind. The causes of children's fears are of course manifold, varying with home conditions and their experience of life. Not infrequently, fear is due to inhibition of the child's impulses of self-expression, or to the fear of wrongdoing—and of consequent punishment—engendered by the expectation of grown-ups that *of course* he will be naughty, if he has the chance, unless he is prevented.

“It's funny how often they say to me, ‘Jane?  
Have you been a *good* girl?  
Have you been a *good* girl?’  
And when they have said it, they say it again,  
‘Have you been a *good* girl?’

“I go to a party, I go out to tea,  
I go to an aunt for a week at the sea,  
I come back from school or from playing a game;  
Wherever I come from, it's always the same:  
‘Well?

Have you been a *good* girl, Jane?’”<sup>11</sup>

Two points may be noticed in this connexion. In the first place, fear and curiosity, though they may strive together in the human mind, are ultimately incompatible: all ways, then, in which the teacher can encourage the child's instinct of curiosity will tend to lessen his opportunities of fear. Fear of animals will diminish as he is helped to find out the truth about them: how they live, what they look like, in what respects they resemble or differ from other animals, etc. Fear of wrongdoing comes,

<sup>11</sup> A. A. Milne. Cp. “Go and see what Tommy is doing, and tell him not to!”

as we have seen, from being expected to do wrong: let the teacher, then, expect the best; let him show surprise, not when Jane has been a good girl, but when she has not. Fear of God—and many children, alas, are afraid of God—comes from two causes: either from positive false teaching about Him, or from the cruelty or neglect or harshness of parents, a young child's projection of the faulty characteristics of his earthly father on to "our Heavenly Father" being very common, and only to be corrected slowly and with difficulty. Fear of this kind is to be overcome only by the child learning, from someone he can believe, and who evidently *knows*, to think of God as wholly loving and gentle and worthy of trust and confidence: and this, like other things, he will learn more surely from the psychological atmosphere which the teacher creates than from his explicit teaching about God.

Secondly, we may call attention to Dr. Valentine's suggestion<sup>12</sup> that reverence, expressed in worship, is the true sublimation—in modern life the only possible sublimation—of the emotion of fear: though it must be added that worship engaged in *with this object consciously in view* will not achieve it, since it would be egocentric and so cease to be worship. But the teacher who can help his children to believe in, and at prayer-times<sup>13</sup> to contemplate and adore, the Beauty and Holiness and Majesty of Him who is also their Father and best Friend, may be well assured that he is doing more than he could by any other means to rid them of the demon of fear. The case for "Church Schools," we may note in passing, lies less in the fact that they are places in which "definite religious instruction" is given, than in their relation to the parish church, and to the worshipping community of which they are an integral part.

<sup>12</sup> *Modern Psychology and the Validity of Religious Experience*, p. 113.

<sup>13</sup> Such times should always include short periods of silence—with little children of not more than a minute's duration—preceded by suggestions from the teacher as to the mental picture or idea upon which they are to concentrate.

Professor Hocking, in that great book *Human Nature and its Remaking*, says that the primary task of education is the "exposure" of the developing mind to the right stimuli—"to what is noble, generous and faith-provoking."<sup>14</sup> He dismisses the modern cant of asking what *right* we have, as parents and teachers, to choose these stimuli, by insisting on the rights of the children themselves.

"Children have rights which education is bound to respect. The first of these rights is *not* that they be left 'free' to choose their way of life, i.e., to make bricks without either straw or clay. Their first right is that they be offered something positive, the best the group has so far found. . . . The growing will has *no protection against starvation*."<sup>15</sup>

The section (on "Education") from which these words are taken is so profoundly true that we make no apology for quoting further. Professor Hocking strikes exactly the note on which we would wish to end our own reflections on the task of the Christian teacher, and indeed on the pastoral office as a whole.

"For the specifically human developments of instinct, the stimuli are commonly either non-existent or imperceptible except through the behaviour of other human beings who are actively responding to them. Of these, the principle holds that *no one can expose a child to that stimulus unless he himself appreciates it*. . . . It is especially with regard to those modes of interpreting instinct which constitute our moral and religious tradition that this principle becomes important. For no one can so much as present the meaning of an idea of this kind,—let us say of a particular way of meeting pain or injustice, a Spartan way, a Stoical way, or some other,—unless he himself finds satisfaction in that idea. And then it follows, since satisfaction and happiness are highly convincing states of mind (understanding by happiness not temperamental gaiety, but the subconscious and hence serious affirmation of

<sup>14</sup> Cp. Plato: *Republic*, 401b.

<sup>15</sup> Pp. 260-261.

life as a whole by the will as a whole),—it follows that children will tend to adopt the beliefs of those whom they instinctively recognize as happy; and of no others. . . . Ethics and religion must be removed from set courses of public instruction unless the believers are there; for mechanical teaching of these things is worse than none.”<sup>16</sup>

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 262–265.

# INDEX

- Absolution, 164, 168, 169  
*Acedia*, 101  
 Acts of faith, hope, love, 29, 33, 166  
 ADLER, 24, 99, 102, 128, 131, 134,  
     136, 176 n.  
 ADLERIAN SCHOOL, 98, 101 n.  
 Adolescence, 117, 223  
 Adolescent, 221, 224-227  
 Affect, 23, 29, 33-35, 128, 129, 207,  
     219  
 Affective Prayer, 32, 33  
 Alcoholism, 139  
 ALLERS, 62, 100, 101 n., 131 n.,  
     152 n., 175, 176, 178, 180  
 ALLIER, 24  
 Alternating personality, 144  
 Amnesia, 145  
 ANGLES, 77 n.  
 ANSELM, Saint, 89  
 Anxiety neurosis, 149  
 Apperceptive system, 84  
 ARISTOTLE, 30 n., 49, 52, 53, 128 n.,  
     140, 206 n.  
 AUGUSTINE, Saint, 31  
 Authority, 196-199, 213, 226  
 Autognosis, 43  
 Auto-hypnosis, 38, 39  
 Auto-suggestion, 18-20, 32  
  
 BALMFORTH, 18 n.  
 BARRETT, 205  
 BAUDOUIN, 28 n., 38  
 Beatific Vision, 37  
 Beatitudes, 66 n.  
 Behaviour pattern, 24  
 Behaviourists, 21, 127, 136  
 BERGSON, 136  
 BERMAN, 126 n.  
 BERNARD, Saint, 174  
 BICKNELL, 138 n.  
 Bi-sexuality, 132, 184, 185  
 Boredom, 73, 206  
 BOSSUET, 37  
 BROWN, 41, 43, 52, 167  
  
 BUCHMANISM, 112  
 BURT, 127, 128, 131, 138, 151, 179  
 BUTLER, 62  
  
 CAESAR, 133 n.  
 CARPENTER, 209  
 CATHERINE OF GENOA, Saint, 43, 72  
 CATHERINE OF SIENA, Saint, 72  
 CHALMERS, 163  
 Character, 119, 122, 126  
 CHESTERTON, 59  
 Church Tutorial Class, 229  
 Cognition, 23, 37 n., 207, 219  
 COLERIDGE, 40  
 Compensation, 99, 100, 151  
 Complex, 92, 93, 147  
 Conation, 23, 36, 219  
 Concentration, 86  
 Conflict, mental, 128, 153, 180, 225,  
     230  
 Contemplation, 37  
 Contention, 38  
 Contra-suggestibility, 204  
 Conversion, 60, 98, 170, 195-197,  
     210, 213  
 CORRIE, 109 n.  
 COUÉ, 17, 28  
 Cross, the, 19, 20, 164, 170, 213-215  
 Crowd psychology, 202-203  
  
 DALTON PLAN, 227  
 DARWIN, 83, 88  
 DAVID, 44  
 DAVIES, HUDSON, 71, 80 n.  
 DEARMER, 194  
 Definiteness, 199-201  
 Deflection, 163, 167  
 Dementia praecox, 114-117  
 Depression, 96  
 Desires, 31, 32, 36  
 Determinism, 136  
 DEWEY, 82  
 Director, spiritual, 62, 101  
 Discipline, of mind, 82-84

- Disposition, 46, 47, 114, 122, 222, 223  
 Dissociation, 118, 125, 126, 143, 144  
 Distractions, 23-26  
 Divine Office, 32, 93  
 Dreams, 60  
 Drug-addiction, 139  
  
 Egocentric thought, 24-26  
 ELLIS, HAVELOCK, 132 n., 133, 134, 135  
 Emotion, 47, 197, 198, 207, 214  
 Endocrine glands, 99, 124, 125, 126 n.  
 Environment, 72, 79, 80, 98, 127-129, 201-203  
 Exhibitionism, 104, 130  
 Ex-KAISER, 54  
 Extravert, 108-118, 125, 126, 143, 173  
  
 Faith in God, 15-20, 29, 30, 191-194  
 Fatigue, 72-76, 207 n.  
 Feeling, 33, 110-113  
 Food, 72, 80-82  
 Forgetfulness, 56, 85, 86  
 Forgiveness, 155, 170  
 FOX, 86 n.  
 FRANCIS OF ASSISI, Saint, 29, 72, 119 n.  
 FRANCIS OF SALES, Saint, 32, 35  
 Freedom, 227, 228  
 FREUD, 19, 42 n., 85, 98, 104, 128, 129, 131, 134, 135, 136, 148, 149, 151 n., 162, 167  
 FROST, BEDE, 27 n.  
  
 GALEN, 107  
 GALTON, 42  
 GAUME, 172, 174  
 GILLESPIE, 115 n., 117 n., 126 n.  
 GLADSTONE, 207 n.  
 GRENSTED, 37 n., 137 n., 155 n., 161, 191, 192 n.  
  
 Habit, 49-52, 60, 63, 66, 118, 142, 143, 165, 166, 172, 173, 182, 183  
 HADFIELD, 76, 139  
 HART, 229  
 HEALY, 138, 151 n., 183  
 HENDERSON, 115 n., 117 n., 126 n.  
 Heredity, 114, 122-124, 135, 137, 138  
 Heterosexuality, 128, 129, 132, 134, 135  
  
 HIPPOCRATES, 117 n.  
 HOBBS, 22, 82  
 HOCKING, 233  
 HODGSON, 101 n.  
 HOLY SPIRIT, 22, 36, 38, 87, 102, 154, 169, 194, 196, 214, 219  
 Holy Unction, 193, 194  
 Homosexuality, 93 n., 125, 128-135, 154 n., 182, 185  
 HOSEA, 31  
 HUDSON, 21 n.  
 Human nature, 45, 46  
 HUVELIN, Abbé, 119 n.  
 Hypersensitiveness, 102  
 Hypnosis, 201  
 Hysteria, 114, 118, 126, 144, 149-151  
  
 Ideal, the, 159, 162, 167  
 Idolatry, 219, 220  
 Imagery, 27  
 Imagination, 28, 225  
 Industrial psychology, 69, 91  
 Inspiration, 88-90  
 Instinctive level of mind, 15  
 Instincts, 28, 30, 44-48, 52, 55, 122, 126, 163, 195, 205, 210-212, 222, 223  
 Instruction, 192-197, 210, 215, 216, 218-234  
 Intellect, 29, 52, 214  
 Introspection, 40, 41, 58 n.  
 Introversion, 178  
 Introvert, 41, 60, 108, 118, 125, 126, 131, 149, 173, 176  
 Intuition, 37, 38, 110, 111  
 Inversion, 132-135, 184-188  
 ISAIAH, 36 n., 89 n.  
  
 JAMES, 50, 89, 132, 208  
 JAMES-LANGE theory, 15 n.  
 JEREMIAH, 45  
 JOHN BAPTIST, Saint, 215  
 JOHN OF DAMASCUS, Saint, 13  
 JOHN OF THE CROSS, Saint, 32  
 JULIAN, Mother, 94  
 JUNG, 14, 99 n., 108-111, 128, 136, 147 n.  
  
 KIRK, 32 n., 35 n.  
 Kleptomania, 141, 142, 211  
 KNOX, 20 n.  
  
 Laying on of hands, 193, 194  
 LEONARDO DA VINCI, 133 n.

- LOMBROSO, 138  
 LOVEDAY, 85  
 Lunatics, 59  
 LUTHER, 36, 170  
 Lying, 131  
   — pathological, 149-152, 177-180  
  
 MACCURDY, 153 n., 181 n.  
 MAGGIORA, 73  
 MALINOWSKI, 153 n.  
 Manic depressive insanity, 146 n.  
 MARCHANT, 88  
 Masochism, 20  
 Masturbation, 130, 131, 152-154,  
   159, 180-184  
 McDUGALL, 21 n., 36 n., 41, 45,  
   46, 50, 94, 100, 114, 115, 118,  
   125, 126 n., 128 n., 135 n., 144,  
   145, 147 n., 148, 162, 178, 202,  
   203, 229  
 Meditation, 23-30  
 Memorization, 224  
 Memory, 41, 84-86  
 MENDELIAN LAWS, 123  
 Method, 72, 76-79  
 MICHAELANGELO, 133 n.  
 MILLER, 129 n.  
 MILNE, 152 n., 231 n.  
 MITCHELL, 144 n.  
 Mood, 118  
 MOSES, 73 n.  
 Mother-fixation, 134, 154  
 MYERS, 69, 79  
  
 NAPOLEON, 59  
 Need, 19  
 Nervous breakdown, 42  
 Neurasthenia, 114, 115, 154  
 Neurosis, 99, 118  
 Neuroticism, 43, 110  
 NEWMAN, 119 n.  
 NIETZSCHE, 41  
  
 Oedipus-complex, 134  
 Organ-inferiority, 131  
  
 PAGET, 101  
 Paranoia, 151 n.  
 PAUL, Saint, 22, 46, 66 n., 72, 89,  
   136, 140, 141, 163, 174  
 PAVLOV, 81, 123 n.  
 Pentecost, 22  
 Perversion, 46, 132, 152, 153, 161  
  
 Phantasy, 18-20, 35, 44, 45, 117,  
   149, 177, 178, 181  
 Pharisaism, 97  
 Pharisees, 17, 51  
 Phobias, 147, 148, 175, 176  
 Physical disease, 188-194  
 PIAGET, 25  
 PLATO, 61, 89, 204 n., 219 n., 233 n.  
 Pleasure, 33-35  
 POINCARÉ, 89  
 POULAIN, 32 n., 37  
 Prayer, 13, 14, 17, 40, 95, 96, 210,  
   219, 230  
   — ejaculatory, 180  
   — mental, 20, 21, 32  
   — of affection, 23-32  
   — of simplicity, 23, 37-39  
   — vocal, 20, 31, 37 n.  
 Prejudice, 82  
 Pride, 92, 96  
 PRINCE, MORTON, 144 n.  
 Projection, 18 n., 44, 214, 232  
 Projects, 227  
 PRÜMMER, 171, 176  
 PULLAN, 170  
 PUSEY, 172  
  
 Quietism, 38 n.  
  
 Rationalization, 44, 97, 98, 130, 181,  
   197  
 READ, 152 n.  
 Reason, 196, 197, 204  
 Recidivism, 140-146, 159, 171-175,  
   180  
 Regeneration, 100  
 Regression, 154, 178, 225  
 Repentance, 213-215  
 Repression, 42-44, 130, 147, 153,  
   154, 162, 163, 167, 175, 188  
 Resistance, 42  
 Resolution, 30  
 Reversed Effort, Law of, 28, 87, 174  
 RIVERS, 75  
 ROBINSON, FORBES, 40  
 Rosary, 37  
 ROUSSEAU, 51 n.  
 RUSILLON, 24  
  
 SANDIFORD, 80 n.  
 Scrupulosity, 146-149, 175-177  
 Self-assertion, 63, 64, 100  
 Self-control, 162, 163  
 Self-deception, 43-45, 58, 62, 97



- Self-discipline, 228  
 Self-examination, 41, 54-60, 63-65  
 Self-pity, 102, 103  
 Sensation, 110, 111  
 Sentiment, 30, 47-49, 51, 52, 55-57, 60, 63, 66, 118, 142, 143, 161, 163-166, 172, 173, 182, 206, 213, 222  
   — master, 53, 65, 66, 94, 122, 146  
   — of self-regard, 94-97, 101, 146, 147  
 Sentiments of Christ, 61  
 Sentimentality, 207-210, 213-215  
 Sexual invert, 132-135  
 SHAND, 47  
 Sin, 56, 92, 102, 136-156, 161-183, 189-193, 211  
   — original, 137  
 SOCRATES, 40, 204  
 STEVENSON, 53  
 STOUT, 86  
 STREETER, 76 n., 89  
 Subconscious thought, 21, 28, 36, 38  
 Sublimation, 133, 163, 167, 181, 182, 184, 187, 211, 212, 232  
 Suggestibility, 223, 229, 230  
 Suggestion, 142, 143, 191, 192, 195-205, 229, 230  
 SWIFT, 50, 71, 82 n., 201 n., 216  
 Synapses, 126  
  
 TAYLOR, A. E., 84 n., 124, 216  
 TAYLOR, JEREMY, 40, 175, 177, 183  
 Telepathy, 202  
 Temper, 118  
 Temperament, 44, 108, 113, 114, 122, 126, 132, 223  
  
 TEMPLE, F., 137 n.  
 TEMPLE, W., 96  
 TERESA, Saint, 16, 40, 45, 72  
 Theo-hypnosis, 39  
 Thinking, 110, 112  
 THOMAS AQUINAS, Saint, 13, 31, 101  
 THOMPSON, 81 n.  
 THORNDIKE, 75  
 THOULESS, 38, 86 n., 133 n., 197, 201  
 Transference, 155, 167, 169, 191  
  
 Unconscious, racial, 18 n.  
 Uplift, 35, 36  
  
 VALENTINE, 232 n.  
 Vanity, 92, 93  
 VERNON, 74, 121  
 Vicaritis, 97, 99  
 VIRGIL, 133 n.  
 Vocation, 103, 122  
 Vocational guidance, 119  
 Vocational selection, 119  
 VON HÜGEL, 52, 72, 119 n.  
  
 WAGNER, 133 n.  
 WALLACE, 88  
 WARD, 33 n.  
 WATSON, 21 n.  
 WEISSMANN, 123  
 Will to power, 98, 99, 101, 131, 135  
 WILLIAMS, 138 n.  
 Worship, 37, 95, 230, 232  
 WYATT, 74, 137 n.  
  
 ZOLA, 27



BV  
4012  
.D5

Dewar

1135959

Psychology for religious workers.

APR 27 '33

H. L. Hutchings  
J. Leach, Otago, Ia

MUL 30 '33

OCT 8 '33

By Cannon  
J. Whitch

DEC 19 '33

OCT 20 '41

R. J. VanBoskirk

JAN 6 '44

MAY 22 1944

Thompson  
Newirth

MAY 12 1944

Carrie Wallace  
Sam Wallace

Oct 7 '50

Oct 21 1953

JAN 25 1968

Morgan

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO  
LIBRARY



11 587 125

BV  
4012  
.D5

1125959

SWIFT HALL LIBRARY

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO  
LIBRARY



11 587 125